Marco Ciapparelli Marco Colucci Laura Deotti Geoffrey Lambert Yasmine Mittendorff Anna Turco

1. The use of food aid • to address food insecurity: • instruments and approaches Marco Ciapparelli Marco Colucci Laura DeottiGeoffrey Lambert Yasmine Mittendorff Anna Turco

2. Uses of food aid to address food insecurity 1. ACUTE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES • General direct distribution of basic food ration to vulnerable groups • Supplementary / theraupetic feeding • Food for work 2. FOOD BASED SAFETY NETS • Timely provision of assistance • Limits: - protect food security and nutritional status only in the short term • - provide only for consumption requirements • 3. FOOD AID FOR DEVELOPMENT • Maternal child health supplemental feeding • Food for education, work, participation • 4. MONETIZATION • Food aid sold to commercial traders on open market. The proceeds from sales used for other purposes, not directly related to provision of food to hungry people (weakness: food aid is generally sold on local market at below than market price, destroying local market channels)

3. Case study :FFW Programme Bangladesh 1975-1989 (I) CONTEXT OF THE COUNTRY : • Half of the population (112 million) cannot afford an adequate diet • 50 Percent of rural households are landless • Majority of population depends on agriculture; high unemployment due to seasonality • Absolute poverty level declined from mid-1970 to mid-1980 but peaked in correspondence of famines (1974,1977,1988) NATURE of the FOOD for WORK PROGRAMME : • Started in 1975 as a response to an acute humanitarian emergency and then shifted into a food aid for development program. • Food as incentive to stimulate work in public employment schemes: workers paid not with money but with food rations to build infrastructures • Major objectives: 1.Providing income to rural poor during the slack period 2. Stabilizing food grain prices in the market

4. FFW Programme Bangladesh 1975-1989 (II) • Projects administered by WFP and implemented by governmental agencies • Projects administered by Care, financed by USAID , implemented by local gvt • Wage rate varies according to type of project and sex of workers • ( Average wage rate : 4.6 kg of wheat per day, higher for women) • PROS: • Using labour, the only asset owned by rural poor, to feed families. (4 million of direct beneficiaries) • Creation of public goods: coastal and flood-protection infrastructure, small and large-scale irrigation projects, building / repairing of roads, reforestation and creation of fish ponds. CONS: • Technical, organizational and administrative weakness • Non sufficient consultation with local people • Overlapping between Care and WFP: same zone same period • Targeting errors

5. FFW Programme Bangladesh 1975-1989 (III) IMPACT: • Improved production (+ 27%) and income (+26%) in agricultural sector • Enhanced employment, educational and marketing opportunities • Strengthened communications between communities • Reduced mortality (structures holding back floods + access to health services) NUTRITIONAL IMPACT : • In general no evidence of relevant positive results (no provision specific activity, risk of distortion of private Investments and implementation of unnecessary/damaging activities ) • But Bangladesh’s programme experienced positive outcomes, such as : • calories and proteins consumption raised for all age groups in the project area but for children in the weaning stage. • calories per capita improved by about 9% and adequacy by about 8% for the poorest 25% of population. • thanks to : - better supply/demand conditions for food • - better infrastructures (irrigation, access to health facilities,housing)

6. Management of FA : Targeting dimensions (I) a) WHO : Beneficiaries : only food insecure communities • direct: vulnerable peasants and unskilled workers (4 million) • Indirect : wheat producers/consumers + people living where FFW implemented Risks of 2 types of errors: • leakage error : inclusion of people who don't need assistance Costs: - waste of resources - creation of FA dependency - disruption of mkts and local production incentives • 35 % , underestimation of base-line conditions, over-reporting of work • undercoverage error: exclusion of food insecure people requiring assistance with high humanitarian costs • underpayment to workers from 17 – 27% in the project • 18-35 % of wheat not arrived • Under completion of work

7. Targeting dimensions (II) b) HOW : 1. administrative targeting : • Based on screening individual applications for assistance • Poorly used as too costly (time-consuming and info-demanding) 2. indicator targeting : • Distributing FA to subpopulations less food secure than others • Need to use imperfect indicators such as : physiological measures of vulnerability (nutrition, health) or economic measures (assets..) 3. community-based targeting : • responsibility for targeting delegated to local community leaders • Geographic indicator targeting to identify food insecure areas Pros : - exploit local info advantage - better understanding of local vulnerability • Cons : - not pro-poor /elite biased targeting • - uniform distribution of food to all members of community

8. Targeting dimensions (III) 4. Self-targeting : • beneficiaries chose to participate on a voluntary basis • conditions set to foster the participation of only the poor Pros : - no administrative cost of screening - minimize leakage errors • Cons : - effect of level of FFW wage on local labour market • ( risk of substitution wage work ) - FFW placed where expected returns on investments are highest , not where most needed • Bangladesh: evidence that only poorest tend to participate due to : • - nature of the work (hard work: e.g. creation of roads) - specific cereals retribution (e.g. wheat instead of rice) - seasonally work (85% of the FFW resources are spent on during the agricultural activities )

9. Targeting dimensions (IV) c) WHAT Sometimes FA is the most convenient transfer for donors not for recipients • Problems: • - Which commodities / which varieties ? • - Raw or processed product ? (e.g. : grain or flour ) • Bangladesh Wheat : - negative income elasticity of demand in rural areas - alleviate specific nutritional deficiencies at min costs d) WHEN FA should be provided exactly • to face seasonal food insecurity • as a counter-cyclical transfer (food output / world market prices ST shocks) But evidence of pro-cyclical bilateral FA as a result of : - Long lags between time of commitment and effective delivery of FA • - Bureaucratic delays (procuring/transporting food) • - Inertia : generalized need , no present specific country conditions

10. Targeting dimensions (V) • Bangladesh : From January to May, when no more flood water FFW fails to address the problem of slack season unemployment ( Sept-Oct and Jan-Mar) and increasingly competes with agricultural activities when unemployment higher • e) HOW MUCH : • Difficult determination of needs due to: • Scarce availability of data on which basing forecasts • Difficulties in predicting needs • Political pressures Improvement in needs assessment over past decade due to: • - general accepted set of needs estimates continuously updated (FAO GIEWS ) • - widespread adoption of methods evaluating food access (Save the Children) • BUT assessing food requirements of a population remains difficult because of : • - relying on variety of assumptions • - poor information • - pressures to act quickly

11. Procurement , Supply Chain and Reserves (I) A) LOCATION OF FA PROCUREMENT 1. Local purchase : food is purchased in the recipient country 2. Triangular transaction : food purchased in a neighbouring country of the recipient 3. International : food is purchased in donor country and sent to recipient local purchases / triangular transactions : Pros : - Usually shorter delays between procurement and delivery - Food provided is presumably more culturally appropriate - By increasing demand on local/regional markets, improvement of local farmers’ incentives to grow food Cons: - Food surpluses not always reliable - Acquisition and logistics problems due to underdeveloped , highly fragmented marketing system ( risk of collusion big traders) - Potential negative impact on net food buyers : increase in prices

12. Procurement , Supply Chain and Reserves (II) B)EFFICIENCY OF RESOURCES TRANSFER IN FORM OF FOOD Evidence of inefficiency in food delivering: - less money generated for recipients per dollar spent on FA by donors - FA programs more costly that buying same food in recipient country mkt (Barret , Maxwell, 2004) due to : • High Costs of transoceanic food aid shipments + Ground and handling costs between ports and final destination • Administrative costs incurred by donor or recipient agencies • Rents for successful vendors • Risk of spoilage + monetization losses • Aid tying (double) : aid provided under some conditions reflecting the lobbying power of influential interest groups • (sub communities of producer groups , few large agri-business selling to FA programs, few freight forwarders) • Bangladesh FFW program delivers one taka of income to participating household at cost of 1.8 – 2.4 taka , due to high system leakage and costs of foodgrain handling

13. Procurement , Supply Chain and Reserves (III) C) SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC RESERVES 1. Transport FA from point of entry to final distribution : • Improved efficiency due to upgrading infrastructures and careful management of the logistics ( WFP Ethiopia crises in 2000 , 2003) • Unsuccess in other cases ( Uganda 2002) 2. Food storage : Many countries were provided with grain reserves aimed at • stabilizing (interseasonally or interannually) domestic food prices faced by consumers and/or farmers • Providing a publicly-held strategic stockpile for distribution in times of crisis , in order to : • increase the availability of food at lower than mkt prices • insure local population against delays in the arrangement of commercial imports and in the arrive of international food aid • contrast private hoarding • prevent formation of negative traders’ expectations

14. Procurement , Supply Chain and Reserves (IV) Most grain reserves dismantled in the wake of mkt liberalisation started in 1980s : • No more necessary due to timely access to affordable imported foods and rural infrastructure improvements • Perceived crowding out of the private storage and consequent disincentive to adopt own survival livelihood strategies • Difficulties in determining optimal size /appropriate turnover rates • High fiscal costs for already deficitary governments • In 1974 the Government of Bangladesh found itself constrained by : • Unexpected shortage of food stock • Fall in imports due to rise in international rice price In 1988 and in 1998 Government stockpiles of basic food helped stabilize markets and food prices In recent years evidence of the importance of strategic famine relief-stocks both at onset and during emergencies ( Malawi : 2001/2002 famine vs 1991/1992 crisis)

15. Thank You for the attention!

18. Household Food Economy of Save the Children • method for identifying areas or population groups vulnerable to food insecurity. • developed in recognition of the need to go beyond questions of crop production and food supply to examine the question of households' access to food. • analysis based upon an understanding of how people obtain food and cash income and how those sources of income might change at times of crisis - because of crop or grazing failure, or due to war, civil conflict, insecurity or displacement. • PROS : - transparency (a logical link is built between problem definition and recommended response) - modest requirements in terms of field data, met using relatively inexpensive 'key informant' techniques.