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Security flaws in existing voting systems - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


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Security flaws in existing voting systems. by Slavik Krassovsky. Introduction. HAVA $3.9 billion appropriated in states aid DRE Vendors: Diebold ES&S MicroVote WINvote Sequoia Hart InterCivic. DRE Machine Architecture. Certification process. Is done per FEC guidelines ITAs Ciber

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Presentation Transcript
introduction
Introduction
  • HAVA
    • $3.9 billion appropriated in states aid
  • DRE Vendors:
    • Diebold
    • ES&S
    • MicroVote
    • WINvote
    • Sequoia
    • Hart InterCivic
certification process
Certification process
  • Is done per FEC guidelines
  • ITAs
    • Ciber
    • Wyle
    • SysTest
  • Off-the-shelf hardware and software is exempt
media reported problems
Media reported problems
  • 01/04, Broward County, Florida:
    • 134 out of 10,844 votes are missing
  • 11/03, Boone County, Indiana:
    • 144,000 votes were cast but Boone County contains fewer than 19,000
  • 01/04, Hinds County, Mississippi:
    • Machines stayed down all day
diebold
Diebold
  • Analyzed by researches:
    • Hardcoded DES key
    • No Smart card authentication
    • Unsecure smart card deactivation
    • Hardcoded PIN
    • Etc...
attacks
Attacks on the machine

Undetectable rigging

Attacks
other problems
Other problems
  • No way to verify that their votes were recorded correctly
  • No way to publicly count the votes
  • No meaningful recounts are possible
conclusion
Conclusion
  • Some problems can be solved by strict certification
  • But some problems are inherent
  • It’s best to look for alternatives