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HQ TransÉnergie Response To Blackouts or Catastrophic Events

HQ TransÉnergie Response To Blackouts or Catastrophic Events. Jean-Marie Gagnon Manager Interconnected Networks Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie October 3rd, 2003 IEEE Centennial Panel, Toronto. Typical Response. Power Market Week (September 15th)

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HQ TransÉnergie Response To Blackouts or Catastrophic Events

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  1. HQ TransÉnergie Response To Blackouts or Catastrophic Events Jean-Marie Gagnon Manager Interconnected Networks Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie October 3rd, 2003 IEEE Centennial Panel, Toronto

  2. Typical Response Power Market Week (September 15th) What will have happen if the August 14th blackout will have lasted a week or two and not just a day? The author suggests three typical responses: Political: call for greater oversight and standardisation Market: less regulation and market force Technical: determine what failed and technical steps so it will not happen again

  3. To be covered • Key data about HQ system • Impact of August 14th Blackout on HQ system • Actions following HQ blackouts • HQ Defence Plan • HQ 1998 Ice Storm • Concluding remarks

  4. CDN$ (millions) Assets 18 259 Revenue 3 027 Net Income 389 • Generation is located more than 1000 km from the interconnecting points and major load centers • The installed generation capacity on the North American interconnected system is 15 times bigger than that of HQ • Solving the stability problem resulting from synchronous interconnection would be excessively expensive HQ TÉ 2002 Key Data • Not synchronized with the Eastern Interconnection • Single control area • Own reliability coordinator

  5. HQ Transmission System Characteristics • Remote generation (1000 km) • Design of a reliable and cost effective transmission system • Major concern: system stability • Development of the 735 kV-AC • Fast protection systems • Static excitation systems • Power system stabilizers • Dynamic-shunt compensation • Series Compensation • Special protection systems • 505 substations • 32 227 km of lines (11 280 km of 735 kV)

  6. 1 200 MW 1 470 MW 2 305 MW 2 125 MW 785 MW 870 MW New Brunswick Ontario 1 870 MW 1 000 MW New England New York Interconnections Installed capacity of interconnections with neighbouring systems Import 4,525 MWcapacity +5,200 MW Export 7,100 MWcapacity EXPORT IMPORT

  7. La Grande-2 La Grande-2A 6 16 735 kV Chissibi 735 kV La Grande-1 Nemiscau 12 315 kV Radisson 2 250 MW ± 450 kV Nicolet 735 kV 1 022 km 2 138 MW 105 km Des Cantons 690 MW 735 kV Sherbrooke Québec New England 171 km Comerford Legend 690 MW Generation 214 km Sandy Pond 2 000 MW DC converter Transformer 345 kV Québec-New England MTDC line Phase I • In 1986, the Des Cantons (HQ) to Comerford (New England) HVDC interconnection was commissioned • 690 MW converter stations • 170 km ±450 kV DC line Phase II • New firm energy contract was signed with NEPOOL for 70 TWh over a 10 year period • In 1990, the Radisson (HQ) and Sandy Pond (NE) converters were commissioned • In 1992, the Nicolet (HQ) converter was commissioned • First large scale multi-terminal • 2000 MW converter stations • 1500 km DC line Islanding breaker

  8. August 14th Blackout • Not much happen in Québec • Tripping of generators and radial load isolated on Ontario system • HVdc ties with NY and NE continue operation • Northern NY and NE did not blackout • Highgate HVdc Back-to-back stop • HQ sustained restoration of power in NY and Ontario and offered additional support if required

  9. HQ 1989 Blackout • Turning point • Before 1989: '82 and '88 blackouts • Generation rejection scheme • Dedicated SPS for foreseeable events (Churchill loss) • Review of planning criteria • Due compliance process through NPCC • After the '89 blackout • Political and social response • Clear direction to do something • Technical response • Strengthen the system • Revised system design philosophy against extreme contingencies

  10. Basic Principles to System Design Four categories of events:

  11. Defence plan against extreme contingencies … First Level: Normal Events • Increase system strength • HQ TransÉnergie has adopted NPCC Design criteria to upgrade the reliability of its transmission system • This resulted in the implementation in the 90's of a major transmission upgrade program with the addition of: • Series compensation (11 000 MVAR) • Local shunt reactors automatic switching scheme to control voltage installed in 22 transmission 735 kV substations

  12. … Defence plan against extreme contingencies Second Level: Extreme Contingencies • Wide area SPS to mitigate impact at high transfer level • Fully operational since 2000 • This automatic defence scheme relies on: • a generation rejection and remote load shedding system covering extreme contingencies in 15 735 kV substations • an under frequency load shedding system distributed in about 150 distribution substations • Complementary action of the 735 kV shunt reactors automatic switching system • a under voltage load shedding system

  13. UVLS in the Montréal area

  14. … Defence plan against extreme contingencies Third Level: Beyond Extreme Contingencies • SPS to protect majorequipment from damage • Installed in the 1980’s • Protect against overvoltage from system separation • Local action results in controlled separation • Not a global separation scheme • Input • Loss of corridor (LC) • Overfrequency (OF) • Power swing relays (PS) • Overvoltage (OV) • Action • Switch-in special surge arresters (sacrificial) • Limit overvoltage at 1.4 pu • Trip local line breakers in series

  15. What are the Benefits • We already see the benefits • No blackout since 1989 • TÉ system has suffered major incidents with limited impact • In 1998, the consequence of the Ice storm could have been much more dramatic • Improved operating flexibility in particular with regard to interconnection operation

  16. Québec 1998 Ice Storm 1998: A VERY UNUSUAL STORM • THE DURATION: 5 days from 5th to 9th of January • THE AFFECTED AREA:100 X 250 km in Québec • THE STORM INTENSITY: more than 75mm of radial ice on conductors

  17. …Québec 1998 Ice Storm 116 TRANSMISSION LINES OUT OF SERVICE ON JANUARY 9th 1998

  18. …Québec 1998 Ice Storm • A second turning point • Political response • Two commissions (public and internal) • Clear mandate to minimize impact • Technical response • Set security objectives for power system restoration • Sources substation must be secured on BPS • Restore 50% of load in 4 days • Restore 100% of load in 21 days • Study of other catastrophic events

  19. …Québec 1998 Ice Storm • Major system reinforcement program to minimize impact in affected area in the future • Major 735 kV loop projects in Montreal, South-shore, Québec, Outaouais area and new interconnection between Ontario and Québec • Mechanical reinforcement of 735 line sections • Line de-icing will be used to limit ice building • One Statcom/DC installed at Lévis and Boucherville substation (not approved) • Conductor heating on the regional network • current circulation in the line • Low voltage short-circuit • Load transfer • Mobile emergency generators (30 MW)

  20. Prioritized Projects for the Bulk Power System • Two mechanical reinforcement projects • Two line de-icing installations

  21. Conclusion • CEA Actions for assuring the electric system reliability Continuing and accelerating: • The development and the implementation of operating systems; • The training of the operating personnel; • The enforcement of compliance to the criteria's required to support the reliable and efficient operation of the existing facilities • These steps are needed and HQ supports them

  22. …Conclusion • The question about blackouts goes beyond normal reliability, it is on a philosophy on how to address extreme events and preserve system security • So, we must try to prevent them • Or, at least try to minimize their impact • Adoption of automatic action schemes like tripping load • The public will accept them if the benefit can be demonstrated • It means: • A lot of studies • Consideration to profound re-design • A lot of $ • That's the challenge before us: can't it be avoided?

  23. Thank you • I would like to thank… • Jean-Pierre Gingras • Gilles Trudel • at TransÉnergie

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