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Security Analysis and Improvements for IEEE 802.11i

Security Analysis and Improvements for IEEE 802.11i. Changhua He, John C Mitchell Stanford University NDSS’05, Feb. 03, 2005. Outline. Wireless Threat Models Possible threats and their practicality in wireless networks IEEE 802.11i Data Confidentiality & Integrity: CCMP

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Security Analysis and Improvements for IEEE 802.11i

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  1. Security Analysis and Improvements for IEEE 802.11i Changhua He, John C Mitchell Stanford University NDSS’05, Feb. 03, 2005

  2. Outline • Wireless Threat Models • Possible threats and their practicality in wireless networks • IEEE 802.11i • Data Confidentiality & Integrity: CCMP • Mutual Authentication: RSNA Establishment Procedure • Availability: not an original design objective, problematic • Attacks and Solutions • On Authentication: Security level rollback, reflection attack • On Availability: Michael countermeasure attack, RSN IE poisoning, 4-Way Handshake blocking • Failure Recovery and improved 802.11i • Conclusions

  3. Wireless Threats • Passive Eavesdropping/Traffic Analysis • Easy, most wireless NICs have promiscuous mode • Message Injection/Active Eavesdropping • Easy, some techniques to gen. any packet with common NIC • Message Deletion and Interception • Possible, interfere packet reception with directional antennas • Masquerading and Malicious AP • Easy, MAC address forgeable and s/w available (HostAP) • Session Hijacking • Man-in-the-Middle • Denial-of-Service: cost related evaluation

  4. IEEE 802.11i • Ratified on June 24, 2004 • Data confidentiality and integrity • Encryption in Link Layer • WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy • TKIP: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol • CCMP: Counter-mode/CBC-MAC Protocol • Mutual authentication • RSNA: Robust Security Network Association • EAP-TLS/802.1X/RADIUS • Key management: 4-Way handshake, Group key handshake, etc. • Availability • not an original design objective • Some real vulnerabilities exist

  5. 802.11i: Confidentiality & Integrity • WEP, TKIP for backward compatibility • CCMP: long-term solution • AES: 128-bit key, 128-bit block, Counter mode + CBC-MAC • 48-bit Packet Number for replay prevention • Use the same key for both Encryption and MIC • Counter and init. vector not overlap • better to use different key for different purpose • With a fresh key, 802.11i CCMP is believed secure for confidentiality and integrity !

  6. 802.11i: Mutual Authentication • RSNA Establishment Procedures • Network and Security Capability Discovery • 802.11 Open System Authentication and Association • EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication • 4-Way Handshake • Group Key Handshake • Secure Data Communications • RSNA security analysis gives: • can provide satisfactory authentication and key management • could be problematic in Transient Security Networks (TSN) • reflection attack could be possible if not implemented correctly

  7. Supplicant UnAuth/UnAssoc 802.1X Blocked No Key Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked MSK Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked New GTK Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked New GTK AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X UnBlocked PTK/GTK AuthenticatorUnAuth/UnAssoc 802.1X Blocked No Key AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) MSK Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key Authentica-tion Server(RADIUS) No Key 802.11 Association EAP/802.1X/RADIUS Authentication MSK 4-Way Handshake Group Key Handshake Data Communication RSNA Conversations

  8. Outline • Wireless Threat Models • IEEE 802.11i • Attacks and Solutions • On Authentication: • 1. Security level rollback • 2. reflection attack • On Availability: • 3. Michael countermeasure attack • 4. RSN IE poisoning • 5. 4-Way Handshake blocking • Failure Recovery and improved 802.11i • Conclusions

  9. Bogus Beacon (Pre-RSNA only) Bogus Probe Response (Pre-RSNA only) Bogus Association Request (Pre-RSNA only) Pre-RSNA Connections Security Level Rollback Attack Supplicant RSNA enabled Pre-RSNA enabled AuthenticatorRSNA enabled Pre-RSNA enabled Beacon + AA RSN IE Probe Request Probe Response + AA RSN IE 802.11 Authentication Request 802.11 Authentication Response Association Request + SPA RSN IE 802.11 Association Response

  10. Security Rollback: solutions • Security Level Rollback Attack • Similar to general version-rollback attack • Destroy the security since WEP is completely insecure • Not a real vulnerability of 802.11i standard, but an implementation problem of TSN • Very possible mistake for transparency requirement • Solutions • Allow only RSNA connections: secure, but too strict for common network systems, where TSN is more convenient • Adopt both, supplicant manually choose to deny or accept a connection, authenticator restrict pre-RSNA (WEP) connections to only insensitive data

  11. {A1, Nonce1, sn, msg1} {A2, Nonce1, sn, msg1} {A1, Nonce2, RSN IE, sn, msg2, MIC} {A2, Nonce2, RSN IE, sn, msg2, MIC} {A1, Nonce1, RSN IE, GTK, sn+1, msg3, MIC} {A2, Nonce1, RSN IE, GTK, sn+1, msg3, MIC} {A1, sn+1, msg4, MIC} {SPA, sn+1, msg4, MIC} Bogus Authentication Peers Authenticated Reflection Attack Adversary Impersonates Communicating Peers Legitimate Devices Authenticator and Supplicant

  12. Reflection Attack: Solutions • Possible in ad hoc networks • Each participant plays the role of both authenticator and supplicant • Violate the mutual authentication concept • Less damage if strong confidentiality adopted • Adversary fool the peers to send packets • Cannot decrypt the packet and generate response • Solutions: • Restrict each participant to play only one role: ok for WLAN, but inappropriate for ad hoc networks • Each participant play both roles, but under different PMK

  13. 802.11i: Availability • Not an original design objective • Physical Layer DoS attack • Inevitable but expensive and detectable • Network and upper Layer DoS attack • Depend on protocols, not our focus • Link Layer DoS attack • Flooding attack: could be detected and located • Some Known DoS attacks on 802.11 networks • DoS attack on Michael countermeasure in TKIP • RSN IE Poisoning/Spoofing • 4-Way Handshake Blocking

  14. Known DoS attacks and Solutions • DoS attacks on plain 802.11 networks • Forge unprotected management frames, like Deauthentication/Disassociation frame • Exploit virtual carrier sense mechanism by forging unprotected control frames, like RTS/CTS etc. • 802.11i still has these problems, solutions could be • Authenticate management frames • Validate virtual carrier sense in control frames • DoS attacks on EAP messages • Forge EAPOL-Start, EAPOL-Success, EAPOL-Logoff, EAPOL-Failure • 802.11i can eliminate these by simply ignoring them ! • Send more than 255 association request to exhaust the EAP identifier space (8 bits) • Adopt separate EAP identifier counter for each association

  15. MAC IV/KeyID Ext. IV Data/MSDU MIC ICV FCS Contains TSC Encrypted TKIP MPDUFormat Michael Countermeasure • TKIP Michael algorithm and countermeasures • Message Integrity Code (MIC), provide 20-bit security • one successful forgery / 2 min., need countermeasures • Cease communication for 60 sec. if two Michael MIC failures detected in one minute, re-key & deauthentication • Limit to one successful forgery / 6 month • Check order: FCS < ICV < TSC < MIC • Update TSC unless MIC is validated

  16. Michael DoS and Solutions • DoS attack through MIC failures • Intercept a packet with valid TSC (possible) • Modify packet and corresponding values of FCS, ICV (easy) • Send modified packet twice in one minute (easy) • MIC always invalid, TSC always valid • Solutions • When MIC failure, cease communication only, no re-keying and deauthentication • Update TSC before MIC is validated • What happens if modify TSC to extremely large number? • Change TSC also change encryption key, wrong decryption • Some confidence on TKIP key schedule algorithm • Mitigation but not elimination

  17. Bogus Beacon + Modified RSN IE Bogus Probe Response + Modified RSN IE Disassociate the Supplicant RSN IE confirmation failed, Disassociation RSN IE Poisoning Supplicant Unauthenticated Unassociated 802.1X Blocked AuthenticatorUnauthenticated Unassociated 802.1X Blocked (1) Beacon + AA RSN IE (2) Probe Request (3) Probe Response + AA RSN IE Legitimate Message Exchanges (18) {AA, ANonce, AA RSN IE, GTK, sn+1, msg3, MIC}

  18. RSN IE Poisoning: Solutions • Easy to launch the attack • Legitimate participants unaware of it • Continue message exchanges, waste resources • Adversary have more time to repeat the attack • Solutions • Authenticate management frames • Difficult to authenticate Beacon and Probe Response frame • Confirm RSN IE as soon as possible (EAP-TLS) • Necessary modifications on the standard • Relax the condition of RSN IE confirmation • Ignore insignificant bits, only confirm authentication suite • If authentication suite modified, probably error at the beginning of associations

  19. AA, ANonce, sn, msg1 SPA, SNonce, SPA RSN IE, sn, msg2, MIC AA, ANonce[1], sn, msg1 AA, ANonce[n], sn, msg1 4-Way Handshake Blocking Supplicant Auth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK AuthenticatorAuth/Assoc 802.1X Blocked PMK PTK Derived PTK Derived Random GTK AA, ANonce, AA RSN IE, GTK, sn+1, msg3, MIC SPA, sn+1, msg4, MIC PTK and GTK 802.1X Unblocked PTK and GTK 802.1X Unblocked

  20. 4-Way Blocking: Solutions • Random-Drop Queue: not so effective • Authenticate Message 1 • Make use of the share PMK, but need to modify packet format • Re-use supplicant nonce • Supplicant re-use SNonce, eliminate memory DoS • Performance degradation, more computations in the supplicant • Combined solution: • Supplicant re-use SNonce • Store one entry of received ANonce and derived PTK • If ANonce in Message 3 matches the entry, use PTK directly; otherwise derive PTK from Message 3 and use it • Eliminate the attack, ensure performance in “friendly” scenarios, only minor modifications on the algorithm

  21. Failure Recovery • Important for large protocols like 802.11i • Not affect protocol correctness, but efficiency • Not eliminate DoS vulnerabilities, but make DoS more difficult • 802.11i adopts a simple scheme • Whenever failure, restart from the beginning, inefficient ! • Tradeoffs • Defensive DoS attack vs Captured DoS attack • Assumptions on adversary’s capability and network scenario • A better failure recovery for 802.11i • If failure before 802.1X finishes, restart everything • Otherwise restart components from nearest point • channel scanning time >> protocol execution time

  22. Stage 1: Network and Security Capability Discovery Stage 2: 802.1X Authentication (mutual authentication, shared secret, cipher suite) 802.1X Failure Stage 3: Secure Association (management frames protected) Association Failure Stage 4: 4-Way Handshake (PMK confirmation, PTK derivation, and GTK distribution) 4-Way Handshake Timout Stage 5: Group Key Handshake Group Key Handshake Timout Stage 6: Secure Data Communications Michael MIC Failure or Other Security Failures Improved 802.11i Architecture

  23. Conclusions • 802.11i provides • Satisfactory data confidentiality & integrity with CCMP • Satisfactory mutual authentication & key management • Some implementation mistakes • Security Level Rollback Attack in TSN • Reflection Attack on the 4-Way Handshake • Availability is a problem • Simple policies can make 802.11i robust to some known DoS • Possible attack on Michael Countermeasures in TKIP • RSN IE Poisoning/Spoofing • 4-Way Handshake Blocking • Inefficient failure recovery scheme • Improved 802.11i

  24. Highlight Our Findings

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