Sound Approximations to Diffie-Hellman using Rewrite Rules

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Sound Approximations to Diffie-Hellman using Rewrite Rules Christopher Lynch Catherine Meadows Naval Research Lab Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Formal Methods Approach usually ignores properties of algorithm But Algebraic Properties of Algorithm can be modeled as Equational Theory

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### Sound Approximations to Diffie-Hellman using Rewrite Rules

Christopher Lynch

Naval Research Lab

Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
• Formal Methods Approach usually ignores properties of algorithm
• But Algebraic Properties of Algorithm can be modeled as Equational Theory
Example: DH Protocol
• A ! B: gnA
• B ! A: gnB
• A ! B: e(h(exp(g,nB¢ nA)),m)
• B ! A: e(h(exp(g,nA¢ nB)),m’)
DH uses Commutativity (C)
• exp(g,nB¢ nA) = exp(g,nA¢ nB)
• This can lead to attacks
• Analysis using C-unification finds these attacks
C-Unification
• exp(g,X ¢ Y) = exp(g,nA¢ nB) has two solutions
• Solution 1: [X  nA, Y  nB]
• Solution 2: [X  nB, Y  nA]
C-unification is Exponential
• exp(g,X1 Xn) = exp(g,c1 cn) has 2n solutions
• Let d1,,dn be a permutation of c1,,cn
• 2n permutations exist
• Then [X1 d1,,Xn dn] is a solution
Goal of Paper
• Find an efficient theory H to approximate C soundly
• i.e., an attack modulo H is an attack modulo C
• But what about vice versa (that’s the hard part)
Our Results
• We found an efficient theory H which approximates C soundly
• We gave simple properties for a DH protocol to satisfy
• We showed that if a protocol has these properties then a C-attack can be converted to an H-attack
Basic Properties
• symmetric keys of form h(exp(g,nA¢ nB))
• An honest principal can send exp(g,n)
• h-terms appear nowhere else, exponent nonces appear nowhere else, exp-terms appear nowhere else
Properties preventing Role Confusion Attacks
• Messages encrypted with DH-key from Initiator and Responder must be of different form
• Messages encrypted with DH-key must contain a unique strand id
Intruder
• As usual, the intruder can see all messages, and modify, delete and create messages
• Of course, the intruder does not have to obey any of these rules
• Most DH-protocols for two principals satisfy these properties
• They are syntactic, so it is easy to check if a protocol meets them
Who Cares?
• A Protocol Developer: A protocol with these properties will have no attack based on commutativity
• A Protocol Analyzer: If a protocol has these properties, analyze it using efficient H-theory. Only if it does not, then use C.
Contents of Talk
• Representation of Protocol
• Derivation Rules
• Properties and Proof Techniques
Example of DH Protocol
• A ! B: [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B ! A: [exp(g,nB),

e(h(exp(g,nB¢ nA)),exp(g,nA))]

• A ! B: e(h(exp(g,nA¢ nB)),ok)
Specification of Protocol Rules
• A: ! [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B: [Y, nonce] !

[exp(g,nB), e(h(Y,nB),Y)]

• A: [Z, e(h(exp(Z,nA),exp(g,nA))]

! e(h(exp(Z,nA),ok)

Instantiation of Specification
• A: ! [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B: [exp(g,nA), nonce] ! [exp(g,nB),

e(h(exp(g,nA¢ nB)),exp(g,nA))]

• A:[exp(g,nB),

e(h(exp(g,nB¢ nA)),exp(g,nA))]

! e(h(exp(g,nB¢ nA),ok)

Equation needed in Protocol
• Need to know that:

h(exp(g,nA¢ nB)) = h(exp(g,nB¢ nA))

• That’s where C is needed, but is there a more efficient H
• h(exp(X,Y ¢ Z)) = h(exp(X,Z ¢ Y)) will work, but still not good enough
Modification of DH Protocol
• Assume inititiator uses function h1 and responder uses h2
• A ! B: [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B ! A: [exp(g,nB),

e(h2(exp(g,nB¢ nA)),exp(g,nA))]

• A ! B: e(h1(exp(g,nA¢ nB)),ok)
New Specification
• A: ! [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B: [Y, nonce] !
• [exp(g,nB), e(h2(Y,nB),Y)]
• A: [Z, e(h1(exp(Z,nA),exp(g,nA))]

! e(h1(exp(Z,nA),ok)

New Instantiation
• A: ! [exp(g,nA), nonce]
• B: [exp(g,nA), nonce] ! [exp(g,nB),

e(h2(exp(g,nA¢ nB)),exp(g,nA))]

• A:[exp(g,nB),

e(h1(exp(g,nB¢ nA)),exp(g,nA))]

! e(h1(exp(g,nB¢ nA),ok)

Equation we now need
• h2(exp(x,nA¢ nB)) = h1(exp(x,nB¢ nA))
• So theory H will be

h2(exp(X,Y ¢ Z)) = h1(exp(X,Z ¢ Y))

How Efficient is H

Using results from [LM01], we see that:

• In H, all unifiable terms have a most general unifier
• Complexity of H-unification is quadratic (usually linear in practice)
Completeness Theorem
• C theory is now exp(X,Y ¢ Z) = exp(X, Z ¢ Y) and h1(X) = h2(X)
• Show that any attack modulo C can be converted to attack modulo H
Differences between H and C
• h1(exp(g, n1¢ n2)) equals h2(exp(g,n1¢ n2)) modulo H but not modulo C
• h1(exp(g, n1¢ n2)) equals h1(exp(g, n2¢ n1)) modulo H but not modulo C
• h1(exp(x, n1¢ n2¢ n3)) equals h2(exp(x, n3¢ n2¢ n1)) modulo H but not modulo C
Protocol Instance

A Protocol Instance has 2 parts

• Protocol Rules
• Derivation Rules to represent Intruder
Derivation Rules
• [X,Y] ` X
• [X,Y] ` Y
• X, Y ` [X,Y]
• privkey(A), enc(pubkey(A), X) ` X
• pubkey(A), enc(privkey(A), X) ` X
More Derivation Rules
• X, Y ` enc(X,Y)
• X, Y ` e(X,Y)
• X ` hi(X)
• X, e(X,Y) ` Y
• X,Y ` exp(X,Y)
Derivation modulo C
• Recall rule X, e(X,Y) ` Y
• Derivation modulo C:
• X1 e(X2,Y) `CH Y

if X1 =C X2

Example
• h1(exp(x,nB¢ nI¢ nA)),

e(h2(exp(x,nA¢ nI¢ nB)),m) `C m

• But not h1(exp(x,nB¢ nI¢ nA)),

e(h2(exp(x,nA¢ nI¢ nB)),m) `H m

How to convert from `C to `H
• Requires Certain Properties
• Use Rewrite System R so that S `C m implies S+R`H m+R
• R: exp(X,Y) ! X if Y is not an honest principal nonce
Properties of Protocol
• hashed symmetric keys are of the form h(exp(X ¢ n)), where X eventually unifies with a term exp(g,n’)
• h-terms appear nowhere else, exponent nonces appear nowhere else, exp-terms appear nowhere else
More Interesting Properties
• A message encrypted with h1-term on RHS of protocol cannot unify with message encrypted with h2-term on LHS
• Avoids role confusion attacks
• Messages encrypted with hashed term must include a strand id in message
• Avoids attacks involving different instances of same protocol or different protocols
Properties of Derivable Terms
• Honest Principals follow Protocol Rules
• But Intruder can use derivation rules to create terms which disobey properties
• Nevertheless, we show that there are certain properties that are preserved by derivation and protocol rules
Example Properties of Derivable Terms
• There is a set N (honest principal nonces)
• Elements of N only appear as exponent
• If a term exp(g,t1 tn) is derivable
• t1 and tn are in N or are derivable
• t2,,tn-1 are derivable
• if term is not a key, then tn derivable
More Properties
• There are many more properties
• Some quite complicated
• And many lemmas and theorems to prove them
Properties Imply
• Every term will reduce by R to a term with at most two exponents (all exponents not in N are removed by rewrite rules)
• This and other properties imply that if s and t C-unify then s+R and t+R H-unify
Summary
• Suppose a DH-protocol obeys simple (easy to check) properties
• Then it’s possible to discover attacks based on commutativity, using an efficient equational theory
Related Work
• Properties so that attacks modeling cancellation of encryption/decryption rules are found with free algebra
• Symmetric Key [Millen 03]
• Public Key [LM 04]
Future Work
• Other DH work
• Don’t assume base is known