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This study proposes a secure rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks to enhance security against various attacks. The proposed scheme minimizes computation and communication costs while maintaining efficient key management. The performance evaluation highlights its effectiveness.
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A secure and scalable rekeying mechanism for hierarchical wireless sensor networks Authors: Song Guo, A-Ni Shen, and Minyi Guo Source: IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems, Vol.E93D, No.3, p.p.421-429, 2010. Presenter: Yung-Chih Lu (呂勇志) Date: 2010/12/02
Outline • Introduction • Related Work • Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (B-PCGR) • Proposed Scheme • Security Analysis • Performance Evaluation • Conclusion • Comment
Introduction (1/2) • Goal • Rekeying • Against attack • Eavesdropping attack • Node capture attack • Forward secrecy • Backward secrecy • Saving resource • Computation cost • Communication cost • Storage Overhead
Introduction (2/2) • Wireless Sensor Networks Three-tier hierarchical WSNs Pure flat WSNs Cluster Head: High-End Sensor AP: Access Point Sensor Node: Low-End Sensor
Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (1/3) W. Zhang and G. Cao, IEEE INFOCOM, 2005. • Key pre-distribution phase • Sensor Node • Ex: g(x)=3x2+5x1+2 , x=0,1,2,… g(x) g(x) Base Station g(x) distribution :Sensor node g(x) g(x): a t-degree g-polynomial
Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (2/3) • Setup phase Step1: Generates Step2: Calculates Step3: Sends esi(x,Sj) to Sj Step4: Removes g(x) and esi(x,y) Ex: g(x) =3x2+5x1+2 , t=2 Step1: e(x,y) = x2y1+4y1+5 , t=2, u=1 Step2: e(x,1) = x2+9 g’(x) = 4x2+5x+11 Step3: e(x,2)=2x2+13 e(x,3)=3x2+17 Step4 g(x) g’(x) SI Step3 S2 Step3 S3 Secure Channel e(x,y): a bivariate (t,u)-degree e-polynomial si: theId of sensor node i S1: 1 S2: 2 S3: 3
Basic Predistribution and Local Collaboration-Based Group Rekeying Scheme (3/3) • Rekeying Phase • Sensor node • g’(x), x=0,1,2,… • esj(x,Si), j ≠i g’(x) SI e(x,2)=2x2+13 Step2 S2 Step1:e(0,2)=2x2+13 =13 e(0,3)=3x2+17 =17 Step2: S2sends (2,13) to S1 S3 sends (3,17) to S1 Step3: Toreconstruct the polynomial e(0,y)=5+4y Step4: computes g(0)=g’(0)-e(0,1) =11-9 =2 Step2 S3 e(x,3)=3x2+17 Secure Channel
Proposed Scheme (1/2) • Key pre-distribution phase • Cluster Head • Id • KBS,CHa • KCHa,Si • Sensor node • Id • KBS,Si • KCHa,Si K: a pair-wise key BS: Base Station
Proposed Scheme (2/2) • Group key establishment and rekeying CHa Si 1. Generates a Group key GKka 2. E(Rki, KCHa,Si) Generates a Rki E(gka(x), GKk-1a) GKka= gka(Rki) Ωa:a set of all compromised nodes detected in cluster-a k: k-th
Security Analysis Verification-Based Group Rekeying (VGR) nc:The average number of sensor nodes in a cluster ω: The number of compromised nodes in a cluster t,u: The degree of a polynomial Lkey: The number of bits of a key Lid: The number of bits of an id
Performance Evaluation nc:The average number of sensor nodes in a cluster ω: The number of compromised nodes in a cluster t,u: The degree of a polynomial Lkey: The number of bits of a key Lid: The number of bits of an id
Conclusion • Robustness to the node capture attack • Reactive rekeying capability to malicious nodes • Low communication and storage overhead
Comment • the degree of a polynomial ≧the number of sensor nodes in a cluster • Compare ECC with polynomial • IDS is a heavy burden for the cluster head. IDS: Intrusion Detection System ECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography