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Cooperation. Reciprocators, Cheaters, and Everyone Else . Who Can You Trust?. DeBruine (2002) Two-person sequential trust game Manipulated resemblance of “other player” by morphing with participant’s face Participants trusted similar faces over dissimilar ones.
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Cooperation Reciprocators, Cheaters, and Everyone Else
Who Can You Trust? • DeBruine (2002) • Two-person sequential trust game • Manipulated resemblance of “other player” by morphing with participant’s face • Participants trusted similar faces over dissimilar ones
Extending the Problem of Altruism • While Hamilton’s rule explains kin-selected altruism, it does not explain cooperation between nonkin • How can altruistic behaviour between nonkin be explained in light of evolutionary theory? • The work of Alexander, Hamilton, and Trivers provides us with an answer: reciprocal altruism
Reciprocal Altruism • Providing a service at a cost may be selected for if there are greater reciprocated benefits in the future • Cooperation between two individuals for mutual – although not always immediate – benefit • Synonymous with social exchange and cooperation
Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma (1) • Two strategies: cooperate or defect • Features of the game • Simple representation of real situations • Intelligent plays should be self-evident • Changes significantly over repeated plays
Iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma (2) Numbers represent length of jail sentence Cooperate Defect R = 2 S = 10 Cooperate T = 0 P = 5 Defect
Tit for Tat • Alexander ran a computerized round-robin “tournament” of competing strategies in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma • Tit for Tat strategy was the most successful • Never defect first • Retaliate only after the other player defected • Be “forgiving”
Examples of Reciprocity in Nature • Vampire bats • Regurgitate blood nonrandomly: for “friends” • Baboons & aid during sexual contests • Vervet monkeys & allogrooming • Common chimpanzees • Alliances formed for status (with sexual benefits) after a “political” fashion
Social Contract Theory • Fundamental capacities of negotiating & maintaining social contracts (cheater detection) • Recognition of individual humans • Historical memory of interactions • Communication of values • Model values of others • Representation of costs and benefits
Cheater Detection (1) • Wason reasoning task • Letter on one side, number on other • If there is a “K” on one side, there is a “2” on the other K R 2 0
Cheater Detection (2) • Wason reasoning task • Beer or Coke on one side, age on other • If drinking beer, they must be over 19 years old 19 Beer 16 Coke
Cheater Detection (3) • Correct answers K R 2 0 19 Beer 16 Coke
Cheater Detection (4) • The case of R.M. • Bilateral damage to medial orbitofrontal cortex & anterior temporal cortex • Left & right amygdala disconnected • Performed significantly worse on social contract problems than “precaution” problems • Controls showed no such deficit
The Wrap-Up • Kin selection • Based on Hamilton’s rule • Increases inclusive fitness • Reciprocal altruism • Cost incurred for greater benefit in future • Prisoner’s Dilemma & Tit for Tat • Social contracts & cheater detection
Things to Come • Aggression • Adaptationist perspective • Sex differences • Patterns of aggression • Context effects • Warfare