Post- Brexit Security in Europe

1. Post-Brexit Security in Europe Dragutin Mate UNCLASSIFIED

2. Agenda • UK-EU preparations for a post-Brexit era • Expected impacts on security and defence cooperation • Post-Brexit intelligence-sharing • Defence cooperation • Security threats • Conclusion UNCLASSIFIED

3. UK-EU preparations fora post-Brexitera • In June 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU (aka. Brexit), but it is becoming clear that the British government will not be able to agree a deal with the EU by 29 March 2019. • Brexit‘s timing is bad for both the UK and the EU given the present security risks – international and homegrown terrorism, illegal migration, cyber threats, organized crime, and tensions with Russia. • In response to Brexit, the EU adopted two strategical documents - A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy and A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties - which aim to enhance EU‘s intelligence and security structures and deepen UK-EU security and defence cooperation. • In November 2018, the Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime, Ben Wallace, underlined the need to maintain close security cooperation with the EU, which is in line with the recently revised UK‘s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. • Both sides hope to reach a deal, so the UK proposed 'a tailored partnership with the EU' on foreign policy, defence and development. UNCLASSIFIED

4. Brexitimpacts on security and defence cooperation • UK intelligence agencies estimate that security, defence and intelligence implications of Brexit in the UK and the EU will be minimal. However minor issues could be expected in the short run concerning the fight against transnational threats, organized crime and cybercrime. • A notable global security and stability think-thank Jane's Intelligence underlines that the UK has one of the most mature CT police and intelligence communities in Europe, which has provided ideas, experience, intelligence and personnel to the EU. • UK is a leading member of the Five Eyes,an anglophone intelligence alliance comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. • Jane's Intelligence estimates that, despite Brexit, bilateral defence and security cooperation between EU Member States and the UK will be further enhanced. • Close UK-EU cooperation is expected to continue through bilateral relationships and non-EU fora, such as CdB (Club de Bern) and the associated CTG, whilaa number of EU Member States are collaborating on a military European Intervention Initiative (EII), an initiative led by France and Germany aiming to provide a multilateral rapid response force during times of crisis, which is being developed outside EU and NATO structures. UNCLASSIFIED

5. Expected impacts onsecurity and defense cooperation (I) 1. DEFENCE, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT: 1.1. The EU • UK intelligence supply ends to EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) • Withdrawal of UK military officers seconded to European Union Military Staff (EUMS) reduces short-term operational capability across military activities including planning, operations, logistics, and strategy, although further progress is likely to be made in developing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) • Non-availability of UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood reduces options for Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for EU crisis management operations to France, Germany, Greece, and Italy, although further impetus is given to the establishment of a permanent EU OHQ. 1.2. The UK • Possible UK withdrawal from European Arrest Warrant (EAW) may slow down criminal extradition procedures between the UK and EU Member States.. • UK inability to negotiate continued access to shared security databases, such as the Schengen Information System, may have negative impacts on police effectiveness in identifying foreign criminals entering the country. • UK withdrawal from the EU General Data Protection regulation may have negative impacts on transnational cyber-security cooperation unless the UK adopts similar legally binding provisions.  1.3. The EU and the UK • The loss of global UK diplomatic network would lead to the weakening of European state‘s collective ability to formulate common positions on foreign policy issues, such as sanctions against Russia. • Uncertain UK relationship with EU police agency Europol, with likely short-term consequences of curtailed information flows from UK police forces and withdrawal of UK Europol personnel. UNCLASSIFIED

6. Expected impacts onsecurity and defense cooperation (II) 2. PROJECTED MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO: 2.1. The EU and the UK • Operational intelligence on terrorism and organised crime will continue to be exchanged on a bilateral or ad hoc basis between affected intelligence and security services, such as Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) and Club de Bern (CdB). 2.2. The UK • Bilateral France-UK defence cooperation will be maintained under the 2010 Lanchaster House treaties, including the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), albeit with some likely scaling back. • NATO will remain the principal framework for European defence and security cooperation, the closeness of the US-UK defence and intelligence ‚special relationship‘ will be maintained, and the UK will continue to prioritise the 'Five Eyes‚ intelligence network. • UK terrorism threat levels are unlikely to be directly affected by Brexit, with underlying drivers persisting and principal risks stemming from Islamist extremist and resurgent Northern Irish republican groups . UNCLASSIFIED

7. Expected impacts on security and defence cooperation (III) EU information-sharing systems • It is crucial for the UK to maintain access to EU information-sharing systems : • SIS II (Schengen Information System) • ECRIS (European Criminal Records Information System) • PNR (Passenger Name Record) • EIS (Eurpol Information System) • SCHENGEN III (Prüm Convention – sharing of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data) • EAW (European Arrest Warrant) • Even after Brexit, the UK is expected to seek close cooperation with EU institutions in the area of security and defence, such as EU’s Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), EU Military Staff (EUMS), European Defence Agency (EDA) etc. • In case of restrictions to EU information-sharing systems, counter-terrorism (CT) would be an area which is affected the least. UNCLASSIFIED

8. Post-Brexit intelligence-sharingCONTEST • The UK aims to maintain close cooperation with European partners in the area of intelligence-sharing at both bilateral and multilateral level (CdB, CTG). • Close UK-EU security cooperation is also supported in UK‘s recently revised CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. • CONTEST focuses on Islamist and far-right extremist terrorism. • The effectiveness of the four strands of CONTEST, or the 'four Ps' (PREVENT – PREPARE – PROTECT – PURSUE) would stand at risk without a security agreement with the EU. • To contain the threat of terrorist attacks, UK government agreed to grant increased funding through to 2021, including GBP1.4 billion (USD1.8 billion) for new CT operations and1,900 new security and intelligence officers. • Owing to the recent surge in terrorist attacks from members and supporters of ISIS (DAESH), EU Member States are expected to maintain close CT cooperation with the UKafterBrexit. UNCLASSIFIED

9. Defence cooperation • The UK is one of only two European countries possessing nuclear weapons. It is an influential NATO member, and is ranked fourth in the global security export market. It also holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and has the largest military budget within the EU, making up one-forth of European defence capabilities. • As such, the UK is one of the key pillars of the EU‘s external action. Without the UK, the EU‘s stance on the global stage may weaken, making it more vulnerable to external threats such as Russia and China. • The UK will be withdrawing its troops from the EU 'Battleground' program at the end of March 2019, but will continue its involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Europe‘s East and South, as well as in Western Balkans and the Mediterranean. • The UK will maintain its participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and EU military operations (EU Force Althea, Atalanta, Sophia) after Brexit, albeit it will no longer be able to take command of any operations. • Efforts to participate in joint projects, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). • Ever since the UK voted to leave the EU, the remaining EU member states and EU institutions have taken steps to strengthen their military cooperation, which is reflected in a number of components, including the European Defence Fund (EDF) in the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). • The UK cannot continue to host EU military operational headquarters in Northwood. • Future defence cooperation will continue bilaterally and through NATO. • Michel Barnier, the EU's chief Brexit negotiator, noted that the EU‘s disappointment at the UK‘s decision to leave the UK should be tempered by the fact that the UK has never led in EU defence efforts. However EU should note that the UK is still the strongest military force in Europe. UNCLASSIFIED

10. Defence cooperation (II) EU - UK - NATO • Brexit will not directly affect the UK’s membership of, or role in, NATO. The former head of the British army, Mike Jackson, says that the impact from departing the EU “is more of a policing and judicial matter rather than a military matter. The UK’s military dimension is provided by NATO”.  • In NATO, the UK has a close relationship with the US, with many years of military cooperation in the fight against terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaida (AQ). Both the UK and the US are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and members of the Five Eyes intelligence community. • However UK-US tensions have deepened following the US‘s unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and Trump‘s approval of Russia‘s Vladimir Putin. • The UK might lose its role as the middle link in US-NATO intelligence-sharing and be replaced by Germany or France. • After Brexit, NATO plans to temporarily enhance its presence in continental Europe, which will likely require thatthe EU-NATO relationship be redefined, particularly if this would entail creating a common European military. UNCLASSIFIED

11. Defence cooperation (II) Impacton the defence industry • The Government wants the UK to continue to work with EU partners on developing defence technologies through the exchange of expertise and participation in the European Defence Fund (EDF). The UK also seeks to cooperate with the EU on wider security issues including the Galileo satellite programme and the secure ‘Public Regulated Service’ (PRS) designed for, among other uses, military platforms. • Currently the UK‘s proposals are not supported by the EU, so the UK will lose its influence in the common security and defence capability development while UK companies will be shut out of contracts for maintenance and defence technology. • The UK will no longer be able to participate in multi-billion projects for defence research starting in the 2020s, particularly for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and Governmental Satellite Communications (GovSatcom), which aim to strengthen CSDP. • The UK also will not be able to continue its participation in the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project it had been developing together with France, which decided to continue the collaboration with Germany instead. • The UK is urged to continue its involvement in the Next-Generation Weapon System (NGWS) future fighter programme as individual countries can no longer realistically afford to develop multiple fighter types as they had done previously. • With the UK expected to lose access to the encrypted part of the Galileo navigational satellite, the country is considering to launch its own satellite navigation system. However given the funding already allocated to the system, the UK is more likely to try obtain a deal on continued Galileo membership. Galileo UCAV UNCLASSIFIED

12. Security threats – Jihadistgroups • Security experts estimate that reduced UK-EU cooperation would lead to another surge in terrorist attacks on soft targets and critical infrastructure by fundamentalist jihadist groups such as ISIS/DAEISH and AQ in both the UK and EU Member States. • Another security threat is posed by ISIS foreign fighters returning to their homeland after the defeat in Syria and Iraq, and who had previously been involved in terrorist attacks in the UK, France, Belgium, Germany etc. • Jihadist tactics from Syria and Iraq could be applied to attacks in the UK and the EU (e.g. the use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and drones in terrorist attacks). • The UK will continue to be a breeding ground for Islamist extremism, as demonstrated by recent 'lone wolf' attacks on soft targets and terrorist attacks committed by banned Islamist extremist groups such as Al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK in the UK and globally. • Owing to a continued terrorist threat, the UK government raised in the terror threat level to 'SEVERE' in 2014 – meaning that an attack is highly likely – and further raised it to 'CRITICAL' in 2017  following a suicide bombing in Manchester. UNCLASSIFIED

13. Securitythreats – RWE • A serious threat is posed by right-wing extremist (RWE) groups, which staged a number of attacks on mosques after 2013, leaving several British Muslims dead, and culminated in the 2016 lone wolf murder of the British Member of the Parliament Jo Cox, which was committed by a neo-Nazi supporter. • UK security and intelligence agencies increased the monitoring of RWE after years of limited surveillance due to Islamist terrorist attacks taking priority. • Under 'Prevent', the UK‘s programme for countering terrorism and extremism, the biggest threat to national security – other than Islamist extremism – is posed by Scottish far-right extremists from Scottish Dawn, a Scottish neo-Nazi group outlawed by the UK. • The UK launched a programme to counter the radicalisation of RWE after it was revealed that Jo Cox‘ murderer, Thomas Mair, was a sympathiser of white supremacism and the international neo-Nazi network Blood&Honour and that he was inspired by the Norwegian right-wing extremist and mass murderer Anders Breivik, who shot 77 people dead in his 2011 attack in Oslo. • As fears over immigration spread across Europe during Brexit, UK far-right extremist groups are taking advantage of the situation to increase their profile. • Through their network, RWE are able to influence European security, as demonstrated by the recent protest in Dover, which brought together a number of white supremacists and fascists from the National Front, North West Infidels, National Action, Misanthropic Division, Scottish Defence League, as well as fascists in Wales (Wales' Fascist Movement).  UNCLASSIFIED

14. Securitythreats – Cybercrimeandorganizedcrime • After Brexit, the UK‘s and the EU‘s IT infrastructure might become targets of cybercrime attacks staged by state-sponsored cyber groups (Russia, China, North Korea), extremist groups, and by lone wolves. • A surge is expected in cybercrime and targeted hacker attacks on state infrastructure, with mixed success seen by the recently created National Crime Agency (NCA) in handling the threats. • Organised crime will pose a significant threat to both the UK and the EU after Brexit. In the UK, the social and economic cost of organised crime was estimated to be at least £24 billion, and more than 5,000 criminal groups with over 40 thousand members are estimated to exist in Great Britain alone. • In the event the UK will no longer have access to the EU information-sharing systems, organised crime is expected to surge in both the UK and continental Europe. UNCLASSIFIED

15. Security threats – Third countries • Brexit will be exploited by Russia to further spread its influence, similar to how it has been increasing its presence in the region (the Crimean Peninsula and Ukraine) and Europe in the past years. • A world of weakened EU and UK defence is strategically beneficial to Russia. • Russia meddles in European politics through propaganda. • A weakened EU is a guarantee for keeping NATO out of the Russian sphere of interest. UNCLASSIFIED

16. Security threats – Case Study: British nationalism in Serbia • In its May 2018 analysis, TRAC warns of the security threat posed by British far-right extremists, particularly the founder and leader of the nationalist group Britain First, Jim Dowson, also known as “the invisible man of Britain's far right”. • After Dowson was expelled from Hungary in 2017 for posing a danger to national security, he found a new base to pursue some of his activities, such as training – under the pretext of business dealings – of far-right groups and activists in how to win an ‘online war’. • Dowson spreads anti-Islam sentiments and recruits supporters through a Christian extremist group Knights Templar International (KTI). • Dowson and the former leader of the far-right British National Party  (BNP), Nick Griffin, have formed close ties with leaders of far-right extremist groups in Serbia, such as Order of the Dragon, Generation Identity, Novi gvozdenipukand 1389 Movement. • In 2016, Dowson delivered KTI-sponsored technical equipment to self-proclaimed migrant hunters at the border between Bulgaria and Turkey. He also delivered, as part of a Serbian convoy, bullet proof vests along with tactical gear and communications equipment to Serbians in Kosovo. • Serbia is becoming a 'social media hub' for Dowson to spread his 'patriotic propaganda'. • The former leader of the Serbian nationalist and anti-fascist youth movement 1398 Movement (orig. Srbskinarodnipokret 1398) has become the middle man between Dowson/KTI and influential Russian nationalists against whom sanctions were imposed by the US for supporting pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine (Konstantin Malofeev, Leonid Savin). Jim Dowson UNCLASSIFIED

17. Jim Dowson in Serbia Jim Dowson in Kosovo Nick Griffin with members of the National Serbian Front (NSF) Equipment supplied by KTI for the Serbs in Kosovo

18. Conclusion • Presently, all options concerningBrexitremain open – the EU could extend the deadline to reach a deal on Brexit or instead push for a new referendum which could, even now, reverse Brexit altogether. • If the UK leaves the EU, this will not affect intelligence-sharing and security collaboration, which is conducted both bilaterally and multilaterally. • Defence cooperation will continue through NATO and bilateral defence agreements. • After Brexit, the UK will be facing issues associated with its exclusion from the EU defence research and development. • Terrorist attacks in the UK and the EU by jihadist groups and far-right extremists are likely to surge in the short run; a similar rise is also expected in cyber attacks on state infrastructure. • Whatever decision the UK ends up making – be it another referendum or an extension of the deadline – a deal on security cooperation with the EU is bound to happen. UNCLASSIFIED

19. Thank you for your attention Q & A UNCLASSIFIED