How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier

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How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier

How to Go Beyond the Black-Box Simulation Barrier

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1. How to Go Beyond theBlack-BoxSimulation Barrier Boaz Barak Weizmann Institute

2. Alice wants to convince Bob that x2 L.But, without him gaining any knowledge about w! Thus, she can not simply send w to Bob! We need a more complicated, interactive protocol. Zero Knowledge Proofs [GMR] L 2 NP e.g. L = { x | x is a 3-colorable graph } x 2 L e.g. x is a 3-colorable graph w 2 Wit(x) e.g. w is a 3-coloring of x Prover (Alice) knows w Verifier (Bob) knows only x m1 m2 m2

3. Def of Interactive Proofs Prover (Alice) knows w Verifier (Bob) knows only x m1 m2 m2 Completeness: Given w, Prover can convince the Verifier that x2L Comp. Soundness: If xL, then, regardless of Prover’s (efficient) strategy, the verifier will reject with very high prob.

4. This is called Black-Box simulation. Zero Knowledge Property Prover (Alice) knows w Verifier (Bob) knows only x Informal Definition of ZK: Regardless of efficient strategy Verifier uses, he can not gain new knowledge on the witness Statistically Indistinguishable Computationally Indistinguishable Formal Def: 8efficient verifier V*9S* s.t. ~ ~ V*’s view in interaction w/ P(x,w)  S*(x) Usual way to show ZK: Show universal S s.t. 8V* V*’s view  SV*(x)

5. Our main result: Conjecture is false. (Under standard assumptions) Black-Box Simulation Formal Def: 8efficient verifier V*9S* s.t. V*’s view in interaction w/ P(x,w)  S*(x) Black-Box Simulation: Show alg S s.t. 8V* V*’s view  SV*(x) All previously known ZK protocols used black-box simulators [GMR,GMW,BCC,FS,GKa,RK,…] Conjecture: If a protocol is ZK, then it has a black-box simulator. Implication: Black-box ZK limitations ) ZK limitations

6. Rest of the talk: Proof of Thm 2 The Main Result Main Thm: If CRH* exist then there exists a ZK argument that does nothave a black-box simulator. With negligible soundness error. Proof:Combine the following two theorems: Thm 1 [GolKra89]:If LBPP then every constant-round Arthur-Merlinargument for L does not have a black-box simulator. Thm 2:If CRH exist then every L2NP has a constant-round Arthur-Merlin ZK argument. Remark:Protocol of Thm 2 has other useful properties impossible to obtain w/ black-box simulation. More details later. *CRH – Collision Resistent Hash functions

7. Intuition of Construction:To prove x2L , prove thateitherx2L orprover knows the verifier’s programSuch that verifier can’t distinguish between 1st case & 2nd case. Proof of Thm 2 – High Level View Thm 2:If CRH exist then every L2NP has a constant-round Arthur-Merlin ZK argument. We construct a protocol withnon-black-box simulation:We show universal S s.t. 8V* V*’s view  S(desc of V*’s code, x) Protocol will be Sound because honest verifier will use a program chosen at random (from some collection). Protocol will be ZK because non-black-box simulator knows the verifier program.

8. Proof of Thm 2 Thm 2:If CRH exist then every L2NP has a constant-round Arthur-Merlin ZK argument. • Commitment Schemes (“digital envelopes”) [Blum,Naor] • Witness Indistinguishable (WI) proofs [FeiSha] • Universal Arguments [Mic,Kil,BGol] We’ll first describe 3 tools we need: We then show for every L2NP, the construction of a protocol with desired properties.

9. Witness Indistinguishable (WI) Proofs[FeiSha] L 2 NP x 2 L w,w’ 2 Wit(x) Prover (Alice) knows worw’ Verifier (Bob) knows only x Regardless of efficient strategy Verifier uses, he can not tell if prover used w or w’ • Weaker property than ZK. • Trivial for languages with unique witnesses. • Closed under parallel (even concurrent) composition. • If OWF exist then 9 3-round Arthur-Merlin WI proof for all L2NP

10. Thm [Kil,Mic,B,BGol]:Suppose that CRH exist. Then, 9 a constant-round Arthur-Merlin Universal Argument system. Furthermore, there exists such a system that is WI. Next:Our Protocol Universal Arguments [Mic,BGol] Let M : Ntime(T(n)) machine (T(¢) polynomial), x 2 {0,1}n Suppose Alice knows non-det choice w 2 {0,1}T(n) s.t. M(x;w)=1and wants to prove this to Bob. In standard NP proof systems: Comm. Complexity = Bob’s running time = poly(T(n)) A Universal Arguments System allows to prove statement with Comm. Complexity = Bob’s running time = nfor every polynomial T(¢). Actually, for every function T(¢)complexity = T(n)o(1)(e.g. complexity = polylog(T(n)) ) (Proof uses NEXP=PCP(poly,poly) [BabForLun] & Merkle hash-trees)

11. WIP either x2 L or9 s.t. ()=r Intuition of Construction:Prove in WI thateitherx2L orprover knows the verifier’s program. A First Attempt Honest Verifier chooses r at random. For general verifier V* we have r=V*( ) r 2R {0,1}n Idea:Prove that you knew before seeing r Idea: Prover uses 1st case and Simulator 2nd case (w/ witness=V*) WI ensures indistinguishability. Problem: Not sound! Cheating prover can choose  after seeing r!

12. WIP either x2 L or()=r A Second Attempt Not sound! Cheating prover can choose  after seeing r! Old Problem:  r 2R {0,1}n Why use () and not ( )?? Use C() instead of ! Sound! Let r’=() , then Pr[ r=r’] · 2-n Problem: Simulator will send = code of V*’s strategyWhat will honest prover use for  ?

13. Protocol UZK z=C(;s) C(;s) denotes commit. to  w/ coins s r 2R {0,1}n WIP either x2 L or 9,s s.t. z=C(,s) & (z)=r Sound! Let =C-1(z) and let r’=(z) , then Pr[ r=r’] · 2-n ZK! Prover sends z=C(0n)Simulator sends z=C(V*’s strategy)Indistinguishability follows from commit security + WI Problem: No fixed polynomial bound on V*’s running time Use a WI Universal Argument

14. Note: Only showed simulator for verifiers w/ bounded non-uniformity Protocol UZK z=C(;s) r 2R {0,1}n WIP either x2 L or 9,s s.t. z=C(,s) & (z)=r Thm: Prot UZK is a constant-round Arthur-Merlin ZK arg. for L. Cor: Prot UZK does not have a black-box simulator

15. More Results • Prot UZK can be modified to obtain ZK against non-uniform verifiers. • Prot UZK has simulator with strict prob. poly-time:Impossible w/ black-box simulation [BL] • Modified version of Prot UZK remains ZK under bounded-concurrent compositionImpossible w/ black-box simulation [CKPR] • Instantiating Prot UZK in crypto schemes (e.g. identification, voting) yields schemes with non-black-box proof of security.

16. Corollary of this work: Yes! Black-Box Reductions in Crypto Typical Crypto Thm:Scheme X (e.g. voting) is as secure as Problem Y (e.g. factoring). This is called a Black-Box proof of security. Typical Proof:By contrapositive. Show that if 9 efficient alg A to break Scheme X, then 9 efficient alg B to solve Problem Y. Almost always: show a universal B such that 8 efficient Aif A breaks Scheme Xthen BA(¢) solves Problem Y Question: Is it possible to gain something by using a non-black-box proof of security?

17. The End