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By Ron Schneiderman

Unmanned Drones Are Flying High in the Military/Aerospace Sector. By Ron Schneiderman. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine January 2012. The Real Story of Stuxnet. By David Kushner. IEEE Spectrum March 2013. IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 1. General Atomics: Predator.

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By Ron Schneiderman

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  1. Unmanned Drones Are Flying High in the Military/Aerospace Sector By Ron Schneiderman IEEE Signal Processing Magazine January 2012 The Real Story of Stuxnet By David Kushner IEEE Spectrum March 2013 IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 1

  2. General Atomics: Predator Wingspan: 55 feet Length: 27 feet Fuel Capacity: 625 lbs. Payload Capacity: 450 lbs. (int.) 300 lbs. (ext) Max. Altitude: 25,000 feet Max. Endurance: 40 hours Electro-Optical/Infrared Sensors Inertial Navigation/Global Positioning System Hellfire and Griffin Missiles IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 2

  3. Lockheed Martin: K-MAX Fuel Capacity: 1756 lbs. Payload Capacity: 6855 lbs. Max. Endurance: 12 hours Max. Range: 1150 miles Max. Speed: 92 mph (loaded) 115 mph (unloaded) Intermeshing Rotors No Tail Rotor (i.e., safer, quieter) Battlefield Cargo Re-Supply Optional Pilot Mode IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 3

  4. Honeywell: T-Hawk Max. Endurance: 50 minutes Communication Range: 6 miles Max. Speed: 46 mph Service Ceiling: 10,000 feet Daylight & Infrared Cameras Autonomous Flight w/Manual Intervention Hover-and-Stare, Follow-and-Zoom Capabilities IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 4

  5. Just War Doctrine • Jus Ad Bellum - The Right To Go To War • Just Cause for Declaring War • Comparative Justice on Declarer Side • Competent Authority to Wage War (No Dictators) • Right Intention Without Ulterior Motivations • Probability of Success Must Be Reasonably High • Last Resort After Peaceful Options Are Exhausted • Proportionality Between Benefits and Harms • Jus In Bello – Right Conduct In War • Combatant/Non-Combatant Distinction • Proportionality Between Attack and Advantage • Military Necessity, Limiting Excessive Destruction • Fair Treatment of Prisoners • Prohibit Inherently Evil Means of Warfare IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 5

  6. Domestic Drones: FBI IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 6

  7. Domestic Drones: DHS IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 7

  8. FAA Test Sites To address industry requests for relaxed restrictions on domestic drone use for commercial purposes, the FAA is taking applications for six test sites to investigate safety and privacy concerns. IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 8

  9. Ten-Year World UAV Budget Forecast Source: Teal Group Corporation, 2013 World Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Market Profile and Forecast IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 9

  10. Stuxnet– Invasion! Stuxnet enters a system via a USB stick and proceeds to infect all machines running Microsoft Windows. By using a phony digital certificate that seems to indicate it came from a legitimate source, the worm is able to circumvent automated defense systems. Stuxnet then checks whether a given machine is part of the target industrial control system made by Siemens. Such systems are used in Iran to run high-speed centrifuges for nuclear fuel enrichment. If it is a target machine, Stuxnet tries to access the Internet and download the latest version of itself. Otherwise, it does nothing. IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 10

  11. Stuxnet– Sabotage! The worm compromises the target systems logic controllers. It exploits software weaknesses that have never been identified by security experts. At first, Stuxnet spies on the operation of the targeted system Later, it uses the gathered information to take control of the centrifuges and make them spin themselves to failure. False feedback is provided to outside controllers This ensures that they won’t know that something is wrong until it’s too late. IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 11

  12. Shanghai Hills 61398 Evidence suggests that the headquarters of Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army, which spearheads China’s cyber-warfare efforts, is in Shanghai. IS 376 September 3, 2013 Page 12

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