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A survey of the server-aided verification models

A survey of the server-aided verification models. Outline. Introduction Survey: GL05 Survey: Wu08 Survey: Wang10 Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 Conclusion. GL05. Wu08. Wang10. Wu11. Wang11. Introduction. 簡單回顧從 2005 年到 2012 年之間，有關 server-aided verification (SAV) 的文章。. Outline. Introduction

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A survey of the server-aided verification models

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  1. A survey of the server-aided verification models

  2. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  3. GL05 Wu08 Wang10 Wu11 Wang11 Introduction • 簡單回顧從2005年到2012年之間，有關server-aided verification (SAV)的文章。

  4. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  5. Server-Aided Verification: Theory and Practice Marc Girault and David Lefranc Asiacrypt2005, pp. 605 – 623, 2005 Cites: 16

  6. Definitions • The model of an interactive proof of knowledge

  7. Definitions • Definition 1. Legitimate / Misbehaving / Cheating. • In an interactive proof of knowledge between a prover P and a verifier V, P maybe deviates from the protocol. • : legitimate • : cheating • : misbehaving

  8. Definitions • Definition 2. SAV protocol.

  9. Definitions • Definition 2. SAV protocol. • The protocol is said to be a server-aided verification protocol (SAV) for if: • Auxiliary completeness. • Auxiliary soundness. • Computational saving. • Auxiliary non-repudiation.

  10. Definitions

  11. Auxiliary Soundness • The final predicate • Hard to know • The final predicate is construction from the predicate by randomizing it, that only the verifier known it. • Hard to solve • The final predicate is construction from the predicate such that the final predicate is computationally hard to solve.

  12. Security model in the case of signature scheme • To proof the soundness of a SAV protocol • Assume

  13. SAV protocol for identification schemes Hard-to-know-based SAV protocol

  14. SAV protocol for identification schemes Hard-to-solve-based SAV protocol

  15. Comparison table

  16. Summary • 提出SAV所需要滿足的安全性條件。 • 延伸原本signature scheme的協定，讓它具有server-aided功能。

  17. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  18. Server-Aided Verification Signatures: Definitions and New Constructions Wei Wu, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, and Xinyi huang ProvSec 2008, pp. 141 – 155, 2008 Cites: 9

  19. Definitions • A signature scheme

  20. Definitions • Requirements • Completeness • Existential unforgeability of • Existential unforgeability under adaptive chose message attacks

  21. Definitions • Requirements • Existential unforgeability of • Setup. C: A: • Queries. A can request qs sign queries. • Output. A outputs a pair and wins this game if

  22. Definitions • A server-aided verification signature scheme • The ordinary signature scheme

  23. Definitions • Requirements • Completeness • Computational saving • Existential unforgeability

  24. Definitions • Requirements • Existential unforgeability of • Setup. C: A: • Queries. A can request the following queries. • qs sign queries • qv server-aided verification queries. • A acts as the server, C acts as the verifier. • Executing SAV-Verify, C returns the result to A at the end for each queries. • Output. A outputs a pair and wins this game if

  25. Definitions

  26. Definitions • SAV- against Collusion and Adaptive chosen message attacks • Setup. C: A: • Queries. A only need to make server-aided verification queries. • Output. A outputs a message m*. C chooses a random element where is the set of valid signatures of m* as the response. A wins this game if

  27. SAV protocol for signature schemes

  28. SAV protocol for signature schemes

  29. SAV protocol for signature schemes

  30. Summary • 定義SAV的不可偽造性。 • 提出signer與server共謀的攻擊。

  31. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  32. Comment on Wu et al.’s Server-aided Verification Signature Scheme Zhiwei Wang, Licheng Wang, Yixian Yang, and Zhengming Hu International Journal of Network Security, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 204 – 206, 2010 Cites: 5

  33. New definition of the security of SAV-Σ against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks • An untrusted server is very likely to collude with a signature forger. • Setup. C: A: • Queries. A can only make qv server-aided verification queries. • Output. A outputs a pair where is chosen by A under (pkf, skf). A wins this game if

  34. Summary • 作者認為Wu等人的攻擊方式不夠詳盡，於是提出一個更新的model，並証明Wu等人的SAV-BLS在這model之下是安全的。

  35. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  36. Provably secure server-aided verification signatures Wei Wu, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, and Xinyi Huang Computer and Mathematics with Applications, pp. 1705 – 1723, 2011. Cites: 4

  37. A new construction of the server-aided verification signature scheme Zhiwei Wang Mathematical and Computer Modeling, Vol. 55, Issues 1 – 2, pp. 97 – 101, 2011 Cites: 1

  38. Outline • Introduction • Survey: GL05 • Survey: Wu08 • Survey: Wang10 • Survey: Wu11 and Wang11 • Conclusion

  39. Comparisons

  40. The different of the definition of the against collusion and ACMA

  41. Conclusions • Models • EUF => Soundness • The different of the definition of the against collusion and ACMA • More rational attack model • Multi-signer • Multi-server • Server collude with a misbehaving verifier

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