Security on Grid: Emidio Giorgio INFN – Catania

Security on Grid:Emidio GiorgioINFN – Catania Singapore, 1st South East Asia Forum -- EGEE tutorial 9-10 February 2006dioid

Overview • Glossary • Encryption • Symmetric algorithms • Asymmetric algorithms: PKI • Certificates • Digital Signatures • X509 certificates • Grid Security • Basic concepts • Grid Security Infrastructure • Proxy certificates • Command line interfaces • Virtual Organisation • Concept of VO and authorization • VOMS, LCAS, LCMAPS

Glossary • Principal • An entity: a user, a program, or a machine • Credentials • Some data providing a proof of identity • Authentication • Verify the identity of a principal • Authorization • Map an entity to some set of privileges • Confidentiality • Encrypt the message so that only the recipient can understand it • Integrity • Ensure that the message has not been altered in the transmission • Non-repudiation • Impossibility of denying the authenticity of a digital signature

Overview • Glosary • Encryption • Symmetric algorithms • Asymmetric algorithms: PKI • Certificates • Digital Signatures • X509 certificates • Grid Security • Basic concepts • Grid Security Infrastructure • Proxy certificates • Command line interfaces • Virtual Organisation • Concept of VO and authorization • VOMS, LCAS, LCMAPS

Cryptography • Mathematical algorithms that provide important building blocks for the implementation of a security infrastructure • Symbology • Plaintext: M • Cyphertext: C • Encryption with key K1: E K1(M) = C • Decryption with key K2: D K2(C) = M • Algorithms • Symmetric: K1 = K2 • Asymmetric: K1 ≠ K2 K1 K2 Encryption Decryption M C M

Symmetric Algoritms • The same key is used for encryption and decryption • Advantages: • Fast • Disadvantages: • how to distribute the keys? • the number of keys is O(n2) • Examples: • DES • 3DES • Rijndael (AES) • Blowfish • Kerberos Alice Bob ciao 3$r 3$r ciao Alice Bob ciao 3$r 3$r ciao

public Public Key Algorithms • Every user has two keys: one private and one public: • it is impossible to derive the private key from the public one; • a message encrypted by one key can be decrypted only by the other one. • No exchange of secrets is necessary • the sender cyphers using the public key of the receiver; • the receiver decrypts using his private key; • the number of keys is O(n). • Examples: • Diffie-Helmann (1977) • RSA (1978) Paul John ciao 3$r 3$r ciao Paul John ciao cy7 cy7 ciao Paul keys John keys public private private

One-Way Hash Functions • Functions (H) that given as input a variable-length message (M) produce as output a string of fixed length (h) • the length of h must be at least 128 bits (to avoid birthday attacks) • given M, it must be easy to calculate H(M) = h • given h, it must be difficult to calculateM = H-1(h) • given M, it must be difficult to find M’ such that H(M) = H(M’) • Examples: • SNEFRU: hash of 128 or 256 bits; • MD4/MD5: hash of 128 bits; • SHA (Standard FIPS): hash of 160 bits.

This is some message Digital Signature This is some message Paul keys = ? Digital Signature public private Digital Signature • Paul calculates the hash of the message • Paul encrypts the hash using his private key: the encrypted hash is the digital signature. • Paul sends the signed message to John. • John calculates the hash of the message and verifies it with A, decyphered with Paul’s publickey. • If hashes equal: message wasn’t modified; Paul cannot repudiate it. Paul This is some message Hash(A) Digital Signature John Hash(B) Hash(A)

Digital Certificates • Paul’s digital signature is safe if: • Paul’s private key is not compromised • John knows Paul’s public key • How can John be sure that Paul’s public key is really Paul’s public key and not someone else’s? • A third party guarantees the correspondence between public key and owner’s identity. • Both A and B must trust this third party • Two models: • X.509: hierarchical organization; • PGP: “web of trust”.

X.509 The “third party” is called Certification Authority (CA). • Issue Digital Certificates for users, programs and machines • Check the identity and the personal data of the requestor • Registration Authorities (RAs) do the actual validation • CA’s periodically publish a list of compromised certificates • Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL): contain all the revoked certificates yet to expire • CA certificates are self-signed

X.509 Certificates • An X.509 Certificate contains: • owner’s public key; • identity of the owner; • info on the CA; • time of validity; • Serial number; • digital signature of the CA Structure of a X.509 certificate Public key Subject:C=CH, O=CERN, OU=GRID, CN=Andrea Sciaba 8968 Issuer: C=CH, O=CERN, OU=GRID, CN=CERN CA Expiration date: Aug 26 08:08:14 2005 GMT Serial number: 625 (0x271) CA Digital signature

Users • Large and dynamic population • Different accounts at different sites • Personal and confidential data • Heterogeneous privileges (roles) • Desire Single Sign-On “Groups” • “Group” data • Access Patterns • Membership • Heterogeneous Resources • Access Patterns • Local policies • Membership Sites GRID Security: the players Grid

John’s certificate Verify CA signature Random phrase Encrypt with J.’ s private key Encrypted phrase Decrypt with J.’ s public key Compare with original phrase The Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) • every user/host/service has an X.509 certificate; • certificates are signed by trusted (by the local sites) CA’s; • every Grid transaction is mutually authenticated: • John sends his certificate; • Paul verifies signature in John’s certificate; • Paul sends to John a challenge string; • John encrypts the challenge string with his private key; • John sends encrypted challenge to Paul • Paul uses John’s public key to decrypt the challenge. • Paul compares the decrypted string with the original challenge • If they match, Paul verified John’s identity and John can not repudiate it. Based on X.509 PKI: John Paul VERY IMPORTANT Private keysmust be stored only: in protected places AND in encrypted form

Certificate request… more details • Egee/LCG recognizes a given set of CAs • https://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/pki_certificates.html • How do you request a certificate depends on your CA • For GILDA, have a look at the Video Tutorials: • https://gilda.ct.infn.it/video/Certification/Allproxy.html (Flash) • https://gilda.ct.infn.it/video/Certification/AllCertproxy.ram (Real)

State of Illinois ID Certificate Request User generatespublic/privatekey pair. CA confirms identity, signs certificate and sends back to user. CertRequest Public Key Certification Authority Cert Private Key encrypted on local disk User send public key to CA along with proof of identity.

On the side: certificate management • Import your certificate in your browser • If you received a .pem certificate you need to convert it to PKCS12 • Use openssl command line (available in each egee/LCG UI) • openssl pkcs12 –export –in usercert.pem –inkey userkey.pem –out my_cert.p12 –name ’My Name’ • GILDA (and other VOs): • You receive already a PKCS12 certificate (can import it directly into the web browser) • For future use, you will need usercert.pem and userkey.pem in a directory ~/.globus on your UI • Export the PKCS12 cert to a local dir on UI and use again openssl: • openssl pkcs12 -nocerts -in my_cert.p12 -out userkey.pem • openssl pkcs12 -clcerts -nokeys -in my_cert.p12 -out usercert.pem

X.509 Proxy Certificate • GSI extension to X.509 Identity Certificates • signed by the normal end entity cert (or by another proxy). • Enables single sign-on • Support some important features • Delegation • Mutual authentication • Has a limited lifetime (minimized risk of “compromised credentials”) • It is created by the grid-proxy-init command: % grid-proxy-init Enter PEM pass phrase: ****** • Options for grid-proxy-init: • -hours <lifetime of credential> • -bits <length of key> • -help

User certificate file User Proxy certificate file Private Key (Encrypted) Pass Phrase grid-proxy-init • User enters pass phrase, which is used to decrypt private key. • Private key is used to sign a proxy certificate with its own, new public/private key pair. • User’s private key not exposed after proxy has been signed • Proxy placed in /tmp • the private key of the Proxy is not encrypted: • stored in local file: must be readable only by the owner; • proxy lifetime is short (typically 12 h) to minimize security risks. • NOTE: No network traffic!

Proxy again … • grid-proxy-init ≡ “login to the Grid” • To “logout” you have to destroy your proxy: • grid-proxy-destroy • This does NOT destroy any proxies that were delegated from this proxy. • You cannot revoke a remote proxy • Usually create proxies with short lifetimes • To gather information about your proxy: • grid-proxy-info • Options for printing proxy information-subject -issuer-type -timeleft-strength -help

Delegation and limited proxy • Delegation = remote creation of a (second level) proxy credential • New key pair generated remotely on server • Client signs proxy cert and returns it • Allows remote process to authenticate on behalf of the user • Remote process “impersonates” the user • The client can elect to delegate a “limited proxy” • Each service decides whether it will allow authentication with a limited proxy • Job manager service requires a full proxy • GridFTP server allows either full or limited proxy to be used

Long term proxy • Proxy has limited lifetime (default is 12 h) • Bad idea to have longer proxy • However, a grid task might need to use a proxy for a much longer time • Grid jobs in HEP Data Challenges on LCG last up to 2 days • myproxy server: • Allows to create and store a long term proxy certificate: • myproxy-init -s <host_name> • -s: <host_name> specifies the hostname of the myproxy server • myproxy-info • Get information about stored long living proxy • myproxy-get-delegation • Get a new proxy from the MyProxy server • myproxy-destroy • Chech out the myproxy-xxx - - help option • A dedicated service on the RB can renew automatically the proxy • File transfer services in gLite validates user request and eventually renew proxies • contacting myproxy server

UI MyProxy Server myproxy-init myproxy-get-delegation GENIUS Server (UI) WEB Browser execution Local WS output the Grid any grid service Grid authentication with MyProxy

Virtual Organizations and authorization • Grid users MUST belong to virtual organizations • What we previously called “groups” • Sets of users belonging to a collaboration • User must sign the usage guidelines for the VO • You will be registered in the VO-LDAP server (wait for notification) • List of supported vos: • https://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/virtual_organization.html • Vos maintained a list of their members on a LDAP Server • The list is downloaded by grid machines to map user certificate subjects to local “pool” accounts • Sites decide which vos to accept ... "/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Simone Campana 7461" .dteam "/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Andrea Sciaba 8968" .cms "/C=CH/O=CERN/OU=GRID/CN=Patricia Mendez Lorenzo-ALICE" .alice ... /etc/grid-security/grid-mapfile

VOMS : concepts • Virtual Organization Membership Service • Extends the proxy with info on VO membership, group, roles • Fully compatible with Globus Toolkit • Each VO has a database containing group membership, roles and capabilities informations for each user • User contacts voms server requesting his authorization info • Server send authorization info to the client, which includes them in a proxy certificate [glite-tutor] /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-init --voms gilda Cannot find file or dir: /home/giorgio/.glite/vomses Your identity: /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it Enter GRID pass phrase: Your proxy is valid until Mon Jan 30 23:35:51 2006 Creating temporary proxy.................................Done Contacting voms.ct.infn.it:15001 [/C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Host/L=INFN Catania/CN=voms.ct.infn.it/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it] "gilda" Creating proxy ...................................... Done Your proxy is valid until Mon Jan 30 23:35:51 2006

VOMS - components • Authz DB is a RDBMS (currently MySQL and Oracle are supported).

FQAN and AC • short for Fully Qualified Attribute Name, is what VOMS uses to express membership and other authorization info • Groups membership, roles and capabilities may be expressed in a format that bounds them together<group>/Role=[<role>][/Capability=<capability>] • FQAN are included in an Attribute Certificate • Attribute Certificates are used to bind a set of attributes (like membership, roles, authorization info etc) with an identity • AC are digitally signed • VOMS uses AC to include the attributes of a user in a proxy certificate [glite-tutor] /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-info -fqan /gilda/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL /gilda/tutors/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL

VOMS and AC • Server creates and sign an AC containing the FQAN requested by the user, if applicable • AC is included by the client in a well-defined, non critical, extension assuring compatibility with GT-based mechanism • At resources level, authorization info are extracted from the proxy and processed by LCAS and LCMAPS /home/giorgio > voms-proxy-info -all subject : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it/CN=proxy issuer : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it identity : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it type : proxy strength : 512 bits path : /tmp/x509up_u513 timeleft : 11:59:52 === VO gilda extension information === VO : gilda subject : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Personal Certificate/L=INFN/CN=Emidio Giorgio/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it issuer : /C=IT/O=GILDA/OU=Host/L=INFN Catania/CN=voms.ct.infn.it/Email=emidio.giorgio@ct.infn.it attribute : /gilda/tutors/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL attribute : /gilda/Role=NULL/Capability=NULL timeleft : 11:59:45

Groups • The number of users of a VO can be very high: • E.g. the experiment ATLAS has 2000 member • Make VO manageable by organizing users in groups: Examples: • VO GILDA • Group Catania • INFN • Group Barbera • University • Group Padua • VO GILDA • /GILDA/TUTORS can write to normal storage • /GILDA/STUDENT only write to volatile space • Groups can have a hierarchical structure, undefinitely deep

Roles • Roles are specific roles a user has and that distinguishes him from others in his group: • Software manager • VO-Administrator • Difference between roles and groups: • Roles have no hierarchical structure – there is no sub-role • Roles are not used in ‘normal operation’ • They are not added to the proxy by default when running voms-proxy-init • But they can be added to the proxy for special purposes when running voms-proxy-init • Example: • User Emidio has the following membership • VO=gilda, Group=tutors, Role=SoftwareManager • During normal operation the role is not taken into account, e.g. Emidio can work as a normal user • For special things he can obtain the role “Software Manager”

LCAS & LCMAPS • Local Centre Authorization Service (LCAS) • Checks if the user is authorized (currently using the grid-mapfile) • Checks if the user is banned at the site • Checks if at that time the site accepts jobs • Local Credential Mapping Service (LCMAPS) • Maps grid credentials to local credentials (eg. UNIX uid/gid, AFS tokens, etc.) • Map also VOMS group and roles (full support of FQAN) "/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms" .cms "/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms/prod" .cmsprod "/VO=cms/GROUP=/cms/prod/ROLE=manager" .cmsprodman

GSI environment variables • User certificate files: • Certificate: X509_USER_CERT (default: $HOME/.globus/usercert.pem) • Private key: X509_USER_KEY (default: $HOME/.globus/userkey.pem) • Proxy: X509_USER_PROXY (default: /tmp/x509up_u<id>) • Host certificate files: • Certificate X509_HOST_CERT (default: /etc/grid-security/hostcert.pem) • Private key X509_HOST_KEY (default: /etc/grid-security/hostkey.pem) • Trusted certification authority certificates: • X509_CERT_DIR (default: /etc/grid-security/certificates) • Voms server public keys • X509_VOMS_DIR (default: /etc/grid-security/vomsdir)

Further Information Grid • LCG Security: http://proj-lcg-security.web.cern.ch/proj-lcg-security/ • LCG Registration: http://lcg-registrar.cern.ch/ • Globus Security: http://www.globus.org/security/ • VOMS: http://infnforge.cnaf.infn.it/projects/voms Background • GGF Security: http://www.gridforum.org/security/ • IETF PKIX charter: http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/pkix-charter.html • PKCS: http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/index.html

Security on Grid: Emidio Giorgio INFN – Catania