1 / 16

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE. WHY?. Persistant negative media coverage of Haiti, which fuels general frustration in the field and among the donor community A few recurrent myths : 1. All the problems of Haiti started after the earthquake 2. Slow funding disbursement

monty
Download Presentation

CHANGING THE NARRATIVE

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. CHANGING THE NARRATIVE

  2. WHY? • Persistant negative media coverage of Haiti, which fuels general frustration in the field and among the donorcommunity • A few recurrentmyths: 1. All the problems of Haiti startedafter the earthquake 2. Slow fundingdisbursement 3. Failure to recover 4. Not worthinvesting in Haiti

  3. Myth 1: All the problems of Haiti startedafter the earthquake…not quite

  4. Before the quake • Haiti was already the poorest country in the Southern hemisphere. • 75% of Haitians earned less than $ 2 a day. • 70% did not have stable jobs. • 85% of schools and hospitals were private, charging much more than the average Haitian could afford to pay. • More than 50% of children being denied an education. • The great majority of the population (70-80 %) had no access to electricity and relied on charcoal and wood for cooking. • Only 5% of the roads were in good condition.

  5. Myth 2: Slow fundingdisbursement …actually

  6. Public sector bilateral and multilateral donors have committed or disbursed $2.27 billion to the humanitarian earthquake response and an additional $160.0 million has been committed or disbursed to the cholera response from humanitarian funding pools. • Of the $4.60 billion pledged in development aid for Haiti in 2010 and 2011 at the NY conference, 88 percent of these funds have been either disbursed (43 per cent) or committed to specific programmes (45 per cent).   • Donors have also disbursed $389.3 million and committed a further $330.8 million for recovery efforts through sources of funding outside the New York pledges. • Total amount of private money raised for relief and recovery unknown. However, using online databases and government information, it is estimated that at least USD 3 billion was privately raised (OSE).

  7. Putting the Haiti RecoveryFund in perspective • When comparing the performance of seven such funds after their first year of operation with the performance of the HRF, the HRF – with US$335 million -received the largest sum of funding for its first year of operation, outranked only by the Iraq Reconstruction Fund.  • By the end of its first year, the HRF Steering Committee had allocated 71 percent of the total funds received. Only the Iraq and East Timor Trust Funds had a faster approval rate. • The HRF ranks third in terms of project disbursements in the first year of operations with 14 percent of approved funds disbursed to recipients. [Text from HRF 2010 progress report]

  8. Myth 3: Failure to recover

  9. Humanitarian update • Camp population dramatically decreased from 1.5 million to a little over 500,000 people as of Nov.2011 • 100,000 temporary shelters have been built out of planned 111,000 by end of 2011. • Daily hot meals were provided to more than 1.1 million children in more than 3,000 schools in 2010. This effort continued in 2011. • A national and one contingency plan per department in place ahead of the 2011 cyclone season.

  10. Cholera response • National cholera response and alert systems are now in place in a country that had no such infrastructure before the cholera outbreak. • The monthly case load has dropped from a 84,000 high in November 2010, to 19,000 in April of this year, to 13,500 in October. • The case fatality rate has also dropped markedly, to just over 1% today. This still has to be brought down further.

  11. Key facts on recovery • Post-earthquake, nearly 414,000 housessubject to damage assessment • More than 21,000 houses repaired • Some 430 kms of roads constructed or rehabilitated since the earthquake • Trees replanted on 350 hectares in 2011 • National immunization coverage increased from 49% in 2005 to 69% in 2011. In the 36 “low immunization communes”, coverage rates average 71%.

  12. Contextualizingresults Haiti • In Haiti, one year after the 2010 earthquake, 31,000 transitional shelters had been built . • Close to 5 million cubicmetresremoved in lessthantwoyears. • 300,000 Haitians had benefited from cash-for-work activities less than a year after the quake. Other post-crisis situations • In Aceh, one year after the Tsunami, over 6,000 transitional houses were built out of 127,069 damaged or destroyed houses. • Five and a half years to remove 1.1 million cubic metresof tsunami waste and 160,000 cubic metres of household waste in Aceh. • One year after Israel’s military operation in Gaza, more than 75,000 people had benefited from cash-for-work schemes .

  13. Myth 4: Not worthinvesting in HaitiIt IS worthit but it has to be for the long haul

  14. Structural challenges remain Putting funding into perspective USD 2 billion is the total amount disbursed so far for the recovery of Haiti, a country with a population 10 million people USD 10 billion is the 2010 budget of the Municipality of Paris, for a population of approximately 2.2 million USD 3.8 billion is what Brazil will spend, over the next 2 years, in the construction of soccer stadiums for the 2014 world cup New York city 2012 operating budget is USD 69.5 billion for a population of 19,378,102. USD 2.5 billion is the 2012 operating budget for the city of Ottawa. • Funds needed to increase progress in key sectors and support essential humanitarian needs in 2012 • Chronic gender inequities and pervasive gender-based violence • Chronic failures in the administration of justice • Sectoral policies and strategies developed but still to be endorsed by Parliament • A number of key policy decisions to be taken by the Government to enable the recovery process to accelerate • Uncertainty about the future of the IHRC

  15. The wayahead • Need for a national vision for change and reconstruction that ensures a minimum standard of living and guarantees basic human rights to a majority of the population • Predictable funding increasingly channeled through government institutions • Stronger synergies between development efforts and the continuing humanitarian response • Increased international support to strengthen the capacities of the state • Greater level of coordination, transparency and collaboration between the Government of Haiti and the international community

More Related