C hapter 7. A roadside billboard of Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen. 7. Understanding Chinese Economic Reform. 7.1 Radical reform: the successful cases 7.2 Radical reform: the unsuccessful cases 7.3 Gradual/partial reform: the successful cases 7.4 Gradual/partial reform: the unsuccessful cases
A roadside billboard of Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen
7.1 Radical reform: the successful cases
7.2 Radical reform: the unsuccessful cases
7.3 Gradual/partial reform: the successful cases
7.4 Gradual/partial reform: the unsuccessful cases
7.5 Whither Chinese-style reform?
7.1.1 Agricultural reform
7.1.2 Reform of Chinese bureaucracy
Notes: By 1988, 90% of government officials above the country level were newly appointed after 1982; 60% of those government officials had college degrees. This was a result of retiring 3.4 million revolutionary veterans.
a: Governor/party secretary.
Source: Li (1998, p. 394), which also gives other references.
7.2.1 Price-release reform
7.2.2 The SOE reform during the 1990s
7.3.1 Introduction of dual-track system
7.3.2 Decentralization of authority
7.3.3 Reform of foreign exchange system
7.4.1 The SOE reform in the 1980s
7.4.2 Decentralization of authority in the 1980s
7.4.3 Reform of China’s banking system
Shirk (1993), Dittmer and Wu (1993, pp. 10-12) reach a similar conclusion, sketching out four relatively complete, synchronous cycles of fang and shou during 1980 to 1989: fang predominated in 1979–80, 1984 and 1988, while shou predominated in 1981, 1985–86, 1987, and 1988–89.
7.5.1 Political economy of reforms
7.5.2 WTO and the Chinese reform
Notes: (1) The judgment of a reform program as being ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ is based on available data and literature. (2) The terms ‘radical’ and ‘gradual/partial’ are elastically defined, since according to international standard, during the past three decades China’s all reform programs as a whole have been implemented via only but a gradual/partial approach.
Source: Defined in the text.
Interest groups, stakeholders and reform in China
Political, economic and cultural elites in the later reforms
Notes: (1) Each circle denotes the scope of reform that is proposed by and in favor of an elite. (2) The area that is overlapped by the three circles denotes the scope of reform that is in favor of all the three elites concerned.
Figure 7.2 Collective actions of the Chinese elites on reforms
Chapter conclusion: The analytical narrative of the successful and unsuccessful cases of the Chinese-style reform shows that the efficiency of a reform depended upon: (i) the initial institutional conditions; (ii) the external environment; and (iii) the reform strategy. The empirical evidence suggests that a radical reform tends to be more efficient than a gradual/partial one during the early stages (the late 1970s and the early 1980s), while a gradual/partial reform tends to be more efficient than a radical (big-bang) one in the later stages. We also find that the Chinese-style reform has evolved from the collusion of the CCP radicals and conservatives to that of the political, economic and cultural elites, at the cost of retarding political reforms and of sacrificing the benefits of the rest of the people.
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