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Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games

Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games. Recall: Nash equilibrium. Let A and B be | M | x | N | matrices. Mixed strategies: Probability distributions over M and N If player 1 plays x , and player 2 plays y , the payoffs are x T Ay and x T By

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Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games

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  1. Algorithms for solving two-player normal form games

  2. Recall: Nash equilibrium • Let A and B be |M| x |N| matrices. • Mixed strategies: Probability distributions over M and N • If player 1 plays x, and player 2 plays y, the payoffs are xTAy and xTBy • Given y, player 1’s best response maximizes xTAy • Given x, player 2’s best response maximizes xTBy • (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium if x and y are best responses to each other

  3. Finding Nash equilibria • Zero-sum games • Solvable in poly-time using linear programming • General-sum games • Unknown whether solvable in poly-time • “Together with factoring, the complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium is in my opinion the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P today.” -- Papadimitriou • Several algorithms with exponential worst-case running time • Lemke-Howson [1964] – linear complementarity problem • Porter-Nudelman-Shoham [AAAI-04] – support enumeration • Sandholm-Gilpin-Conitzer [2005] - MIP Nash = mixed integer programming approach

  4. Zero-sum games • Among all best responses, there is always at least one pure strategy • Thus, player 1’s optimization problem is: • This is equivalent to: • By LP duality, player 2’s optimal strategy is given by the dual variables

  5. General-sum games: Lemke-Howson algorithm • = pivoting algorithm similar to simplex algorithm • We say each mixed strategy is “labeled” with the player’s unplayed pure strategies and the pure best responses of the other player • A Nash equilibrium is a completely labeled pair (i.e., the union of their labels is the set of pure strategies)

  6. Lemke-Howson Illustration Example of label definitions

  7. Lemke-Howson Illustration Equilibrium 1

  8. Lemke-Howson Illustration Equilibrium 2

  9. Lemke-Howson Illustration Equilibrium 3

  10. Lemke-Howson Illustration Run of the algorithm

  11. Lemke-Howson Illustration

  12. Lemke-Howson Illustration

  13. Lemke-Howson Illustration

  14. Lemke-Howson Illustration

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