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Are Cassandras right?

Are Cassandras right?. Riccardo Faini Università di Roma Tor Vergata. Three main risks for the world economy. The oil shock The current account imbalances The short run outlook for the three main economic areas The interest rate conundrum. The oil price a medium run perspective.

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Are Cassandras right?

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  1. Are Cassandras right? Riccardo Faini Università di Roma Tor Vergata

  2. Three main risks for the world economy • The oil shock • The current account imbalances • The short run outlook for the three main economic areas • The interest rate conundrum

  3. The oil pricea medium run perspective

  4. Will oil price remain high for long?

  5. The Damocles’ word of external imbalances • According to the IMF, the US current deficit will stand at 6% in 2006 and 2006; for the OECD it will reach 7% • The counterpart to the US deficit are substantive surpluses in Asia, the EU and oil exporting countries. • A dollar depreciation will cause a wealth loss abroad, aggravating the negative effect on aggregate demand

  6. Taking a closer look at the US current account imbalances • 1995 – 1999: the rise in investment is partly offset by a concomitant increase in saving • 2001-2004: the investment rate falls, but saving drops even more • Hence: foreign saving helped finance the technology led investment boom in the first period. Nowadays, it supports mainly the rise in private and public consumption

  7. What’s behind the current account surplus • in emerging Asia? • in Japan? • in China? • in oil exporting countries?

  8. In emerging Asia the current account surplus after 1998 reflects a major drop in investment

  9. Also in Japan the fall in investment (the red line) is the main factor behind the rise in the current account surplus

  10. While in China the strengthening of the current account balance reflects mainly the rise in saving (the blue line)

  11. Finally, in the oil exporting countries.. the oil price bonanza has so far been associated with a rise in the saving rate (the blueline), while the investment rate is still lagging behind

  12. Why are real interest rates so low? • A saving glut? • Saving went up only in China and in oil exporting countries. • Even there, the increase in saving may not last long • A drop in investment? • Investment fell in Japan, emerging Asia and in the oil exporting countries • In (most) cases, though, the fall in investment may be temporary • A portfolio reallocation effect? • Again, a temporary phenomenon?

  13. The interest rate conundrum

  14. Has fiscal policy become irrelevant? • In the eighties real interest rates responded sharply (from 0% in 79-80 to 6.9% in 84-85) to fiscal imbalances. • In the early 2000’s the interest rate response is almost muted. • In Europe, domestic spreads seem to be little affected by fiscal indiscipline

  15. Real interest rates and debt ratios in Europe

  16. The pessimist’s perspective • Fiscal indiscipline is no longer associated with higher interest rates, presumably because of greater global financial integration • However, low global real interest rates mainly reflect temporary phenomena, such as unusually high saving rates in China and oil producers and low investment rates in other areas • Moreover, individual countries with a high and rising debt may suffer relatively more from tighter financial conditions

  17. European countries with a large and rising debt face higher spreads

  18. Who is more vulnerable? • The rise in interest rates will add to the burden of high public and foreign debt countries • The increase in interest rates may lead to a rise in the level of spreads: • Greater risk of financial distress • Greater risk aversion by markets participants • The rise in the debt ratios may further boost countries spreads

  19. Is Europe falling behind?

  20. The picture is less worrying if we focus on per capita growth

  21. Falling behind? Italy during the last decade • The decline in relative GDP per person • The loss in export market shares • The behavior of productivity

  22. The loss in export market shares

  23. The outlook today • Growth is unlikely to pick up on a sustained basis • Inflation is higher than in the rest of the EU: the standard adjustment mechanism does not work for Italy • Slow growth and lack of fiscal restraint have resulted in a significant deterioration of the budget

  24. Losing competitiveness

  25. An unpalatable combination • Taken together, low growth, real appreciation, rigid markets, high debt ratios and large fiscal deficits are a cause of concern • Structural reforms in the product markets and in the educational system should loom high in the policy agenda • Fiscal consolidation should come soon before interest rates start rising

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