Arab Socialism extended, overstretched and made irrelevant

1. Arab Socialism extended, overstretched and made irrelevant

2. Nasser’s influence: • Iraq (Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam ‘Arif hade been plotting a coup since 1956; they called themselves the Free Officers) • Syria, • Jordan, • Lebanon, • Yemen, • Libya, and • Palestinians.

3. Jordan and Lebanon • Both vulnerable to Nasser’s aggressive policies of pan-Arabism.

4. King Hussein (Jordan 1952-1999) • History of close relations with Britain. • had been a particular target of the Nasserist propaganda machine (“The Voice of the Arabs”) calling the Jordanians to overthrow the monarchy and joint the progressive ranks of modern Arab republics.

5. 1957 • opposition inspired by convergence of all of the reformist currents of • Nasserism, • Ba’thism, and • Communism.

6. King Hussein did all he could to distance himself from Britain • He stood up to British pressures and stayed out of the Baghdad Pact. • In March 1956 he dismissed the British officers still running his army.

7. King Hussein: • Even negotiated the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty effectively ending British influence over the Hashemite Kingdom. • Made conciliatory efforts toward Egypt and Syria (to demonstrate Jordan’s commitment to Arab nationalism).

8. King Hussein opened up his government • To pro-Nasserist forces. • In 1956 free and open elections for the first time in Jordan’s history, which gave left-leaning Arab nationalists a clear majority in the Jordanian parliament. • Invited the leader of the largest party, Sulayman al-Nabusi to form a government of loyal opposition (lasted less than six months).

9. The Nabulsi government • Had a difficult time reconciling the contradictions between the loyalty (to the king) and opposition. • Enjoyed greater public support and loyalty from the Nasserist “Free Officer” elements in the Jordanian military than did the king.

10. In 1957 Hussein: • Demanded al-Nabulsi’s resignation, on the pretext of the government’s sympathies for communism. • Then he went after the Free Officers. • King Hussein suspended the constitution and proclaimed martial law.

11. The pressures on Jordan intensified • following the 1958 union of Syria and Egypt. • Arab nationalists redoubled their calls for the Hashemite government to step aside and for Jordan to join the UAR.

12. King Hussein’s own vision of Arab nationalism • More dynastic than ideological; • He turned to Iraq, led by his cousin King Faisal II; • Within two weeks, he concluded a unity scheme with Iraq called the Arab Union launched he Amman on February 14, 1958.

13. The Arab Union (AU) • No match to for the UAR. • The AU was seen as a reactive move (rather than pro-active) action against the threat of Nasserism. • Iraq, • host of the Baghdad Pact, • prime minister Nuri al-Sa’id was regarded as one of the most anglophile Arab politician of his day.

14. King Hussein • Recognized the vulnerability of his own position (without Iraq); • Recalled his own army, which had reached 150 miles inside Iraq, Hussein turned to Britain and the US on July 16 to request military assistance. • On July 17, (1958) British paratroopers and aircraft began to arrive in Jordan.

15. Jordan: • Requested economic assistance from the US. • Rewarded by a steady increase in US financial aid (by the 1960s about 50 million annually; these funds enabled Jordan to experience a period of sustained economic growth.

16. Lebanon: • Another state that came under intense pressure from the union of Syria and Egypt. • The sectarian division of power agreed to in the 1943 National Pact had begun to unravel.

17. Lebanon: • The constitution of 1926, • the census of 1932, and • the National Pact of 1943 established the basis of confessional politics.

18. Each district reserves seats for different religious groups • Ensuring representation of all minorities. • Example: Beirut (of the 19 total seats, 9 are reserved for Muslims and 10 for Christians). • Further divisions are made among the groups ensuring that the proportion of seats allocated to Sunni, Druze, Shiites, Greek Orthodox, Maronite candidates represents the districts demographic reality.

19. This complex calculus • is done throughout Lebanon’s districts, ensuring that the even 64-64 seat split between Christians and Muslims looks like this:

21. Lebanese Muslims (Sunnis, Shiites, and Druzes) • were particularly aggrieved. • they did not approve of the pro-Western policies pursued by the Maronite Christian president Camille Chamoun.

22. Lebanese Muslims • Saw Nasser as strong Arab leader who would unite the Arab world and end the perceived subordination of Lebanon’s Muslim in the Christian-dominated Lebanese state.

23. Lebanese Muslims (1957-8) • Believed that they outnumbered the Christians. • No new census since 1932 only confirmed Muslim suspicions that the Christians refused to recognize demographic reality.

24. Lebanese Muslims • Knew that under true majority rule Lebanon would pursue policies in line with the dominant Nasserist politics of the day. • Began to question the political distribution of power that left them with less political voice than their numbers would warrant under a more proportional system.

25. President Chamoun (1952-1958) • believed Nasser posed a direct threat to Lebanon’s independence, • he sought foreign guarantees from outside subversion.

26. After the Suez Crisis • Chamoun did not think he could count on France or Britain for support. • Instead he turned to America. • In March 1957 he agreed to the Eisenhower doctrine.

27. The Eisenhower doctrine: • Called for American development aid and military assistance to Middle Easter states to help them defend their national independence. • Also authorized deployment of US troops (to potect against “International Communism”).

28. When the president of Lebanon formally accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine • he entered on a collision course with both the Nasser government and Nasser’s many supporters in Lebanon.

29. The Lebanese parliamentary elections. • In Lebanon, the parliament elects the president of the republic for a single six-year term. • The parliament resulting from the 1957 elections would thus elect the next Lebanese president in 1958.

30. The run-up to the elections: • Chamoun’s opponents: Muslims. Druze, and Christians formed an electoral bloc called the National Front (NF). • (The NF represented a far larger share of the Lebanese public than that supporting President Chamoun).

31. As parliamentary elections neared • the US government feared Egypt and Syria would promoted the National Front and undermine the position of Chamoun. • So the US subverted the elections (the CIA provided funds)

32. Chamoun won in a landslide • The opposition press took the election results as proof that Chamoun sought to stack the parliament in his favor in order to amend the Lebanese constitution to allow himself an unlawful second term as president.

33. The opposition shut out of the parliament: • Some of its leaders turned to violence to prevent Chamoun from gaining a second term of office. • Bombings and assassinations in Beirut and the countryside in early 1958. • The breakdown in order accelerated after the union of Syria and Egypt (July).

34. Civil war in May 1958 • The commander of the Lebanese army (General Fuad Shihab) refused to deploy the army to prop up the discredited Chamoun government. • The US prepared to intervene.

35. The Qassim coup (Iraq) • The overthrow of the Hashemite regime in Iraq on July 14, 1958

36. In Lebanon • Opposition forces celebrated the fall of the monarchy in Iraq. • They believed the Hashemite monarchy was a British puppet state and that the Free Officers were Arab nationalists in Nasser’s mold.

37. Chamoun (Lebanese President) • immediately requested US assistance to save country from falling under the control of pro-Nasser forces.

38. Chamoun • Invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine two hours after receiving news of the violent revolution in Iraq. • Marines landed in Beirut the next day (US Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean).

39. The US intervened in Lebanon • “The American show of force on behalf of its Lebanese ally included 150,000 troops on the ground, dozens of naval vessels off the course, and 11,000 sorteis by naval aircraft that made frequent low-level flights over Beirut.” (Rogan) US troops left after 3 moths without firing a shot.

40. Political stability in Lebanon after American occupation • The commander of the the Lebanese army, general Fuad Shihab, was elected president on July 31, 1958. • President Shihab oversaw the creation of a coalition government combining loyalist and opposition members.

41. Shihab (1958-1964) • Modernization of the state; • Installing the basics of a social welfare system. • Increased government expenditures • public works projects such as road building, • rural electrification, • and the extension of the supply of water to previously neglected rural areas.

42. Lebanon: • The government removed trade restrictions. • A free press, • A burgeoning publishing industry, • A university that attracted students from all over the Arab world.

43. Lebanon: • Faced with nationalization laws in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, Arab capital descended on Lebanon.

44. Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union • Believed that the Iraqi Revolution would set off an Arab nationalist sweep. • They were convinced that the Iraqi coup had been masterminded by Nasser. • This explains the swiftness of the action of the US and Britain to prop-up the regimes in Lebanon and Jordan.

45. Would Qassim now • bring Iraq into union with Syria and Egypt and thus change the balance of power in the region? • Or would the rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad be preserved in the republican era?

46. 1958 • It looked as though the Arab world might break the cycle of foreign domination that had marked the Ottoman, imperial, and cold War eras to enjoy an age of true independence.

47. The new Iraqi government was divided • Qassim vs. Arif

48. Qassim • Determined to rule an independent state and had no intention of delivering his country to Nasser’s rule. • Worked closely with the Iraqi Communist Party, • Sought closer ties to the Soviet Union, • and was cool toward the Cairo regime that had clamped down upon the Egyptian Communist Party.

49. Qassim’s second in command, Colonel ‘Arif • Called for joining the UAR. • A great disappointment for pan-Arabism.

50. The decade of the 1960s: the decade of defeats for Nasser • The union with Syria unraveled in 1961. • The Egyptian army got mired in Yemen’s civil war. • And a disastrous war with Israel in 1967.