Preparing for COIN in Afghanistan

1. Preparing for COIN in Afghanistan • Population Centric COIN vice Enemy Centric COIN. • We must do both simultaneously • Focus on the Indigenous Security Forces. • Afghan Army and Police

2. COIN in Afghanistan We are an enemy-centric force vice population- centric force. We must do both simultaneously by reposition a significant portion of our forces in order to understand the people and secure them where they work and sleep. We must make the ANSF the main effort in order to succeed. We are still failing to truly partner with them. We must do more than operate with the ANSF, we must LIVE with the ANSF.

3. Why COIN is Population-Centric Population-centric COIN is about separating, protecting, influencing and controlling the population. The enemy is fluid; the population is fixed -- the enemy may not be identifiable; the local population is. The Enemy will come to us if we secure the population Hearts or Trust: the population must believe that our success is in their long-term interests. Minds or Confidence: the population must be convinced that we (GIRoA and ISAF) actually are going to win, and we (ANSF and ISAF) will provide permanent physical protection.

4. Understanding the Afghan People

5. The Afghan People They have learned to survive 30 years of war by hedging their bets - that’s why they play both sides. The 12 or 16 years you spent in school learning how to read and write, they spent learning how to read people. Understand that they will quickly read you from cover to cover - that’s why your commitment and genuine concern is so important. Corruption is a cancer and it is the number one complaint among Afghans, followed by physical security and food security.

6. The Afghan People Afghans base all thoughts and decisions on history. Afghans live in an agriculture-based society. The Key! The difference between the cities and rural tribal areas is about 100 years. This is all about the Afghans…Afghans must solve Afghan issues. Everything we do must be focused towards getting the Afghans to pick our side!

7. The Afghan Culture Afghan culture is communal based. Jirga’s and Shura’s! Afghan culture is Iraqi culture on steroids! Pashtunwali mixed with Islam. Afghans value their culture because they have had nothing else for so long. They will kill, fight, and die for honor, family, and religion.

8. The Afghan Culture The fundamental tenet of Pashtunwali is an honor code that amounts to an un-written law of the people that guides individual and collective community behavior. Pashtunwali represents a set of moral codes and rules of conduct that impact the daily lives of many Afghans to a greater degree than the tenants of Islam. Pashtunwali promotes honor, self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, revenge, and tolerance. The use of violence to defend one’s honor and the honor of the family or tribe, to the death if necessary, is the most significant aspect of Pashtunwali.

9. The Afghan Culture Breaching an Afghan’s home and offending his honor requires revenge. Example: You do not do uninvited house searches, except in extreme circumstances. You cordon a village and ask the tribal or village elder to produce the suspect or to allow the ANSF to conduct the search. You search only if given the permission and as a last resort.

10. The Afghan Culture Note: Disregard the past advice at your own peril. You “can” search the house or village but one or more of your soldiers/Marines will pay for that search with his life. Honor is all the tribal or village elder has and you just took it from him. You didn’t show him proper respect in his world. How many of the tribe’s sons is he willing to sacrifice to reclaim his honor? The answer is “all of them” because he is powerless without his honor.

11. Focus on the ANSF

12. The ANA/ANP/ABP Listen to the Afghans – they know more about their country/situation than you do Leverage Afghan culture. Don’t change how they fight – make their way of fighting better/more effective. Don’t try to make them a western army. Focus on ANSF leadership and logistics. Don’t solve their problems for them – allow them to come up with their own solutions.

13. The ANA/ANP/ABP Accept the chaos; don’t try to bring order to it. Learn to thrive in the same chaos that ANSF will be operating in. You have to believe in the cause. If you are not willing to fight and risk your life right next to the Afghans, then they will never respect you. If you fight next to them and prove your mettle, they will do anything for you. This shared danger and hardship will bring loyalty and respect from the ANSF.

14. ANA: Credible Force The ANA is the most respected institution associated with GIRoA. We must capitalize on this! The ANA is a well developed fighting force at the company level and below. Our assistance is still needed at the battalion level and above. Bottom Line: ANA battalions are deep in the fight and lack the training time to develop as a unit. ISAF must live and operate with ANA.

15. ANP: Community Policing We must develop a local and community-based police force that respects the rule of law and gives the people justice, honor and fairness. Focus effort on building capacity and reducing corruption by engaging in close partnership and mentorship. ISAF must live and operate with ANP.

16. ABP: Para-Military As ‘the Protector of the Border’: they interdict insurgents and disrupt their freedom of movement, they help prevent criminal activity along the border, and they protect Afghanistan’s economic interests. Although part of the ANSF they are the ‘poor brother’ and are chronically corrupt: poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led. ISAF must live and operate with ABP.

17. The Insurgency In Afghanistan

18. Insurgency in Afghanistan ISAF definition of the insurgency “The Afghan insurgency is a networked movement with diverse motivations aimed at the overthrow of the elected Government of Afghanistan through the use of subversion and armed conflict in order to establish local authority in support of their aims or to re-establish the Taliban”.

19. The Insurgency in Afghanistan is a Pashtun Insurgency and the Taliban have Prerequisites to be Successful • Vulnerable Population (a Cause): • The insurgents must offer hope of change and exploit political, economic, or social dissatisfaction with the current government. • Leadership Available for Direction • Leadership that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the insurgent’s strategic desired end state. • Lack of Government Control: • It may be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely the chances for insurgent success; the opposite is also true.

20. The Taliban’s Principles and Practices 1. Terrorism: -The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or tointimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. 2. Provocation: - Carry out atrocities that prompt opponents (counterinsurgents, government or sectarian opponents) to reactviolently, in ways counter to their interests. 3. Intimidation: -Terrify and coerce members of the government security forces, civil administration and the insurgent’s own community who cooperate with, or support the government. 4. Protraction: -Draw out the conflict to avoidstrong counterinsurgent forces, control own loss rates, enhance the exhaustion effect and preserve strength after setbacks. 5. Exhaustion: -Soak upassets of the counterinsurgent forces and government agencies in actions that require major effort, but do not advance their.

21. Somewhere in Pakistan there is a True Believer that is training to kill you.  He is training with minimum food or water, in austere conditions day and night.  The only thing clean on him is his weapon.  He doesn't worry about what workouts to do---his rucksack weighs what it weighs and he runs until the enemy stops chasing him.  The True Believer doesn't care how hard it is; he knows he either wins or dies.  He doesn't go home at 1700; he is home.  He only knows the “Cause”

22. Unsuccessful COIN Practices The more you protect the force, the less secure you are. Coalition Forces are road bound and playing into the enemies TTP’s Coalition Forces are not arrayed to protect the Afghan populace. Security forces must transition from remote FOBs/COPs to live and provide security among the people. Coalition Force surrendering the night to the enemy based on unwillingness to protect the populace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week The more force used, the less effective you are. Tactical success guarantees nothing. Overemphasizing killing and capturing the enemy rather than securing and engaging the populace.

23. Unsuccessful COIN Practices Conduct large-scale operations as the norm. Focus special forces primarily on raiding. Low priority on quality trainer/advisors/mentors. Try to build a conventional army out of the indigenous forces. Allow open borders. Ignore rule of law and governance. Failing to follow through on reconstruction and development promises.

24. Successful COIN Practices Must work from the bottom up - focus on the District and Village Level - to influence the people at the grass roots. Focus on controlling, securing and needs of the population. Establish and expand secure areas (understand, shape, clear, hold, build). Isolate insurgents from the populace. Secure the people where they sleep. Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support GIRoA. Strong political and military cooperation and info sharing. Must understand the motivations, strengths, weaknesses, formal and informal distributions of political power.

25. Successful COIN Practices Doing nothing is a legitimate course of action and sometimes the best one. Counterinsurgents’ best weapons don’t shoot. The indigenous force doing it successfully, if imperfectly, is better than the Coalition doing it for them . Police in the lead as often and as soon as possible. Train ANSF as counterinsurgents first and foremost. Embed quality trainer and advisors. Secure the borders and protect key infrastructure.

26. Successful COIN Practices • Successful COIN operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture. Insurgents hold a distinct advantage in this area. Use ASCOPE to bridge the gap. • Emphasize intelligence. Every Marine, soldier and patrolman is an intelligence sensor/collector. • Appreciation of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict. • Declassification and dissemination to the lowest level and across the coalition and indigenous government forces. “Find a way to share Intel with your partners” • Without understanding the environment, intelligence cannot be understood and properly applied. • The environment can only be understand by interacting with it.

27. Successful COIN Practices • Use appropriate level of force • Balance short term tactical gains with longer term negative reactions • Adopt appropriate and measured levels of force: • Use escalation of force/force continuum procedures. “Training” • ANSF in the lead directed by ISAF using appropriate lethal force. • Minimize collateral damage and compensate quickly. • Understanding when to use the bomb, when to use a rifle and when to use the camera.

28. Successful COIN Practices • Implication for us is that victory will not happen on our watch. We need long term campaign plans right down to the tactical level; we must create the foundation on which our successor can build. • Ensuring a comprehensive handover is vital to maintain successful momentum and ensure mistakes are not repeated. • Make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Circulate lessons learned across units. • Local commanders have the best grasp of the local situation. • Decentralize operations by using Mission Orders and Command. • Give responsibility and authority down to the lowest level.

29. Successful COIN Practices • Establish Security Under the Rule of Law • Establish security for the civilian populace under the Rule of Law which • must be understood by the people. • Transition security responsibilities from combat to law enforcement as • quickly as feasible. • When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. • Cannot enforce a western style judicial system. Focus on traditional forms of justice widely perceived as legitimate, (jirgas, shuras). • Give the people justice and honor.

30. ABP: Para-Military As ‘the Protector of the Border’: they interdict insurgents and disrupt their freedom of movement; they help prevent criminal activity along the border and they protect Afghanistan’s economic interests. Although they are part of the ANSF, they are the ‘poor brother’ and are chronically corrupt: poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led. ISAF must live and operate with ABP.