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Which Patient do I treat? Economists and Physicians in the Lab. Marlies Ahlert University Halle-Wittenberg Stefan Felder Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Basel Bodo Vogt University of Magdeburg. Research questions.

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which patient do i treat economists and physicians in the lab

Which Patient do I treat?Economists and Physicians in the Lab

Marlies Ahlert University Halle-Wittenberg

Stefan Felder Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Basel

Bodo Vogt University of Magdeburg

research questions
Research questions
  • Elicitation of social preferences of indi-viduals deciding in allocation problems
  • Choices more in line with utilitarian prin-ciples or more with some egalitarian rules?
  • Framing effects (med vs. neutral)?
  • Professional effects (physicians vs. economists)?
slide3

Overview

The allocation problem and possible solutions

Classification of distributors

Framing and professional effects

Who is being served and how much do they receive?

Conclusion

1 allocation problem
1. Allocation problem
  • Economist / physician i = 0
  • Endowment: ECU / time R
  • 7 recipients / patients i = 1,...,7
  • Recipients are differentiated acc. to- minimal needs mi

- productivity / effectivity pi

the allocator decides about the ration of the resources each of the recipients i receives r i
The allocator decides about the ration of the resources each of the recipients i receives: ri

Payoff of recipient i

induced preferences payoff of the allocator
„Induced“ preferencesPayoff of the allocator:

t:participation rate oftherecipients‘ payoffs(20%)

c: Fine foreveryrecipientwithzeropayoff(50 ECU)

2 classification of allocators ideal types
2. Classification of allocators(ideal types)

Ownpayoffmaximizer: Typ S (OPMA)

Maximizeshisownpayoff, actsaccordingtotheinducedpreferences

WS (0 , 1 ,...,n) = 0

Beithemostproductiveperson, personkisbeingservedift mk pk> t mk pi- c.

Residual endowment goes to the most productive individual

utilitarian typ u ua
Utilitarian: Typ U (UA)

Modified dominance criterion for serving k:

Hurdle is higher

number maximizer typ n nma
Number maximizer: Typ N (NMA)

maximizes

Priorization acc. to minimal need serves to overcome i=0

If the residual endowment is not sufficient to serve a further person, the allocator is indifferent as to which person is being served and who receives the residual.

rawlsian typ r ra
Rawlsian: Typ R (RA)

Priorizationaccordingot minimal need (like NMA)

Allocatesthe residual resourcesaccordingtotheleximin-criterion

He servespersonswithlowmipiwithinthesetofrecipients

experimental design 1
10 treatments

1 distributor

7 potential recipients

10 x 7 choices for each distributor

Experimental design /1
experimental design 2
Experimentaldesign /2

17 Sessions with 136 students in total

2 different „framings“: neutral, medical

22 advanced medical students

(8 in the neutral, 14 in the medical frame )

36 students in economics

(21 in the neutral, 15 in the medical frame )

MaXLab Magdeburg, elfe Essen

general observations tested for
General observations tested for
  • Type of allocators are more clearly revealed unter familiar conditions:

- Economist in the neutral frame, Types S and N

- Physicians in the medical frame, types N uad R

  • in both frames, physician more clearly deviate from the induced direction (toward altruistic behavior)
  • Economist deviate more from the induced direction in the neutral frame
5 who is being served and by how much
5. Who is being served and by how much?

Hypothesis set 1

  • All allocators prioritize persons with low minimal need
  • TypS has a strong positive interest to serve persons with high productivity
slide18

5. Who is being served and by how much?

logit-model for positive payoffs of the recipients

  • The endowment has a positive effect on the likelihood of being served
  • All allocator serve those persons more likely who have a low minimial need (holds for types N and R)
  • All allocator serve those persons more likely who have a high productivity (holds for types S and N
5 who is being served and by how much1
5. Who is being served and by how much?

Hypotheses set 2

  • Typ S und Typ N will serve those recipient extra, who show a high productivity
  • Rawlsian will increase the extra ration for those, who have a long initial payoff
conclusion
Conclusion
  • We are able to identify types, who systematically differ from each other
  • Distributive norms show up more clearly under conditions familiar to the allocators (oec,oec; med,med)
  • Productivity (+) und minimal need (-) influence the probability of being served