office of export control policy and cooperation na 242 n.
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation NA-242 PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation NA-242

Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation NA-242

408 Views Download Presentation
Download Presentation

Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation NA-242

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript

  1. Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation NA-242 Adam M. Scheinman Director (202) 586-2331 June 2002 ECCO Seminar

  2. OFFICE OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION (NA-20) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Linton Brooks Deputy Administrator Nonproliferation Research & Engineering Robert Waldron Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-22 Nonproliferation & International Security Stephen Black, Acting Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-24 Nonproliferation Policy Trisha Dedik, Director NA-241 Export Control Policy and Cooperation Adam Scheinman, Director NA-242 International Nuclear Safety & Cooperation James Turner Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-23 Materials Protection & Emergency Management Jack Caravelli Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-25 International Safeguards Ron Cherry, Director NA-243 Fissile Materials Disposition Ed Siskin, Acting Assistant Deputy Administrator NA-26

  3. NA-242: Technical Lead on Nuclear Technology for USG Functional Overview Domestic Controls International Controls DOE Complex Industry Multilateral INECP • Sensitive Subjects/ • Countries Lists • Foreign Travel • Foreign Visits & • Assignments • CRADAs • NCI/IPP • Part 810 • Authorizations • Munitions • Dual-Use • Iraq - Oil-for-Food • NSG • Zangger Cmtee • Wassenaar Arrgmt. • Iraq Action Team • Add’l Protocol • MTCR/AG • Russia/NIS • Middle East/SAsia • East Asia • Latin America • Southern Europe

  4. Licensing: DECATS Export Controlled Information Technology Transfer Surplus Material Industry Export Control Iraq – Oil for Food Multilateral: Purpose, Strategies & Mission Nuclear Supplies Group Non-Proliferation Treaty Technical Projects International NuclearExport Control Program (INECP) OVERVIEW

  5. Licensing

  6. Industry Part 810 authorizations Dual-use export licensing Nuclear-related munitions licensing Assurance requests for NRC exports Nuclear safety Export Controlled Information Iraq - Oil for Food Foreign national visas DOE Complex Sensitive Subjects/Countries Lists Foreign travel by DOE scientists and engineers Foreign national visits and assignments International agreements (IPP, NCI, MPC&A, etc.) Nuclear software Transfer of surplus property “Deemed exports” DOE publications “Pit-out” reviews Licensing Team Areas of Responsibility

  7. DOE ExportControlAwarenessTraining (DECAT) System (Under Development) Purpose: • Counter spread of weapons of mass destruction • Serve domestic and international export control and nonproliferation training needs • Provide an on-site awareness training of export control requirements • Test user’s knowledge of export control • Serve as early warning proliferation indicator

  8. DOE ExportControlAwarenessTraining (DECAT) System System Requirements: • Secure web-based client-server system • Online documentation and help • Usable at multiple DOE sites • Incorporate site-specific data into the system • contacts list • procedures • policies • test modules • manuals on-line • Ability to edit core content without programming skills

  9. DOE ExportControlAwarenessTraining (DECAT) System Reporting Requirements: • Individual user information • Site statistics: • Tool access and usage reports • Training completion reports • Annual reminders for refresher training • Access to employee information for update of site training records • DOE compliance reports: • Number of sites participating in Awareness Training • Percent of employees who have completed training • Percent of employees who failed training

  10. DOE ExportControlAwarenessTraining (DECAT) System Favorable Features: • Consistent information to all sites: • Eliminates duplication of effort • Allows easy dissemination of latest information and features • Enhances sites that lack own training capabilities • Compliance reporting capability • Training scheduled to user’s convenience reaches a wider audience • Documentation of material presented • Leverages infrastructure resources

  11. DOE ExportControlAwarenessTraining (DECAT) System Current Status: • Preparing for implementation • Pending cyber security approval

  12. Export Controlled Information (ECI) Export Controlled Information (ECI) - Technical information whose export requires a license • ECI should be protected if uncontrolled dissemination would adversely affect U.S. national security or nonproliferation objectives • DOE policy on dissemination of ECI must balance commitments to: • U.S. nonproliferation and national security goals • Scientific and technological advance • Benefit to U.S. industry • Benefit to U.S. taxpayer • Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements

  13. Export Controlled Information (ECI) ECI (continued): DOE reviews technical documents to identify ECI whose release must be controlled ECI review may require:: • For publications: • Edit sensitive data • Limit distribution • For presentations: • Edit sensitive data • Limit audience

  14. Export Controlled Information (ECI) ECI (continued): NA-242 initiatives to control release of ECI under FOIA: • Proposed legislation similar to DOD’s enacted in 1984 • DOE would gain authority to withhold ECI • But even now DOE may require FOIA requestor of ECI to disclose citizenship and, if foreign, to obtain export license • And if FOIA requester is U.S. citizen, DOE should advise of export licensing requirements for ECI transfer out of the country

  15. Technology Transfer Control Objectives: • To identify materials, equipment, and technology of proliferation concern • To prevent transfers to proliferants • To protect against inadvertent transfers • To weigh proliferation and security concerns against value of scholarship, technology advance, and economic benefit • To implement U.S. Government policy on transfers

  16. Technology Transfer Control Mechanisms of Transfer: • Sales, donations, loans, leases, exports • Technical exchanges and communications • Work-for-others, Cooperative Agreements, patent assignments • Publications and presentations • Visits and assignments to DOE sites • Foreign travel by DOE personnel

  17. Technology Transfer Control Transfer Control Principle: • Whatever the transfer mechanism, export control review is a must Control Measures: • Export control review of all proposed transfers, exchanges, publications, presentations, visits and assignments, and foreign travel • Export control requirements placed in all transfer agreements • DOE/NNSA approval required for retransfers

  18. Technology Transfer Control Tools for Export Control Review: • Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lists – Trigger and Dual-Use • Export control regulations – Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission • DOE/NNSA • Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation • Sensitive Countries List • Sensitive Subjects List • Technology experts and export control personnel

  19. Surplus Property Transfer of Surplus Property: • Equipment and materials must be made useless for nuclear purposes • Transfer agreement must include strict nonproliferation conditions • There is a presumption of destruction for NSG Trigger list items and for weapons components • For items deemed too valuable to destroy: • Request exception from DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation • May require modifying equipment to render it useless for nuclear purposes • Must get DOE/NNSA approval for retransfer or export

  20. Industry Export Control Dual-Use Export Licensing: • Export Administration Act of 1979 gives Commerce the lead • Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implement • EAR sections of note: • 15 CFR Part 738, Special country policies • 15 CFR Part 742, Control Policy – CCL-based controls • 15 CFR Part 744, Control Policy – Catch-all controls based on end-user and end-use • 15 CFR Part 752, Special Comprehensive Licenses • 15 CFR Part 774, Commerce Control List (includes Nuclear Referral List of items requiring DOE/NNSA review)

  21. Industry Export Control Munitions Licensing: • Under jurisdiction of the Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls • Authority • Arms Export Control Act 1976 • International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Part 121 • DOE reviews nuclear-related cases • Category V - Explosives, Propellants, Incendiary Agents • Category XVI - Nuclear Weapons Design and Test Equipment • Review process similar to dual-use cases, except without time limits or escalation

  22. Industry Export Control NRC Exports: • Special or general licenses required for nuclear facilities, components, fuel, and source or byproduct materials • Authority • Atomic Energy Act of 1954 • 10 CFR Part 110 – implementing regulations • DOE/NNSA participates in Executive Branch review of NRC export licenses and obtains foreign government peaceful use assurances • DOE provides general license request confirmations

  23. Iraq - Oil for Food • NA-242 reviews about 4,000 applications annually for exports to Iraq from various countries under the UN Oil for Food program • Cases referred to DOE/NNSA from US UN Mission in New York • Review responsibility shifted to the IAEA Action Team as of June 1, 2002 • LLNL performs reviews; NA-242 recommends to approve, deny, or hold

  24. U.S. Export Controls Activities • Maintain DOE/NNSA Guidelines on Export Control and Nonproliferation • Export control training seminars for industry, academia, and federal government agencies • Maintenance of Proliferation Information Network System (PINS) • Review and approval of “deemed exports,” dual-use, and nuclear-related munitions cases • Individual validation licensing for overseas activities • DOE Export Control Awareness Training (DECAT) System through NA-242 web site coming soon

  25. U.S. Export Controls Activities continued: • Review technology transfer cases referred to DOE/NNSA by the Departments of Commerce and State. • Participation in the DOC Bureau of Industrial Security Operating Committee on export policy and the Assistant Secretary-level Advisory Committee for Export Policy (ACEP) • Review of Foreign Access Tracking System database (foreign visitors to DOE/NNSA and contractors) • Review of Foreign Travel Management System (foreign travel by DOE and contractor personnel) • Participation in Export Control Coordinators Organization (ECCO) seminars

  26. AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE • Continue to maintain existing and develop new expertise necessary to support NA-242 initiatives • Incorporate export licensing and nonproliferation awareness into security briefings for new personnel • In the interim, ensure that “deemed exports” and ECI applicability review are done for all foreign national visits and assignments and foreign travel by federal and contractor personnel • Target professional societies and groups of industry for nonproliferation awareness training • Actively participate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshops and Seminars

  27. Multilateral

  28. Multilateral Regime Support Nuclear Suppliers Group NPT Export Committee (Zangger) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY’03 NPT Review Conference – 2005 Working Groups Other Issues Export Control Workshops Bilaterals IAEA Action Team IAEA Additional Protocol Technical Projects Stockpile Stewardship Economic Globalization Characterization of DOE Complex Nuclear Propulsion Machine Tools SNET List Review Technical Review Group Commercialization of DOE lab technology (CRADAs) Plutonium Isotope Separation Multilateral Team – Areas of Responsibility

  29. Multilateral Purpose: • International export control regimes prevent nuclear proliferation by: • delaying a nuclear program and allowing other means, such as diplomacy, to help; • causing proliferants to accept less capable and more costly options; and • Establishing international guidelines and principles for nuclear suppliers with the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  30. Multilateral Strategies: Strengthen the multilateral supplier regimes through continued U.S. technical leadership Promote adherence to multilateral nuclear supplier arrangements in support of USG nonproliferation policy Cooperate with the U.S. interagency, DOE and NNSA offices, and like-minded multilateral partners to promote peaceful nuclear trade and nonproliferation objectives Ensure that DOE and NNSA program offices and contractors are fully apprised of all multilateral commitments and obligations Strategies

  31. Multilateral Mission: • Initiate studies on rapidly developing technologies and initiatives before problems arise • Technical studies: Accelerator Production of Tritium; Naval Reactor Technologies • Multilateral negotiations: Conversion technologies; Plutonium Isotope Separation • Policy studies: Globalization study • Pursue an active role in preventing proliferation. • Protect U.S. national security interests and peaceful nuclear trade. • Conceptual change from “export control” to “supplier policy.”

  32. Multilateral Role of NA-242: • Multilateral Regime Support • Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) • NPT Export Committee (Zangger) • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) • Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in FY’03 • Technical Team Projects • Stockpile Stewardship, Globalization, Characterization of the Complex, etc. • Other Issues • Export Control Workshops • Bilaterals • IAEA Action Team

  33. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) NA-242 Participation: • Consultative Group (working to revise the NSG Guidelines and improve the structure and effectiveness of the regime) • U.S. Chair (Richard Goorevich, NA-242) to chair the Consultative Group during the 2002-2003 term.

  34. INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership (40 countries): Argentina Germany Portugal Australia Greece Romania Austria Hungary Russia Belarus Ireland Slovakia Belgium Italy Slovenia Brazil Japan South Africa Bulgaria Kazakhstan (new) Spain Canada Korea, Republic of Sweden Cyprus Latvia Switzerland Czech Republic Luxembourg Turkey Denmark Netherlands Ukraine Finland New Zealand United Kingdom France Norway United States Poland

  35. NTP Exporters (Zangger) Committee • Conversion Technology • successfully completed • led by NA-242 • Plutonium Isotope Separation • on going • NA-242 provides technical lead • Full Scope Safeguards • U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue • Next NPT Revcon – 2005 & international outreach • U.S. member of Friends of Chair Committee to examine issue

  36. Team Projects Examples of NA-242 / Multilateral Team Projects: • Technical Review Group (TRG) Phase II • Stockpile Stewardship • Collaboration with the UK on Machine Tools, Technical Review Group (TRG) Peer Review, and SNET List Review • Economic Globalization and Nuclear Technology Supply • Nuclear Propulsion • Characterization of the DOE Complex

  37. Team Projects Other • Hosted the 2001 NSG Plenary - Aspen, Colorado • Implementation of NSG Information Sharing System (NISS) upgrade. • Bilateral discussions on technical supplier issues and export controls (e.g. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Baltic States) • Promote broader international adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol • Focus on export/import reporting requirements

  38. International Nuclear Export Control Program (INECP)

  39. Developing effective exportcontrol licensing processes Developing industry compliance by ensuring exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology are aware of national and international requirements Helping customs officials to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities Providing tools of export control Information technology Publications and handbooks Communication systems Dual-use material analyzers Remote inspection systems International ExportControl Program (INECP) Team – Areas of Responsibility Provide training and assistance to Russia, FSU and others by:

  40. International Nuclear ExportControl Program (INECP) Mission: • Provide training and assistance to develop national systems of nuclear export control worldwide. Approach: • Three tiered approach: • U.S. Interagency (State Department lead) • Government-to-Government • Technical interactions

  41. INECP: Promoting Effective Nuclear Export Controls Worldwide Transparent and standardized national licensing system Industry awareness and outreach Ability to detect and prevent illicit shipments Maturing Cooperation Expanding Assistance Future Priorities

  42. INECP – Export Control Licensing Process • Leverage off Department of Commerce Export Control Assistance Program • Assist with implementation of nuclear-related legal and parliamentary requirements • Provide training to government and industry in U.S. and international nuclear export control and nonproliferation processes and norms • Provide tools • Automated information systems for licensing and exports • Publications, handbooks, and technical guides • Communication systems

  43. INECP – Export Control Licensing Process (continued): • Assist in strengthening controls on transfer of: • Surplus/decommissioned equipment – especially NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use List items • Technology

  44. INECP – Internal Compliance/Industry Outreach • Industry Outreach • Partner with Department of Commerce • Assist in identifying potential exporters of controlled equipment, materials, and technology • Provide training to exporters in national and international export control laws, policies, regulations, norms • Internal Compliance • Encourage nuclear exporter compliance through training and assistance • Assist exporters in establishing internal compliance programs

  45. INECP - Enforcement • Partner with U.S. Customs international assistance programs and export control and border security program • Assist in the prevention of illicit exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology • Provide and sponsor training to recognize nuclear-related dual-use commodities • Provide tools and equipment • Remote inspection systems, handbooks, and publications • Dual-use material analyzers • Communication systems and databases

  46. Looking Ahead

  47. Looking Ahead • Following 9/11, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has moved to the fore of the U.S. national security agenda • NA-242 funding will rise in FY03 • New program areas: • Add missile technology dual-use export reviews in FY03 • Add CBW in FY04 • Broaden reach of INECP – South Asia, Middle East, East and Central Asia, the Caucasus, major transshipment states • Proliferation Research and Analysis Project – anticipate emerging proliferation threats and identify chokepoints • Support U.S. Customs role in enforcing domestic export controls

  48. Looking Ahead – Other Ideas • Continue to work toward ECI exemption from FOIA • Propose mandatory check-off block in FACTS to ensure that visited offices conduct “deemed export” review • Propose mandatory check-off block in FTMS to ensure DOE and contractor travelers conduct export control review • Develop an unclassified database of questions and responding NA-242 guidance • Develop introductory export licensing and nonproliferation awareness material for new DOE and contractor employees as part of security briefing • Expand outreach to scientific and technical communities to raise export licensing and nonproliferation awareness