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Gulf at War Part Two The Gulf War 1990-1991 and Beyond PowerPoint Presentation
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Gulf at War Part Two The Gulf War 1990-1991 and Beyond

Gulf at War Part Two The Gulf War 1990-1991 and Beyond

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Gulf at War Part Two The Gulf War 1990-1991 and Beyond

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  1. Gulf at War Part TwoThe Gulf War 1990-1991 and Beyond Sources: Yergin Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil, Oxford UP, 2006

  2. General remarks • The 1990-91 Gulf War is known in neighboring states as the Second Gulf War • Like the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 (the First Gulf War), it began with a surprise attack by Iraqi forces on the orders of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein • A second miscalculation: to absorb Kuwait and confront the world with a fait accompli • It inaugurated the permanent introduction of US ground and air forces into a region previously frequented only by its naval forces

  3. Outline • Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait • Operation Desert Shield • Operation Desert Storm • The financial burden • Bill Clinton’s dual containment • US military presence in the Gulf

  4. The war begins • August 2, 1990: 100.000 Iraqi troops begin invasion of Kuwait • They meet little resistance and soon advance toward Kuwait City • Reason offered by Saddam: Kuwait belonged to Iraq; Kuwait did not respect OPEC quotas • Real reasons: • to dominate the Arab world and the Gulf • to make Iraq the predominant oil power • to make up for the losses caused by the war with Iran

  5. International reactions • Disposition and re-supply of Iraqi forces suggest they might advance toward Saudi oil fields • UN Security Council Res. 660 and 662: condemn Iraq's invasion and annexation and call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal • USSR, longstanding Iraq’s ally, is no more in position to veto SC Res • Aug. 4: NSC decision to deploy US forces as quickly as possible in order to: • deter further Iraqi aggression • establish defenses in Saudi Arabia • buildup sufficient power to retake critical facilities

  6. Bin Laden’s offer to Saudi Arabia… • Returned from Afghanistan 1989 and had a following among “Afghan Arabs” (Arabs who fought Soviets in Afghanistan) • After Iraqi invasion of K., he approached several key Saudi decision makers with offer to deploy his Afghan fighters to reverse the aggression • Main aim is to keep strangers (mainly Americans) out of Saudi Arabia

  7. …is rejected • Saudis know well that Mujahedin had won as a result of international support and ground conditions not religious convictions • So they refuse: “there are no caves in Kuwait; you cannot fight them from the mountains and caves” • “We will fight them with faith” • The Royal family’s rejection proved costly. For a long time Bin Laden challenged the House of Saud as well as the United States

  8. Desert Shield • On August 7, deployment of U.S. forces began, reflecting guarantees to S Arabia that went back to Harry Truman • By Aug 9, GCC States agreed to permit access to US forces • Aug. 20 National Security Directive 45: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: • first of two key Presidential directives that guided US policy and actions The directive articulated U.S. interests in the region and the four principles that would guide U.S. policy during the crisis (Doc. 2)

  9. UN ultimatum • Security Council Res. 678 followed on Nov 29 1990: if Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein did not remove his troops from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 a U.S.-led coalition was authorized to drive them out • This time Soviet assent is encouraged by a $4 billion credit granted by Saudi Arabia under US pressure • Saddam did not comply to UN ultimatum • From Desert Shield to Desert Storm

  10. Desert Storm • Jan. 15, 1991: US National Security Directive 54, Responding to Iraqi Aggression in theGulf : • provides authorization for U.S. forces to begin military action, authorized by various U.N. resolutions, to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait • notes that while the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq "have had measurable impact upon Iraq's economy but have not accomplished the intended objective of ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. There is no persuasive evidence that they will do so in a timely manner“ (Doc. 4)

  11. Coalition at war • Early in the morning of January 17, Baghdad time, the U.S.-led coalition launched air attacks against Iraqi targets • Feb 24, coalition ground forces began their attack • Feb 27, Kuwait City was declared liberated, and with allied forces having driven well into Iraq, President Bush and his advisers decided to halt the war • A cease-fire took effect at 8:00 the following morning

  12. Address on the End of the Gulf War, Feb 27, 1991 • George H. W. Bush: “Kuwait is liberated. Iraq's army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal” • A controversial decision

  13. Desert Storm: Paying the bill • Besides assistance to USSR, Saudi Arabia (and Kuwait) agreed to $800 m economic aid to Turkey and $1 b over 5 years for a Turkish special defense fund • SA directed $800 m to Eastern Europe • SA covered billions of $ of in-country expenses for US and European forces including fuel and water costs, transportation of US forces; moving a Syrian and Egyptian brigade closer to front

  14. …paying the bill • US Ambassador Charles Freeman: “Saudis paid for the transportation and, indeed, the equipment of many of Third World forces who arrived […] from uniforms to guns to Jeeps to artillery, all of which the Saudis provided, along with salaries and housing and water and food” • By the war’s end, SA contribution and commitments would surpass $ 60 billion

  15. Providing political and religious cover • SoS James Baker’s 3 prewar questions: • Would Arab leaders guarantee their support • 1.if all military operations remained firmly under US control • 2.if US attacked Iraq • 3.if Iraq attacked Israel and Israel retaliated • SA (King Fahd) readily answered yes to all 3 questions • Kuwaitis did the same, but had great difficulty answering affirmatively to third question

  16. In the Twilight of the Cold War • Reagan/Bush period as high-water mark in US-Saudi relations • US-Saudi partnership helped not only to liberate Kuwait but also to defeat Soviets in Afghanistan • Thus, it helped to end the Cold War with US as winner • Subsequent US priorities and policies did not include reassessment of relationship

  17. Bill Clinton (1992-2000) • Mainly focused on domestic agenda • International priorities: • 1.Global economy • 2.Promotion of democratization • Action: • 1.creation of NAFTA and WTO • 2.backing of Washington Consensus • 3.establishment of National Economic Council • Middle East: • priority to Arab-Israeli settlement • Iraq-Iran: Dual Containment

  18. Dual Containment Policy • First articulated in 1993 and openly endorsed in 1994: • a determined effort to contain both Iraq and Iran • it went against tendency by SA to face Iraq’s menace by improving relations with Iran • it offered no solution to regional problem of how to reduce two of the region’s gravest threats • instead of solving problem, it simply froze it

  19. …Dual Containment • Dual Containment meant to deter Iraq and Iran by deploying more US troops in the region • At about the same time (1994) Saddam Hussein again threatened Kuwait’s border • Therefore, to the Clinton Administration facts seemed to indicate that Dual Containment was the right answer

  20. US Troops in Saudi Arabia • Nearly 500,000 at the time of Desert Storm • Reduced to less than 1000 in 1993, but still there despite promises of total withdrawal • 1994: 36,000 US troops sent again; F and GB also send troops • From that time on, US troops in and around Saudi Arabia constantly increased, out of Dual Containment and the fear that Saddam would otherwise menace the region again • Deployment in SA in 2000: nearly 80,000

  21. Unrest, protests, and terrorism • During and after Desert Storm, unrest mounts against US military presence in SA • Considering the costs, why is SA unable to defend herself? Why does the House of Saud tolerate the US military presence? • Besides, the introduction of Arab satellite television in the early to mid-1990s magnified the Iraqi sufferings and added to protest against Americans

  22. Protests take an anti-American turn • 1995: strike to a joint US-Saudi facility that housed a US military mission • 1996: truck bomb explosion outside Khobar Towers (apartment complex housing 2000 US servicemen) • 1998: simultaneous explosion of two powerful bombs at the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

  23. …anti-American turn • The 1998 attack is carried on Aug. 7, 8th anniversary of US entering SA and 6 months after bin Laden issued his “jihad against Jews and Crusaders” which urged followers to kill the Americans and their Allies • Terrorism is pushed to the front of the Clinton Administration foreign policy concerns • US Justice Dept. charged bin Laden with conspiracy to kill Americans • Bin Laden became America’s most wanted fugitive

  24. The fate of the Ma’danResurrecting Eden – You Tube