Issues in Public Administration

1. Issues in Public Administration MPA 509 Decentralization in Pakistan

2. Agenda • What is Decentralization • Why Centralize • Benefits and Criticism and Prerequisites on Devolution • History of Decentralization in Pakistan • Repairing the System • The Current Local Government Reforms • Weakening Political Collectivities • Representative Vs. Participatory Decentralization • Conclusions • Policy Recommendations • Quote of the Day

3. Decentralization • the transfer of resources and power (and often, tasks) to lower-level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some degree (Manor, 1997) The local authorities will have the authority and responsibility to address all problems that are, in their determination, within their ability to solve

4. Why Decentralize? • Improves governance and public service delivery by increasing: • Allocative efficiency—through better matching of public services to local preferences. • Productive efficiency—through increased accountability of local governments to citizens, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs. (Azfar, 1999)

5. Benefits of Decentralization • Dilutes State Authority and Control • Distribution of Power Away from Elite • Incorporation of Marginalized Decision Making • Greater Efficiency of Service Delivery • Greater Perception of Needs of People

6. Criticism of Decentralization • Can Create Complicated Relationship Between Local and National Development Priorities • Can Lead to Regional and Financial Inequality • Leaves Decision Making Open to Capture by Elite Elements and Special Interest Groups

7. Prerequisites of Decentralization • Strong Central State • Strong Civil Society Closely Associated with State • Organized Mass-based Political Party/Force • Structural Reform e.g. Land Reform • Political Competition

8. History of Decentralization in Pakistan

9. The Colonial Legacy • Attempts by Non-Representative Central Government to Legitimize Centralization of Political Power • Despite Increasing Representation, Discretionary Powers in the Hands of Non-Elected Officials • Bureaucratic Control Exercised Through Personal Rule of Powerful District Commissioner • Urban/Rural Divide

10. Ayub Khan • 1962 Constitution gave Power to President and Governors • Further Centralization Through One Unit Policy and Interventions Against Political Parties • The Absence of Mass-based Political Parties Created a Lack of Pressure to Decentralize

11. Basic Democracies (BD) • Need for Legitimacy met through this System of Circumscribed Representation at the Local Level • Strong Elements of Bureaucratic Control • Provincial Governments and Non-elected Council Chairmen Given Power to Nominate and Suspend Council Members, • Also Given Power to Overrule Decisions by Councils • Rural Elite Co-opted Through BD System • Introduction of Personalized, Clientelist Politics

12. Bhutto • Repealed Basic Democracies, Promulgated but did not Implement LGO 1972 and LGO 1975 • Fear of Losing Power to Regional Mass-based Parties Provided Disincentive for Decentralization • Growing Urbanization Changed the Social Structure • Consequent Political Change, with the creation of a More Organized and Politically Active Urban Middle Class

13. Zia-ul-Haq - I • Centralization Reinforced Through Direct Military Control of Quasi-Presidential Government • Implemented Bhutto’s LGOs • No Constitutional Protection Given to Elected Bodies • Provision of Municipal Services Primary Objective • Local Governments Given Little Financial Power • Non-Party Basis of Elections Curtailed Power of Parties, and Perpetuated Clienteles Politics and Elite Capture

14. Zia-ul-Haq - II • Urban Councils Enjoyed Higher Levels of Revenue and Income than Rural and semi-Urban Ones • Urban Councils Under No Obligation To Provide Funds to Rural or semi-Urban Areas • Rural and semi-Urban Areas Dependent on Provincial Administrative Tier for Financial Support • Competition between Urban Middle Class and Numerically Strong Rural Elites for Resources

15. Zia-ul-Haq - III • Non-Party Based Elections in 1985 Created Localization of Politics at all Levels • Revival of Party Basis (1988) Did Not Reverse Localization of Politics Due to Weakened Parties • Space Left by Parties Filled by Fluid Local Political Factions

16. Summary (1947-2000) • Institutionalization of Clienteles, Personalized Politics • Disempowerment of Provincial Elected Tier • Circumscribed Power of Elected Local Governments • Strong Bureaucratic Hold Over Local Governments • Political Power Highly Centralized

17. Repairing the System • Increase Powers and Autonomy of Local Government • Reduce/Eliminate Bureaucratic Control • Devolve Some Federal Functions to Provinces • Reduce Patron-Client Politics • Balance Power Between Provincial and Local Government • Provide More Equitable Flow of Resources to Rural/semi-Urban Areas

18. The Current Local Government Reforms

19. Context • Local governments in Pakistan • Not recognized by constitution as third tier • Uneven development (military & civilian times) • Every renewal a new experiment without backward-forward linkages • Poor coexistence of LGs with political govts • Bureaucratic and provincial controls • Weak resource base and implementation capacity • Poor participation of people

20. Three Tiered Local Government System District Administration Caters to Development Needs Like Health Tehsil Administration Caters To Municipal Needs and Services Union Administration Elects Members of the Higher Tiers CCB’s Advisory Role in Service Provision

21. Devolution Plan 2000(Cont.) The Basic Structure

22. Current Reforms - Overview • Provincial to Local Decentralization, with no Federal Devolution • Limited Constitutional Support for Local Governance • Separation of Service Delivery Functions • Some Services Retained by Provinces, Others Devolved to Local Level Such as Health and Education • Budgeting, Planning and Development Functions of Services Devolved to Local Level

23. Overview - II • Legislative Division Between Urban and Rural Areas Eliminated • Pooled Resources and Rural Voting Strength Allow Greater Rural Access to Development Funds • Users (Citizens) Given Role in Service Delivery Through CCB’s • Deputy Commissioner (DC) Replaced by District Coordination Officer (DCO) Answerable to Nazim

24. Overview - III • Accountability to Citizens Through Electoral Process • Electoral Process Creates Linkages Between Different Levels of Local Government • Union Councilors Elected Through Majority Vote • District and Tehsil Council Made Up of Nazims and Naib Nazims From the Union Level • Seats Reserved for Women and Peasants

25. LGO 2001 and Pro-Poor Change

26. Weakening Political Collectivities - I • Attempt to Institutionalize Role of Military at Centre Through Presidential Power and NSC • Elections on Non-Party Basis • Enables Military to Create Complete Tier of Local Level Political Collaborators • Lack of Linkages Between Political Parties and Local Governments Creating Rivalry • Clienteles Politics Continued • In Punjab, 30% Nazims Former MNA’s or MPA’s, 90% Members of Political Families • In Rural Areas, 70% Seats Won by Traditional Elites

27. Weakening Political Collectivities - II • Interventions Against Politicians and Political Parties • Selective Accountability and Disqualification e.g. Education Criterion • Nazims Pressured to Align With Political Parties • Alignment of Nazims Gives Rise to Central Control and Friction With Opposition Parties • Lack of Space for Collective Political Action • CCB’s Only for Service Delivery, Not for Political or Social Reform • Citizens Separate from Decision-making, • Lack of Vertical Political Linkages • CCB’s Sparingly Implemented

28. Extent of Electoral Responsiveness • Nazims Not Necessarily Representative of Majority • Union Councilors Elected by Popular Vote Have Limited Role in Budgeting and Development Plans • Skewed Elections and Lack of Power at the Local Level Can Impair Accountability

29. Bureaucratic Power • Provincial Bureaucracy Cannot Suspend Local Governments • Although DCO Under Nazim, Fiscal Planning and Personnel management remained the Domain of DCO • Nazim Lacked Power to Suspend/Transfer Officials • Provincial Level Bureaucracy Maintained Control Over Appointments Limiting Autonomy of Nazims to Effect Change

30. Tension Between Provincial and Local Tiers • No Federal to Provincial Decentralization, While there has been Provincial to Local Devolution • Lack of Political Ownership by Political Parties Resulted in Competition Between Parties and Local Governments • Emergence of Parties as Principals Aggravated Competition and Rivalry • Encroachment On Each Others’ Perceived Territory Lead to Inter-Tier Conflict, Hampering Efficiency

31. Extent of Financial Empowerment • Rule Based System of Transfer (Provisional Finance Commission Awards) Controlled by Bureaucracy • Inability of Districts to Increase Own-source Revenue Impairs Ability to Increase Development Spending • No Major Revenue Sources Devolved From Provinces • Dependence On External Revenue Provides Reduced Political Incentive to Respond to Citizens, and for Them to Hold Governments Responsible • Declining Per Capita Transfers Will Hamper Development • Increased Transfers in Favor of Areas of Medium and Low Development

32. Representative Vs. Participatory Decentralization

33. Representative and Participatory Decentralization • Representative Decentralization Allows Citizens To Elect People To Make Decisions For Them • Participatory Decentralization Requires Citizens To Directly Play a Role in Decision-making • Participatory Decentralization Allows Citizens To Take Charge Of Development Priorities • Decentralization in Pakistan is Representative

34. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - I • Lack of Citizen Role in Planning • Citizen Participation Restricted to Service Delivery Through CCB’s • Development Planning and Budgeting in Hands of Representatives and Bureaucrats • Lack of Training and Awareness • No Provisions For Capacity Building of Citizens • Very Little Awareness Of CCB’s and LGP 2000

35. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - II • Lack of Space For Demanding Structural Change • While Service Provision Can Be Discussed, No Avenue For Debating Issues Such As Land Reform and Inequality • Lack of Legal Protection • No Safeguards to Ensure Citizen Proposals or Priorities Considered in Development Plans

36. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - III • Danger of Elite Capture • Local Elites Can Dominate Elections, Leaving the Poor as Marginalized as Before • Clienteles Politics Resulting in Resource Allocation to Particular Support Bases • CCB’s and Musalihat Anjuman Susceptible to Elite Capture • Lack Of Political Competition • Citizens Unable to Choose Between Differing Ideologies • In the Absence of Party Support and Organization Less Influential Candidates are Overshadowed by Elites

37. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - IV • Top-Down Approach • System Imposed and Designed By State Elite • Emphasis On Institution Building • People Not Consulted, Especially In the Absence of a Vibrant Civil Society • Power Struggles • Competition Between Local and Provincial Governments Precludes Devolution of Decision-making to Citizens • Attempts By Local Government To Gain Local Support Could Alienate National and Provincial Politicians

38. Conclusions • One formula fits all, implementation in one go • Devolution – phases (from center to province and from province to districts) • Failure to undertake financial repercussions-the transition committees never submitted their reports • Increased political participation yes, sustainability & effectiveness in doubt • Unfinished agenda- un established bodies, departments, failure to make changes in the ordinance due to rigidity • New agenda- Provincial & National Assembly Elections and emerging conflicts • Party or non-party based elections • to have or have not • Constitutional protection without endorsement of parliament

39. Policy Recommendations • Independence for provinces to manage local govt. through constitution of a high powered body from LGs • Ending uncertainty on constitutional position of LGs • Holding of next elections in one go for each province • Capacity building of political representatives with opportunities to play a role • Special focus on women councilors for enabling them to play a meaningful role • Mechanisms for creating symbiotic relationship between LGs and other political tiers • Education qualification may be relaxed for a person elected twice to LGs for competing for higher political levels

40. Highly Responsive Local Government “invited” space “jointly defined” space Fully engaging Civil Society Non-engaging Civil Society “claimed” space “legally defined” space Unresponsive Local Government Source: Nierras, 2002

41. Quote of the Day • Where there is little or no public opinion, there is likely to be bad government, which sooner or later becomes autocratic government. William Lyon Mackenzie King