START Follow-on Update

1. START Follow-on Update November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution spifer@brookings.edu

2. Background: 1991 START Treaty • No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers) • No more than 154 heavy ICBMs • No more than 6000 warheads • No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs • No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs • No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs • Detailed verification measures • Expires December 5, 2009

3. Background: 2002 SORT Treaty • No more than 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads • No limits on SNDVs • No verification measures • Expires December 31, 2012

4. Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009 • SORT count at/near 2200 warheads • Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs capable of carrying 5916 warheads: 550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs 1600 96 Trident I SLBMs 576 336 Trident II SLBMs 2688 47 B-1 bombers 47 18 B-2 bombers 18 141 B-52 bombers 987

5. Background: Russian START-Accountable Forces, July 2009 • SORT count unknown • Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs capable of carrying 3897 warheads: 465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs 2001 268 SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs 1288 76 Bear/Blackjack bombers 608

6. July Joint Understanding • Strategic warhead limit of 1500-1675 and SNDV limit of 500-1100 • Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty • New treaty to contain provisions on: • Counting rules • Elimination and verification (based on START, simplified and less costly as appropriate) • Interrelationship between offense and defense • Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

7. START Follow-on Treaty • Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT • Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations • Missile defense • SNDV limit • Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs • Verification

8. Missile Defense • Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms” • Russians sought to restrict missile defense • US position: missile defense not a subject for START follow-on negotiation

9. SNDV Limit • Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100) • Reasons for higher US proposal: • SNDVs converted to conventional roles • “Phantom” systems • Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US plans to download missiles

10. Conventional Systems • US strategic systems converted to conven-tional roles • B-1 bombers • Four Trident SSGNs • How to assure no nuclear role?

11. “Phantom” Systems • SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules • US “phantoms” include: • B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB • MX ICBM silos • Some Minuteman III silos

12. “Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s

13. “Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo

14. Eliminated Minuteman Silo

15. Closing SNDV Limit • Possible ways to address: • Verification measures to confirm conventional systems have only conventional role • Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on less demanding elimination requirement • Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems

16. Upload Potential • Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles • Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three warheads will have five empty warhead slots • The dog that’s not barking? • May be issue for next round

17. Conventional Warheads • US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven-tional warheads • Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems

18. Counting and Verification • Possible warhead counting regimes • Type attribution rule (START) • Actual load counting -- US plans to vary number of warheads on Trident SLBMs • Simplifying verification measures • Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems

19. Prognosis • Treaty likely as both sides want it • Russian and US motivations differ but strong on both sides • Both presidents strongly endorse treaty • Question = when will treaty be completed?