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Managing Defense: The Challenges Ahead David S. C. Chu, President Institute for Defense Analyses 1 April 2010
Why Is This Important? • Largest Public Institution • Charged with the Most Serious Responsibilities • Involving Issues of Great Consequence to the World at Large
The Constitutional Principles • Article I, Section 8: • The Congress shall have power… • To declare war… • To raise and support armies… • To provide and maintain a navy… • To make rules for the armed forces… • To provide for calling forth the militia… • To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia.... • Article II, Section 2: • The President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy….
Building a Military Force "As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.“ Donald Rumsfeld “The defining principle of the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy is balance, The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through high defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.” Robert M. Gates Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2009)
Force PlanningTheory Andrew Loerch, “Analysis Support for Force Structure Divisions;” Methods for Conducting Military Operational Analysis; LMI Research Institute/Military Operations Research Society (MORS): 2007; Andrew G. Loerch, Larry B. Rainey (editors)
US Force Planning: Theory vs Practice Theory • Late Cold War: Two-front Defense Against Soviet Attack • 1990’s: Capabilities-based, then Two Major Theater Wars • 2000’s: -- 1-4-2-1 -- Steady-state security posture, surge scenarios Reality • Limited Immediate Response to Declaratory Policy Changes • Evolution to Meet Real-world Demands (e.g., Stryker/Future Combat System, AEF, Army modularity, rebalancing)
Meeting the Investment Challenge Increased GWOT Operations Includes RDT&E, Procurement, MilCon, and other O&M (excluding CivPay & Service Contracts) Regan Era Recapitalization Not all available for recapitalization 68% of TOA 50% of TOA * From FY08 GWOT Amendment, Department of Defense, October 2007 – less MilPers & DHP from enacted Supplementals (PL 110-28/5; 109-234/62/13; 108-106/11; 107-20)
The People • Active Military (≈ 1.4 M) • + Reserve Components (≈ 1.2 M) • + DoD Civilians (≈ 1 M) • + Directly Employed Private Sector Civilians
Meeting the People Challenge • Military: All Volunteers (vs Conscription) • Federal Civilians: Civil Service (vs ?) • Contract Services
Meeting the Force Employment Challenge • Civilian Control • Short vs Long War • The Role of Reserves Most Critical: Public Support
In An Uncertain World: “Uncertainty is necessarily the lot of the planner, since he deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.” Harold Brown Foreign Affairs (Jan 1967)