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This paper by Sigurður Guðni Sigurðsson explores the effects of project delays on profitability for both sellers and buyers within the context of fixed contract prices, penalty structures, and payment distribution methods. It discusses various scenarios, including short and long production times, highlighting the financial implications of delays. The analysis emphasizes the strong connection between time and cost and suggests that delays harm both parties. Additionally, it advocates for further research on the interaction between distributed payments and project profitability.
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Delay and project profitability. Sigurður Guðni Sigurðsson September 2007
Delay and project profitability. Presumptions Total time = Production time + Time of utilization Total time is constant • Period of production 1 year, duration of operations 5 years • Affect on producer/developer • Affect on buyer • Period of production 3 years, duration of operations 10 years • Affect on producer/developer • Affect on buyer • Lump sum payment vs. distributed payment
Reason of delay. Contract variation. • The owners (buyer) determination that makes delay and extra cost on his accountability. • Force Majeure. Neither seller or buyer have any control of the cause. The seller can delay the project of such reasons. • Delay based on sellers action. The seller is responsible and pays for it with penalty.
Short project . Sellers presumptions Fixed contract price– Payment on delivery. • Cost estimate Kr. 1.000.000 • Contribution margin 30% • Contract price Kr. 1.428.571 • Duration of production 12 months • Penalty 5 % per month • Maximum penalty 15% • Fixed cost per year 7,5% • Cost of capital 8% • Inflation 4%
Short project Buyers presumptions • Investment – no delay Kr. 1.428.571 • Operation cost per year Kr. 1.000.000 • Markup 70% • Lifetime 5 years • Financial cost 6 % • Fixed cost per year Kr. 75.000 • Inflation 4% • Return on capital 20%
Internal Rate of Return based on income distribution and delay.
Long project period. Sellers presumptions Fixed contract price – Payment on delivery. • Cost estimate Kr. 1.000.000 • Contribution margin 34,1% • Contract price Kr. 1.517.451 • Duration of production 3 years • Penalty 2,5 % per month • Maximum penalty 15% • Fixed cost (36 months) Kr. 75.000 • Financial cost 8% • Inflation 4%
Long project. Buyers presumptions • Investment – no delay Kr. 1.517.451 • Operation cost per year Kr. 1.000.000 • Markup 50% • Lifetime 10 years • Financial cost 8 % • Fixed cost per year Kr. 75.000 • Inflation 4% • Return on capital 20%
Distributed payment . Long project Two payment series • Four payments: Payment order Month. Percentage Dawn payment 0 10,0% Payment # 2 12 25,0% Payment # 3 24 25,0% Final payment 36 40,0% • Four payments - 85% of earned value at each time
Conclusions I • Time and cost in projects have strong connection. • Delay harm both seller and buyer. • The buyers protection by using penalties protect him only if income is low in the delay period or the delay is short. • It is of common interest that the production period is successful. • The length of the production period and lifetime of the product does not influence the results strongly. • Sensitivity for changes in presumptions increase with longer delay.
Conclusions II • The distribution of the income affects the delay impact. More impact as the delivery is later in the product life-cycle. • It is of great interest to study further interaction between distributed payment and profitability of projects. • The impact of distributed payments are often higher than penalty. • Distributed payment is of high value for the seller. • Distributed payment cost the buyer more as the delay increase.