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The Barbary Wars: Madison and Jefferson. The Barbary Wars. Islamic polities or regencies (kingdoms) in North Africa: Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, Tripoli (in Libya)

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the barbary wars
The Barbary Wars
  • Islamic polities or regencies (kingdoms) in North Africa: Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, Tripoli (in Libya)
  • “Corsairs” (really pirates) acting under protection of rulers in each regency would capture European merchant ships, demand ransom and annual tribute
  • 1780s: Problems with Barbary regencies:
    • British encouragement of piracy
    • Barbary regencies had no practice in the law of nations, had their own code of “honor upon the seas”
  • How to deal with Barbary regencies?
    • “Accommodate” or just pay (John Adams)
    • “Change behavior” or intimidate (Thomas Jefferson)
1785 1800 the treaty structure
1785-1800: The Treaty Structure
  • 1785-1787: Congress under Articles of Confederation
    • Morocco “prompts negotiations” with capture and release (1785)
    • Algiers captures 21 Americans; demands $60,000
    • Problem is “asymmetry” – U.S. had no navy, no money, no support from Europe, and nothing to use as leverage
    • What to do?
      • Adams: pay tribute until we have an adequate naval force
      • Jefferson: dishonorable to pay; create a league of second-tier naval powers (Sweden, Portugal, Venice, etc.) for a blockade of Barbary coast – but there is no support from Congress or Europe for this.
1785 1800 the treaty structure1
1785-1800: The Treaty Structure
  • 1790s: Washington’s Administration
    • War breaks out in Europe, Barbary pirates are unleashed
    • Washington’s plan: create a navy to “change behavior”
    • Congress: A U.S. navy in the Mediterranean might entangle us in the European war. Accommodate instead. Authorizes $800,000 for tribute and ransom (1794)
    • Treaty Approach:
      • Negotiate annual tribute and set terms for ransom
      • Pay higher rates to Algiers, and use the authority of the Dey to leverage lower rates with other regencies
      • Get other regencies to recognize authority of Dey of Algiers to act as intermediary on behalf of the U.S.
    • Treaty with Algiers (1795) – nearly $1,000,000 and promise of “good offices” by Dey of Algiers
    • Treaty with Tunis (1797) – $107,000 and agreement to negotiate through Algiers
    • Treaty with Tripoli (1797) – $57,000 and agreement to negotiate through Algiers
1785 1800 the treaty structure2
1785-1800: The Treaty Structure
  • 1800-1801: Jefferson’s administration
    • Problems:
      • 1800 - Dey of Algiers gets bold, orders U.S.S. George Washington to sail to Turkey
      • 1800 - Pasha Yusuf in Tripoli receives several ships from Sultan, threatens war with U.S. and demands a new treaty removing the influence of Algiers
    • With end of Quasi-War with France, naval forces now available for Mediterranean operations.
    • Consuls urge TJ to drop treaty approach and attempt “change of behavior” through “The Consular Plan”:
      • Get tough with Tripoli first (the weakest of the Barbary regencies)
      • Be willing to use force to change Barbary opinion of American character
      • Seek cooperation of European powers
      • Seek treaty with Ottoman Sultan
    • TJ agrees in part…
1801 first attempt to change behavior
1801: First attempt to “change behavior”
  • Deployment of “Commodore Dale’s Squadron”
    • Limited (only 124 guns total) “fleet of observation” to the coast of Tripoli
    • Fleet would make a show to act as a deterrent, combined with diplomatic negotiations to eliminate annual tribute from treaty
  • Successes:
    • Caught Tripoli off guard
    • Blockaded 2 Tripolitan cruisers at Gibralter
    • U.S.S. Enterprise defeated a Tripolitan gunship
    • Sweden offered limited cooperation in a brief blockade of Tripoli
  • Setbacks:
    • No other European powers willing to join coalition
    • Algiers was not fulfilling its promise of using “good offices” on behalf of U.S.
    • Early 1802: the U.S. merchant ship Franklin is captured by Tripoli
  • This causes TJ to re-evaluate strategy and degree of naval power necessary…
1802 1803 commodore morris failed campaign
1802-1803: Commodore Morris’ failed campaign
  • Slightly larger naval force deployed with orders to blockade
    • Commodore Morris focuses instead on convoy duty
    • This emboldens Algiers and Tunis, who begin to make outrageous demands for gifts (including ships) and tribute
  • Other events:
    • Napoleon comes to power in France, impending war between France and GB
    • TJ realizes we must find a speedy way to get control of the situation in the Mediterranean
    • Congress authorizes a significant expansion of the navy designated for the Mediterranean
1803 commodore preble s first campaign
1803: Commodore Preble’s First Campaign
  • Preble blockades Tripoli and “distresses the coast”
  • Operation delayed when Morocco declares war and captures several U.S. merchant ships and imprisons U.S. consul
  • Moroccan Emperor agrees to all of Preble’s demands – no more tribute, no ransom – only “gifts” upon the arrival of a new consul.
  • DISASTER: While Preble is dealing with Morocco, the frigate U.S.S. Philadelphia runs aground and is captured in Tripoli harbor, along with 300 men. Pasha Yusuf demands $3,000,000.
1804 preble s second campaign
1804: Preble’s Second Campaign
  • Unsuccessful bombardment campaign by Preble.
  • 1 success in 1804: Marines, led by Stephen Decatur, capture a Tripolitanketch, sneak aboard the Philadelphia and destroy it.

1804-1805: Barron’s Campaign

  • Late 1804, larger fleet deployed, consuls instructed to refuse any future demands for tribute.
  • Barron blockades Tripoli coast with some success.
1804 1805 barron s campaign
1804-1805: Barron’s Campaign
  • TJ authorizes Madison’s idea of possible “regime change” and a “second front.”
    • General William Eaton & Marines head west from Cairo. The plan:
    • Hamet Pasha will gather troops and supporters along the way.
    • Eventually topple Yusuf Pasha’s regime.
  • 1805: Joint naval and land operation, Eaton’s forces capture the port city of Derne.
    • Yusuf Pasha reaches an agreement with Barron.
1821 a critical year
1821: A Critical Year

What to do about independence movements in South America?

  • Still recovering from War of 1812
  • Proclamation of neutrality in colonial revolutions since 1815
  • Missouri Compromise and slavery (1820)
  • Legality of Spanish cession of Floridas (1820)
  • Setbacks in revolutionary movements (military defeats and civil unrest)
  • Privateers sailing out of newly independent states

The great danger – if the U.S. seemed to side too strongly with revolutionary movements and governments, European powers might side with Spain to achieve symmetry.

slide13

How to handle deal with both European powers and the peoples fighting for their independence, in a way that combines our “interest guided by justice”?

  • Recognize independence immediately (Henry Clay, “Doctrine of Lexington,” including an American hemispheric alliance against Russia/“The Holy Alliance” and European colonization)
  • Join an Anglo-American alliance to promote republican revolution in Europe (“Edinburgh Doctrine”) for counter-pressure
  • Use the possibility of recognition as a foreign policy tool in consideration of U.S. long-term strategic security interests (John Quincy Adams)
clay s lexington doctrine 1820
Clay’s “Lexington Doctrine” (1820)
  • The U.S. should support “by all means short of actual war” the cause of South American independence
    • Immediate recognition of states that had won or were fighting for their independence
    • Revoke neutrality laws of Madison and Monroe
    • Develop relations with South American leaders
  • What Clay did NOT want:
    • military intervention
    • fomenting of revolution or promoting civil unrest in colonies
    • forcing American principles or government upon South American states
adams independence day address 1821
Adams’ Independence Day Address, 1821
  • Purposes:
    • To remind Americans of founding principles and explain our foreign policy positions squarely in the framework of those principles.
    • To establish the justice of revolutionary causes in SA (and to provide justification for futurerecognition)
    • To suggest(through focus on principles of liberty) that colonial systems are unjust and should in time be abolished
jqa a criteria for use of force abroad
JQA’a criteria for use of force abroad
  • Must be within U.S. means
  • Must not result in wider war (especially with Europe)
  • Should contribute to the long term general peace of mankind
  • Should enhance America’s moral standing
  • Should result in an improvement of America’s defensive military capabilities
jqa s conditions for recognition
JQA’s conditions for recognition
  • SA states must:
    • demonstrate effective control over a specific territory
    • demonstrate willingness to abide by law of nations
    • agree to most favored nation status for U.S. (and vice versa)
    • be willing and able to maintain political independence from other European powers
    • not harbor colonial expansionist aims of their own
  • Meeting all of these criteria does not mean automatic recognition by the U.S.
events of 1823
Events of 1823
  • France (supported by continental allies) invades Spain to restore monarch to throne
  • Rumors of European alliance to restore Spanish dominions in western hemisphere.
  • British proposal: joint Anglo-American opposition
  • Emperor Alexander (Holy Alliance) implies threat that the U.S. should remain neutral in the restoration campaign
monroe doctrine annual message 1823
“Monroe Doctrine” (Annual Message 1823)
  • A declaration of rights on behalf of the U.S and the American states
  • Terms of relations between the U.S. and Europe
    • No new colonization by European nations in the Western Hemisphere
    • No attempts to expand or restore former European colonies that have declared and achieved independence
    • The U.S. will not intervene in existing and future colonial revolutions…unless…
    • The U.S. will not interfere in the internal affairs of European nations
mckinley s war message 1898
McKinley’s War Message 1898
  • Why should we get involved?
    • In “the cause of humanity”
    • Protection of American citizens and property in Cuba
    • Injury to American commerce
    • Cuban instability is “a constant menace to our peace”
  • How should we get involved?
    • Recognize insurgents as belligerents -- NO
    • Recognize Cuban independence – NO
    • Intervene on one side or the other -- NO
    • “neutral intervention” to “impose a rational compromise”
mckinley s war message 18981
McKinley’s War Message 1898
  • Is intervention compatible with the tradition of “neutrality”?
    • “strict neutrality” vs. “neutral intervention” (impartial use of force)
  • Congress authorizes use of force “for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba”
  • Teller Amendment (no permanent annexation of Cuba to U.S.)
platt amendment 1901
Platt Amendment 1901
  • Cuba shall make no treaties with foreign nations “which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba.”
  • Cuba shall not authorize any foreign power (other than the United States) to inhabit any portion of the island for military or naval purposes.
  • The Cuban government shall contract no foreign debt beyond what could be paid by “the ordinary revenues of the island.”
  • Cuba must sell or lease to the United States “lands necessary for coaling or naval stations” in order to “enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense.”
  • The United States reserved “the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.”
the platt amendment
ThePlatt Amendment
  • Morgan’s objections
    • Violates right to political independence
    • Goes too far in imposing political ideas, forms and terms
    • Will require intervention for altruistic purposes
    • Will invite rebellion and lead to permanent involvement in Cuba
  • Ratified by Cuban Legislature in 1903
  • See TR’s 1906 Annual Message to Congress
tr s corollary to monroe doctrine 1904 message to congress
TR’s Corollary to Monroe Doctrine (1904 Message to Congress)
  • Our pledge to uphold and enforce that doctrine “may force the United States, however reluctantly . . . to the exercise of an international police power.”
    • West. Hem. nations have the right to freedom and independence so long as they do not by their actions (political or economic) provoke or invite intervention in the western hemisphere by European nations.
    • The United States as the “police force” of the western hemisphere will judge whether circumstances or actions by other nations warrant military or administrative intervention. (TR 1905 Message to Congress)
    • Introduces the idea of “preventive” action in foreign policy
slide26

American Imperialism

in the

Philippines

what to do with the philippines
What to do with the Philippines?

Problems:

  • Aguinaldo had fought with U.S. against Spain and had declared independence
  • European interests in the Philippines
  • Must take all or nothing (but only really needed Manila Bay and Luzon)
  • Annexation only constitutional if future statehood planned (Puerto Rico annexed on possible future statehood; Guam annexed out of security/economic interests)
what to do with the philippines1
What to do with the Philippines?

Option #1: Leave as if nothing had happened (isolationists) (ISMD pp. 377-78)

  • Arguments against:
    • colonial power vacuum
    • moral duty (see Senator Albert Beveridge, “The March of the Flag”)

Option #2: Recognize independence, negotiate treaty based U.S. security arrangements (Senators George Hoar and John Morgan) (ISMD pp. 378 and 396)

what to do with the philippines2
What to do with the Philippines?

Option #3: Occupy and establish protectorate (Senators Orville Platt and Albert Beveridge) (ISMDp. 378, 416-420)

  • Arguments for:
    • Moral duty (See Platt and Beveridge in 1899 & 1900 Senate debates)
  • Arguments against:
    • Explicitly colonial
    • Affect on American moral character (“Imperialist”)
    • Unconstitutional (no authority to establish protectorates or colonies)(Senator Hoar)
    • It would commit U.S. to defense without adequate control over Filipino government (no Platt Amendment for Philippines)(President McKinley/Theodore Roosevelt)
what to do with the philippines3
What to do with the Philippines?

Option #4: Annex permanently as territory

  • Arguments for (McKinley, T. Roosevelt) (ISMD pp. 393):
    • Prevents colonial power vacuum
    • Economic interests in Far East
    • No “Filipino” people (claims of independence do not apply)
    • Moral duty
  • Arguments against (Hoar) (ISMD pp. 372-76, 379):
    • Abandons tradition of “neutrality”/entanglement in world affairs
    • Involvement in colonial race/conflicts
    • Undermines Monroe Doctrine
    • No intention of adding as a future state
    • Unconstitutional
what to do with the philippines4
What to do with the Philippines?

Compromise: Temporary annexation (ISMD p. 422)

    • Arguments for (McKinley, Roosevelt):
      • Cannot fall into hands of another colonial power
      • Security/economic interests (Morgan)
      • Moral duty (Platt, Beveridge)
    • Arguments against (See Hoar’s arguments in 1899 Senate debate)(ISMD pp. 381-385):
      • Unnecessary
      • Contrary to stated purposes in Constitution’s Preamble
      • Contrary to principles of Declaration of Independence
        • See Beveridge & Hoar exchange in 1900 Senate debate
  • Result: U.S. Filipino War (1899-1902)(ISMD p. 423)
slide32

Woodrow Wilson, World War I,

and the

League of Nations

woodrow wilson s post war vision 1916 1917
Woodrow Wilson’s post-war vision, 1916-1917
  • International relations must be based on “a new and more wholesome diplomacy”
  • Complete transparency in treaties, alliances and diplomatic relations
  • Cooperation among nations in pursuit of common interests
  • Must unite to defend the rights of mankind
  • Free navigation of the seas
  • Territorial adjustments only to promote future security and liberty of those peoples
  • No excessive/punitive indemnities
  • Association of nations to act as lawgiver, court, and enforcer of law
woodrow wilson s 14 points 1918
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points, 1918
  • Complete openness and transparency in diplomacy.
  • Absolute freedom of seas
  • Free and equal trade worldwide
  • Multilateral arms reductions
  • Adjustment of colonial claims based on interests of populations

6-13. Territorial adjustments in Europe along cultural lines based on right to self-determination or “autonomous development”

14. “General association of nations” to guarantee political independence and territorial integrity of all nations against aggression

republican amendments to the paris peace covenant 1919
Republican Amendments to the Paris Peace Covenant (1919)
  • U.S. must be sole and final judge of its international obligations
  • U.S. may withdraw from League by Congressional resolution
  • U.S. will not intervene abroad or employ military without Congressional resolution
  • The U.S. will accept no mandate without Congressional approval.
  • League has no authority over U.S. domestic affairs
  • No monetary contributions except by act of Congress
  • League has no authority over U.S. armaments levels
founding vs wilsonian foreign policy
Founding vs. Wilsonian Foreign Policy

Wilson:

  • Rights best secured through collective security/delegation of sovereignty to international legal bodies
  • Highest (absolute) moral duty is to promote welfare of other peoples and the world as a whole
  • Use of force justifiable only for primary purpose of promoting world democracy or civilization of others
  • Enemies are selected based on regime type (autocratic) according to historical events
  • Not all peoples/nations have the right to political independence equally (no natural right)
  • Must engage in wars of liberation for collective world security
  • No more “neutrality” in old sense – must intervene in foreign wars as a “neutral” (not selfish) as dictated by history

Founding:

  • U.S. has natural right to political independence in order to decide how best to defend rights and sovereignty
  • Highest moral duty is to secure rights of own citizens
  • Use of force justifiable only for primary purpose of self-security
  • Statesmen select enemies based on level of threat and capability, as dictated by prudence
  • Must respect the equal natural right of other peoples/nations to political independence
  • Should refrain from wars of liberation unless necessary for our security
  • Remain neutral in foreign wars that do not critically affect our interests or security, as dictated by prudence
fdr and wwii
FDR and WWII
  • The problem: Allies need the Soviets to defeat Germany and Japan; but also need to start thinking about role of USSR in the post war world.
  • FDR rejects suggestion to use military to initiate Soviet roll back before end of the war:
    • Need to prevent a renewed German-Soviet pact
    • Needs continued Soviet non-intervention in PTO
    • Possible public backlash against prolonged war/casualties would renew isolationism
    • Plan to “contain by integration” as a full partner in shaping post-war peace. This would alleviate perceptions of external sources of insecurity. FDR, 1944: “They haven’t got any crazy ideas of conquest.; and now that they have got to know us, they are much more willing to accept us.” (SC p. 9)
    • Foreign aggression would be checked by new international organization (UNO), and Soviet aggression would be undermined by full participation in that organization.
3 views on u s russian relations and policy toward the ussr
3 views on U.S.-Russian relations and policy toward the USSR
  • Former VP Henry Wallace:
    • Peaceful co-existence possible on ideological plane
  • W. Averill Harriman (Amb. To Russia), General John Deane (Military Advisor on Russian Policy) and President Truman (initially):
    • Ideological differences less important; appeal to reasonable common interests
    • The Soviets can be trusted to behave like rational actors in response to U.S. aid and concessions.
    • Use a diplomatic quid pro quo system (a.k.a. “carrot and stick” policy) to promote cooperation and reach compromise. Types of leverage:
      • Post-war loans
      • Threat of publicity of Russian unilateralism/non-cooperation
      • U.S. atomic capability
  • George Kennan (Minister-counselor at Moscow Embassy):
    • The U.S. does not really understand the Russian mind.
    • The USSR expects to dominate its sphere of influence.
    • We must patiently change Soviet perceptions (of western weakness, inconsistency, vulnerability) and modify external behavior.
kennan s long telegram 1946
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946)
  • Part 1: The Soviet world view and long term strategic objectives (“Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook”):
    • Soviet world view:
      • Capitalist nations are a permanent threat
      • “there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”
    • Strategic objectives:
      • Soviets must dominate a communist world sphere
      • Must prevent capitalist wars of intervention, promote war between capitalist nations
      • Utilize “progressive” and “democratic” elements in capitalist societies to promote Soviet objectives through internal pressure on governments
      • Promote “revolutionary upheavals” in capitalist countries
kennan s long telegram 19461
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946)
  • Part 2: The effects of Russian history on the Soviet mind (“Background of this outlook”)(see packet pp. 71-72):
    • Long history of external invasions and threats = strong defensive isolationist posture + view that there can be no peaceful coexistence with potential threats (all enemies must destroyed).
    • Bolshevist system plays on these fears of insecurity to strengthen control over Russia and justify its absolute rule of the regime
kennan s long telegram 19462
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946)
  • Part 3: Official (open) Soviet methods to obtain strategic goals (“Its projection in practical policy on official level”):
    • Maximum development of armed forces and military-industrial capabilities
    • Absolute secretiveness of internal affairs
    • Projection of political influence over immediate neighbors (e.g. Iran, Turkey, Scandinavia)
    • Participation in UNO (only to extent useful)
    • Establish economic and diplomatic ties in “colonial” or “backward” areas
kennan s long telegram 19463
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946)
  • Part 4: Unofficial (secret or “subterranean) Soviet methods to obtain strategic goals (“Its projection on unofficial level”):
    • In capitalist countries:
      • Support communist parties in capitalist countries through the Comintern “tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow”
      • Infiltrate and domestic and international groups (such as “labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, cultural groups, liberal magazines, etc.) for purposes of propaganda
      • Disrupt national self-confidence
      • Hamstring measures of national defense
      • Increase social and industrial unrest
      • “stimulate all forms of disunity,” especially urging disgruntled groups to engage in “defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society.”
      • Promote economic dependence on the state
      • Demonize those who are “financially independent”
      • Foment distrust of other democratic nations
    • Summary: tear down from within
kennan s long telegram 19464
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” (1946)
  • Part 5: U.S. strategic response (“Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy”):
    • no need for recourse to military conflict
    • Soviets will withdraw or back off when “strong resistance” is offered in response to Soviet actions (because they can be patient and will not risk everything on one short-term objective)
    • The West must remain firm, united and strong
    • We must have an objective assessment of Soviet mind and objectives, and educate the American public on Soviet goals and methods
    • “improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit” of American people
    • Provide political, economic, and military “guidance” to Europe
    • Remain true to American traditions and principles
effects of kennan s long telegram
Effects of Kennan’s Long Telegram
  • Lessons learned:
    • The Soviets do not think or behave like other “western” nations, especially the U.S. Therefore we must learn to adjust our foreign policy to the character of the Soviet regime(just as we did with the Barbary polities)
    • Never count on the Soviets to behave “reasonably” (as the US understands “reasonably”)
    • The Soviets will never stop viewing the United States as a threat, because the Soviet regime “relied on the fiction of external threat to maintain its internal legitimacy” (SC p. 20)
effects of kennan s long telegram1
Effects of Kennan’s Long Telegram
  • Truman’s new “draw the line” policy (SC p. 21):

1. Disagreements with USSR would be made public (not concealed on diplomatic level)

2. No “concessions” on Soviet attempts at expansion

3. U.S. will consider requests for economic and military aid from nations threatened by Soviet expansion

4. Diplomatic negotiations with USSR only to officially record and publicize Soviet non-cooperation with western nations

  • See also Truman’s Inaugural Address, 1949
the truman doctrine
The Truman Doctrine
  • Address to Congress, 12 March 1947:
    • “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures”
    • Immediately applied to Greece and Turkey.
    • Questions:
      • Is this compatible with the Founding “rule” regarding interventions in foreign revolutions or domestic problems?
      • Is this an open-ended commitment to assist peoples at risk to Soviet influence and dominance? If so we need a coherent strategy that will make ends and means proportionate to available resources…
kennan s policy of containment
Kennan’s policy of “Containment”
  • 1947: “Long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies” (SC p.4)
  • Reasoning behind “containment”:
    • Internally the Soviet Union was a closed society under strict ideological control, impervious to Western views and ideas.
    • The USSR will be economically self-sustaining for decades (Kennan predicted 30 years).
    • To survive, all Stalin had to do was be patient and when necessary withdraw within its borders.
    • The goal of Kennan’s containment was to get the Soviets to do just this, thus “containing” the USSR to its present territory and sphere of influence.
kennan s policy of containment1
Kennan’s policy of “Containment”
  • Kennan’s “corollaries” to the general strategy of containment:
    • Not all countries/regions are equal in strategic importance (see list SC p. 29)
    • Intervention in the internal affairs of other nations must be justified strictly on lines of national security interests (SC p. 30)
    • Demands of principle and security are compatible (but latter must always trump former) (SC p. 31)
kennan s policy of containment2
Kennan’s policy of “Containment”
  • The means of applying “counter pressure” to contain Soviet expansion are largely economic, political and psychological – not military:
    • Economic: rebuild Europe and Japan economically (primary means)
    • Psychological: restore self-confidence and will to self-determination in countries bordering USSR
    • Political: promote “Titoism” (exploit tensions between USSR and autonomous communist states)
    • Military:
      • Strategic deployment of conventional military forces only as a show of strength (and the willingness to use it).
      • More reliance on small special forces in local situations
      • NO commitment to defend Europe militarily, nor to maintain current U.S. military presence in Europe and Japan
      • Reasoning:
        • Very little chance of Soviet military attack or invasion
        • Military supply (FDR’s “arsenal of democracy” concept) more effective than boots on the ground.
        • Unrestrained military spending would raise taxes , cause inflation, grow budget deficits and undermine morale at home
kennan s policy of containment3
Kennan’s policy of “Containment”
  • Summary: the U.S. must be selective in choosing “strongpoints” at which to apply “counter pressure” (the chess game analogy) (SC pp. 56-63)
    • “counter pressure” to be applied at “strongpoints” (points of strategic importance) rather than at the “periphery” or perimeter of the Soviet Union.
    • Would make the most effective use of limited resources
    • Allowed the U.S. to choose locations of strategic value and points at which we could apply our strengths
    • Strong points included places in which potential threats to U.S. security combined “hostility with capability” (for example, Japan vs. Afghanistan)
  • Goal of strongpoint defense: “not to dominate other power centers, but to see to it that no one else did either” (consistent with Founding principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations)
kennan s policy of containment4
Kennan’s policy of “Containment”
  • Containment also involved very long-term “behavior modification” in the sense that the U.S. should respond “positively” to official Soviet conciliatory measures.
  • Kennan rejected the following Truman initiatives (1948-1950) because they confirmed Soviet sense of insecurity and would lead to further withdrawal from the West, more reliance on subterranean subversive measures, and strengthening of Bolshevist authority at home:
    • North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    • Creation of independent West German State
    • Continued military presence in Japan
    • Authorization of hydrogen bomb
    • Increased stockpiles of atomic weapons
the game changer
The game changer
  • 1949: Soviets successfully detonate atomic bomb
  • Kennan’s nuclear arms policy:
    • We must not fall into the trap of feeling secure because of nuclear capabilities
    • Nuclear arsenal must be kept at level of “minimum deterrence”
    • We must have a strict policy of “no first strike”
slide54

NSC-68:

Truman and Nitze

nsc 68
NSC-68
  • Setbacks in 1949:
    • Mainland China went communist
    • Soviet atomic bomb
    • Inter-departmental disagreements over implementation of containment
    • Expanding and multiplying localized threats
  • Need for a comprehensive and authoritative statement on containment for consistent implementation
nsc 681
NSC-68
  • Introduction (p. 91) is Kennanesque; but Kennan’s patient long term view is replaced by a more immediate sense of urgency to deal with Soviet threat.
  • Primary objective (end): “Frustrate the design of the Kremlin”
  • Overarching policy: Containment (See p. 92, a restatement of Kennan’s very broad definition of Containment)
  • Two strategic requirements for successful execution of Containment:
    • Superior aggregate military strength
    • Consider Soviet “prestige” with every show of US force (face-saving exit option)
nsc 682
NSC-68
  • Second-tier objectives (to satisfy primary objective):
    • Focus pressure on “perimeter” (around “traditional Russian boundaries”)
    • Modify perceptions and behavior of Russian people, Soviet Government, and the world as a whole
  • Necessary means to achieve second-tier objectives:
    • Increased maintained military readiness; must be sufficient to:
      • Deter Soviet aggression
      • Encourage nations resisting aggression
      • Fulfill all existing military commitments
      • Mobilize rapidly in case of war
    • Internal US security
    • Maximization of US economic potential
    • Continue foreign assistance (to strengthen political, economic and military capabilities)
    • Encourage political wedges between USSR and satellite countries (“Titoism”)
    • Domestic information/education efforts
nsc 68 vs kennan s containment
NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment
  • Similarity: Because “prestige” (appearance to Russian people and the world) is fundamentally important to justifying the authority of Soviet regime, specific US measures should be calculated to allow the USSR “to retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face.” (SC p. 97)
nsc 68 vs kennan s containment1
NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment
  • Kennan:

1) political

2) economic

3) psychological

4) military

Prioritization of means:

  • NSC-68:

1) military

2) psychological

3) economic

4) political

nsc 68 vs kennan s containment2
NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment

Likelihood of Soviet resort to a hot war:

Kennan: USSR will not stake its long term goals on the success of “adventuristic” military actions

NSC-68: USSR will refrain from war until it has reasonable assurances of victory; more willing to use small scale force covertly or indirectly through client states (Southeast Europe and Asia)

slide61

NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment

Military end force scales and organization

Kennan: smaller, mobile, elite special forces units

NSC-68: massively expanded military capabilities on traditional military scales; must be sufficient “to provide an adequate defense against air attack on the United States and Canada and an adequate defense against air and surface attack on the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western pacific, Africa, and the Near and Middle east, and on the long lines of communication to those areas.” (SC p. 97)

slide62

NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment

Relation of ends to means (resources)

Kennan: ends determined by limited resources

NSC-68: maximization of domestic production capabilities will allow increased production of military supplies without increasing % of GNP dedicated to military expenditures(only 7% of US GNP was for military, vs. 14% for USSR)

slide63

NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment

Identifying points of interest

Kennan: selective strongpoint counter pressure based on vital vs. peripheral interests

NSC-68: “perimeter defense” = all points along the perimeter (of the Soviet sphere of influence) are of equal importance

slide64

NSC-68 vs. Kennan’s Containment

Reliance on diplomatic relations

Kennan: diplomacy to be utilized to expose Soviet behavior, methods and objectives

NSC-68: diplomacy suspended until the US achieves military superiority

assessment of nsc 68 s weakness
Assessment of NSC-68’s weakness
  • Kennan: Identify with vital/permanent American interests, then assess the Soviet threat in light of those interests on a case-by-case basis (i.e., determine when and where to respond to Soviet actions only when such actions threaten a pre-identified American interest)
  • NSC-68: Characterize the general Soviet threat (to freedom and democracy), then define our interests in light of that general perceived threat (i.e., the threat determines when and where to act – thus the jump to acting EVERYWHERE in response to Soviet actions).
  • This puts the US at a disadvantage – the USSR will determine when and where we act. (SC p. 96)
consequences of nsc 68 korean war 1950 1953
Consequences of NSC-68: Korean War (1950-1953)
  • To Kennan, Korea was not a “vital interest” but a “peripheral interest.”
  • NSC-68: all interests have become equally vital, no matter how small. According to the logic of NSC-68, a perceived Soviet influence on Korea (indirectly through China) means we MUST respond to that threat in Korea. Truman: “If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to acts of aggression elsewhere.” (SC p. 107)
  • NSC-68: although a nation like Korea might not really be a gain for the USSR or a loss for the US, it would be perceived as a gain for the USSR and a loss for the US. (Concept of nation tallying or score-keeping as a way to gauge cold war success)
  • Nation tallying + no distinction between interests eventually develops into “domino theory” (formalized by Eisenhower in 1954)
concerns with nsc 68
Concerns with NSC-68
  • Loss of China (to Mao’s Communist forces) and North Korea
  • Perimeter defense goals of NSC-68 unrealistic
  • Backlash abroad against U.S. military presence
  • Military costs are straining economy at unsustainable levels
  • Concerns over effect of defense spending on public morale
    • deficit spending by Democrats (Keynesian economics)
    • military spending diverts resources from domestic concerns
    • regimented economy for defense undermines the way of life we are trying to defend
    • public opinion in a democratic society affects foreign policy
  • All of this leads to renewed calls for isolationism (“Fortress America” Republicans in 1952 election)
the new look 1953
“The New Look” (1953)

“Greater effectiveness at less cost,” to be achieved mainly by:

  • “Asymmetrical strategic deterrence” (popularly known as “doctrine of retaliation”)
  • Reliance on non-military means to liberate Soviet satellite nations (containment with “roll back”)
dulles strategy of massive retaliation 1954 packet p 97
Dulles, “Strategy of Massive Retaliation” (1954) (packet p. 97)
  • The goal: “maximum protection at a bearable cost.”
  • The means: Instead of maintaining massive levels of costly conventional forces and atomic stockpiles:
    • Rely more on collective security agreements (strategic organizations and alliances)
    • Rather than defend the perimeter, the US will identify strategic regions of interest (especially Middle East and Southeast Asia).
    • Maintain asymmetrical levels of force (nuclear and conventional).
    • Force will be used for “massive retaliation” in response to Soviet actions at selected strong points of U.S. interest.
strategy of deterrence
Strategy of Deterrence
  • Deterrence = If the USSR acts aggressively, the US willretaliate
  • USSR must believe that the risks of aggression outweigh the benefits
  • Deterrence only works if it is clear to USSR that we are willing to employ retaliatory means without hesitation
  • Deterrence actually demands decreases in atomic and military capabilities, to show the enemy that when pushed to the edge we will have to resort to limited means.
  • This leads to “art of brinkmanship” (Dulles)
eisenhower s first inaugural
Eisenhower’s First Inaugural
  • History as an argument against isolationism
  • “Certain fixed principles” that will inform Eisenhower’s “New Look” foreign policy:
    • Strength levels for deterrence only
    • Moral firmness by the U.S.
    • Moral leadership of the world by the U.S.
    • Diversity (no imposing democracy on other nations; toleration of non-Soviet communist regimes)
    • Support for and reliance upon democratic allies (“friends of freedom”) through collective security agreements
    • Assist developing nations economically (melioration)
    • Support for United Nations
foundations of the new look
Foundations of “The New Look”
  • Return to more selective regions of interest (more in line with Kennan’s containment)
  • Diversity (toleration of non-Soviet communist regimes)(SC p. 128)
  • “Asymmetrical response capabilities for deterrence” = decreases in atomic stockpiles and military expenditures and conventional end force size
    • Much more emphasis on an expanded fleet of U.S. based B-52 long range bombers capable of delivering atomic payloads
new look e mphasis on non military m eans
“New Look” emphasis on non-military means
  • Nuclear response was only one ingredient of deterrence. (SC p. 145)
  • No need for war if we give economic aid and moral principles time to work
  • Non-military means:

1. Rely more on psych ops and covert ops (SC p. 156)

2. More diplomacy, include bilateral arms agreements

3. Foreign economic and technological assistance (Meliorism)

4. U.S must prevent moral bankruptcy at home and provide moral leadership abroad

new look emphasis on non military means
“New Look” emphasis on non-military means

5. Reliance on international organizations:

  • “Collective Security” arrangements: NATO and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
  • Internationalism (reliance on international legal organizations), especially atomic oversight by U.N.
    • Eisenhower “Atoms for Peace” (packet p. 95):
      • Creation of Atomic Energy Agency at UN
      • Contributions of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes
      • Bilateral arms reductions
advantages of the new look
Advantages of “The New Look”
  • “More basic security at less cost”
  • The U.S. would choose where and how to respond to Soviet actions (if at all) = greater control over our own policies and actions
problems with the new look
Problems with “The New Look”
  • Though the United States would only use force in strategically defined regions of interest, there would be zero tolerance of Soviet expansion.
  • “The New Look” over-extended U.S. commitments abroad (Middle East and Southeast Asia)
  • Non-military means preferred, but political vacuums will not be tolerated. This leads to over-commitment in Southeast Asia (including Laos and Vietnam).
problems with the new look1
Problems with “The New Look”
  • Over-commitment in the Middle east:
    • “The Eisenhower Doctrine(Special Message to Congress, 1957).
    • To protect the “sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle east” the U.S. will:
        • Tolerate no use of force for the acquisition of territory or influence that infringes upon “inviolate” sovereignty and independence
        • Assist the economic development of Middle east
        • Offer “programs of military assistance and cooperation” (weapons and training) to nations that request it
        • Intervene when requested to resist armed Soviet aggression
successes of the new look
Successes of “The New Look”
  • Only North Vietnam and Cuba lost to communism
  • % of GDP for military expenditures dropped from 13% (1954) to 9% (1960)
  • Wedge driven between USSR and China
  • By 1960, a détente (or “relaxation” of tensions) with USSR seemed possible.
criticism of the new look
Criticism of “The New Look”
  • Relied too heavily on nuclear deterrence
  • Narrowed range of available response means
  • Turned a blind eye to Third World revolutions
  • Allowed a “missile gap” to develop
  • Missed options for negotiations with USSR
slide81

Flexible Response:

Kennedy

and Johnson

reasons for flexible response 1961
Reasons for “Flexible Response” (1961)
  • US/NATO actually achieves military parity with USSR/Warsaw Pact nations, and no missile gap
  • In response, USSR pushes US toward détente by becoming more “adventuristic”:
    • Closed access to West Berlin
    • Resumed atmospheric nuclear testing
    • Placed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba
    • Declared program of “wars of national liberation” to free nations from the evils of capitalism
  • Walt Whitman Rostow (Chairman of Policy Planning Council at State): the perceived expansion of threats demands a corresponding build up of full range of means, in order to have the “flexibility” of responding anywhere, anytime, against any threat.
kennedy s inaugural address
Kennedy’s Inaugural Address
  • Basic aspects of Flexible Response :
    • “Selective strong point interests” replaced by open-ended commitment to preserve the status quo balance of power.
    • Reliance on UN to regulate atomic energy
    • Diplomatic idealism (focus on what both sides have in common)
    • Focus on progress in Third World countries
    • Global meliorism
    • Soaring rhetoric
components of flexible response
Components of Flexible Response

1. Perceptionof expanded threats and interests abroad leads to open-ended commitments abroad:

  • Need to maintain existing balance of power (in terms of “nation tallying”) between US and USSR
  • Underlying attitude: “Zero-sum game” and “score keeping”
  • Kennedy First Inaugural p. 101: “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”
components of flexible response1
Components of Flexible Response

2. Symmetrical defense capabilities necessary to provide a “more flexible set of tools” to respond to threats from communism.

  • (See summary of Containment variations in SC pp. 212-213)
  • Massive increases in spending on conventional forces
  • (SC p. 213) Force levels must be sufficient to
    • “deter all wars, general or limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small.”
    • Act at all levels: diplomatic, covert action, guerilla ops, conventional and nuclear war.
  • Must maintain nuclear parity with USSR – but increased conventional forces will give us more “flexible” options short of nuclear retaliation.
components of flexible response2
Components of Flexible Response

3. Strengthening of strategic alliances by funding and supplying NATO forces

4. Reliance on international legal organizations (especially UN oversight of atomic energy)

  • See Kennedy’s “Truce to Terror” speech (packet p. 103)

5. Emphasis on “appearance” of US as just and strong;

  • Need for the U.S. to “save face” at all costs to avoid embarrassment or humiliation in the eyes of the world
  • Increased importance of soaring rhetoric about freedom and democracy and progress
components of flexible response3
Components of Flexible Response

6. Diplomatic idealism

  • Appeal to what the US and USSR have in common (basis of “détente”)
  • Downplay moral distinctions between US and USSR (no “good vs. evil” language)
  • See Kennedy’s “A Strategy of peace” speech (packet p. 104)
  • Results (SC p. 228):
    • Ban on nuclear tests (except underground)
    • Moscow-Washington “hot line”
    • Ban on nuclear weapons in outer space
    • Sale of US surplus wheat to USSR
components of flexible response4
Components of Flexible Response

7. Third World Meliorism: “immunizing the third world against the disease of communism” (Rostow)

  • See Kennedy’s “Address to the Nation” (1961)

8. Nation building and social planning (in Third World countries)

  • Requires use of American administrators, social scientists, and political scientists abroad.
  • Programs:
    • Alliance for Peace ($20B in aid to Latin America)
    • Peace Corps
    • Food for Peace program
    • Agency for International Development

9. Universalism replaces diversity

  • No toleration of non-Soviet communist regimes.
  • Developing nations must be “assisted” toward establishing democraticregimes
flaws of flexible response
Flaws of “Flexible Response”
  • SC p. 234: “The United States could not even appear to withdraw from what were admittedly overextended positions without setting off a crisis of confidence that would undermine American interests everywhere.”
vietnam as an application of flexible response
Vietnam as an application of Flexible Response
  • Johnson’s “Our World Policy” speech (1964) (packet p. 107):
    • Justification of flexible response
    • Focus on Third World development
    • Meliorism (at home and abroad – “Great Society”)
    • Calls for increased defense spending
    • A progressive appeal to “history”
vietnam as an application of flexible response1
Vietnam as an application of Flexible Response
  • “Zero-sum game” (score keeping) + need to appear strong and trustworthy (i.e., to avoid looking weak and noncommittal in the eyes of the world) = unnecessarily continuing the commitment of the US in Southeast Asia.
    • (SC p. 240) Johnson: “We have not lost a single nation to communism since 1959”
    • See quotes from Johnson about commitment in Vietnam (SC p. 239)
    • An irrational concern with “appearance” determines our commitments – actually commits us to even more dangerous scenarios, when prudence ought to dictate which interests are vital and worth acting upon.
vietnam as an application of flexible response2
Vietnam as an application of Flexible Response
  • (SC pp. 236-237) Because of the vagueness of “Flexible Response,” Johnson made no distinction between dangerous and harmless communist regimes, made no distinction between vital and periphery interests, and was forced to act in a theater chosen by perceived enemies in response to perceived threats.
vietnam as an application of flexible response3
Vietnam as an application of Flexible Response
  • Lack of consensus, clarity and consistency over best means to win the war:
    • Military means vs. Meliorism and social planning in Vietnam
    • See “Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War” (packet p. 108):
      • How to win the war? Use the hope of progress to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people:
        • Economic assistance
        • Agricultural expertise and technology
        • Vaccinations, hospitals and medical schools
        • 4,000+ classrooms
kissinger s statesmanship
Kissinger’s Statesmanship

The Nixon-Kissinger approach would “combine the tactical flexibility of the Kennedy-Johnson system with the structure and coherence of Eisenhower’s, while avoiding the short-sighted fixations that had led to Vietnam or the ideological rigidities of a John Foster Dulles.”

-- (SC p. 273).

1969 background
1969: Background
  • Opposition to Vietnam War grows at home; Johnson begins process of “Vietnamization”
  • USSR and China on the verge of war on the Manchurian border
  • USSR had achieved missile parity with US, but signs of economic difficulties began to show
the strategy of d tente
The Strategy of Détente
  • Détente = a new sense of “cooperation” by the US, coupled with new pressures and inducements to prompt Soviet cooperation.
  • Goals:
    • NOT to (directly) change the internal nature of the Soviet regime, but…
    • to apply “appropriate punishments and rewards, designed to prod and cajole a heretofore “revolutionary” state into accepting the “legitimacy” of the existing international order” (SC p. 289)
    • …and simultaneously allow internal pressures to work change on the Soviet regime from within.
elements of d tente
Elements of Détente
  • Clear-sighted and substantive negotiations
    • Kissinger: “We will deal with the Communist countries on the basis of a precise understanding of what they are about in the world, and then what we can reasonably expect of them and ourselves.” (SC p. 288)
    • Would the USSR come to the negotiating table? Yes, because:
      • USSR had achieved strategic parity with US, so they were freed from their paranoid fear of inferiority
      • Rivalries with China and other communist states forced the USSR to reassess security concerns
      • USSR expansion into “Third World” created new economic and military problems
      • Development of Soviet economy actual made possible (perhaps necessary) a more consumer-oriented society in USSR
elements of d tente1
Elements of Détente

2. “Linkage” (vs. “compartmentalization”)

  • success in one area of negotiations depends on Soviet compliance and cooperation in all areas of diplomatic negotiations

3. Geopolitical Triangularization

  • Establish relations with China; play the mediator between USSR and PRC
elements of d tente2
Elements of Détente

4. “Nixon Doctrine” (SC p. 296):

  • US will honor treaty commitments
  • US will defend allies or nations considered vital to our security
  • When requested, and as required by treaty, we will furnish military and economic assistanceto nations threatened with aggression, but those nations must provide manpower for their own defense.
elements of d tente3
Elements of Détente

5. Tactical withdrawals + tactical escalations + “uncertainty”

    • How to “draw down” without losing face? Shift resources to new strategic points of interest.
    • Deterrence = minimal military capabilities + consistent demonstration of willingness to use means + “uncertainty.”
  • 6. Centralized decision-making:
    • “Backchannel system” of negotiations + tactical secretiveness
appraisal of nixon kissinger approach
Appraisal of Nixon-Kissinger Approach
  • Negative consequences:
    • The extreme concentration of power in the White House + the “backchannel” system + tactical secretiveness + Watergate scandal = American distrust of government, left a disgruntled and “sabotage-minded” foreign policy bureaucracy, and pushed Congress to re-assert its dominance over the executive in foreign affairs.
  • Successes of Nixon/Kissinger approach:
    • Diplomatic relations with China
    • Demonstrated US had the upper hand in managing foreign policy over the USSR
review approaches to the strategy of containment
Review: Approaches to the Strategy of Containment

Heavy emphasis on statesmanship

(discretionary decision-making on a case-by-case-basis with clear goals and long-term, large picture view):

- Kennan’s Containment

- Eisenhower/Dulles and “The New Look”

- Nixon/Kissinger and Détente

- Reagan and “Strategic Defense”

Heavy emphasis on doctrine and procedure

(reliance on bureaucratic systems and vague, open-ended doctrinal commitments):

- Truman/Nitze NSC-68

  • Kennedy/Johnson and “Flexible Response”
  • Carter and Détente?
2 versions of d tente
2 versions of Détente

Nixon/Kissinger:

  • a “relaxation of tensions” only as a stimulus or reward for Soviet behavior modification
  • détente from a position of strength = there is always a price for American “cooperation”

Carter:

  • a “relaxation of tensions” as a way to reach common ground and show acceptance of the status quo
  • détente from a position of weakness = America will pay any price for Soviet “cooperation”
carter s d tente
Carter’s Détente
  • No “strategy”
  • Apply pressure on USSR through a “wider framework of international cooperation” (IO’s, especially UN) by calling for human rights reforms.
    • See “Human Rights and Foreign Policy” speech
  • The US needs détente as much as the USSR (because of moral crisis)
    • See “Address to the American People”
  • Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1980…
    • See 1980 State of the Union Address
reagan s strategy
Reagan’s Strategy
  • SC p. 354: “Reagan’s objective was straightforward, if daunting: to prepare the way for a new kind of Soviet leader by pushing the old Soviet system to the breaking point. …[N]o administration prior to Reagan’s had deliberately sought to exploit those tensions with a view to destabilizing the Kremlin leadership and accelerating the decline of the regime it ran.”
  • Shape strategy in light of what the Soviet rather than the American system could stand.
  • Capitalize on US technological, economic and political strengths.
reagan s moral clarity
Reagan’s Moral Clarity
  • All previous statesmen (from Kennan to Kissinger) saw the Soviet Union as an unavoidable historical “wave” and a permanent fixture in the world; the goal was not to do away with the USSR but to make it conform to the international community.
  • Reagan was the first to see that the USSR ran “against the tide of history.” The goal is to eliminate the USSR by causing it to collapse from within, thus condemning it to “the ash-heap of history.”
    • See Address to British Parliament, 1982
    • The effects on Moscow were immediately apparent
reagan s moral clarity1
Reagan’s Moral Clarity
  • Restoration of faith in America and its purpose
  • We cannot legitimize (and therefore live with) the Soviet regime because it is the “focus of evil in the modern world” and an “evil empire”
  • A rejection of the soft rhetoric of Kennedy, Johnson and Carter
    • See Remarks to Evangelicals, 1983
strategic d efense initiative
Strategic Defense Initiative
  • Motivated by Reagan’s conviction that MAD was itself mad (nuclear retaliation as a deterrent).
  • The concept: defensive capabilities to render nuclear missiles “impotent and obsolete” (ground and possibly space-based missile elimination systems).
    • See Televised Address on National Security, 1983
  • This is STRATEGIC defense – why?
    • Does Reagan still believe in deterrence?
    • Does Reagan desire a symmetrical or asymmetrical strategic approach?
    • Why did Reagan offer to share this technology with the Russians?
reagan s accomplishments
Reagan’s Accomplishments
  • Capitalized on opportunities in early 1980s:
    • Stagnant Soviet economy
    • % of GDP for military spending: USSR 15-20%; US <5%
    • Declining life expectancy in Russia
    • Beginnings of social unrest (as a result of western education in 1950s and 1960s) inside and outside Soviet Union (Solidarity in Poland)
    • Aging Kremlin leadership; Gorbachev was a more “western”/less ideological leader
reagan s accomplishments1
Reagan’s Accomplishments
  • Reagan’s public reassertion of American strength and America’s historical purpose reversed the appearance of American moral and political decline.
  • Demonstrated the superiority of capitalism over communism. Reagan: “Capitalism had given us a more powerful weapon in our battle against communism – money. The Russians could never win the arms race; we could outspend them forever.” (SC p. 351)
  • Recognition that the USSR was historically backward (contrary to human nature), morally decrepit and economically vulnerable – and he was able to persuade Mikhail Gorbachev that without reform the USSR would collapse (Perestroika = “restructuring” and Glasnost = “openness”).
  • Reagan achieved these things without relying on a single National Security Advisor, and despite opposition from his own foreign policy team (Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Schultz; Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger; CIA Director William Casey).