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Complying by the rules in absence of surveillance: The impact of a group-interested versus self-interested authority. Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University. Structural solutions: undoing the dilemma. Privatization Leaders Rules Sanctions.

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slide1
Complying by the rules in absence of surveillance: The impact of a group-interested versus self-interested authority

Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen

Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University

structural solutions undoing the dilemma
Structural solutions: undoing the dilemma
  • Privatization
  • Leaders
  • Rules
  • Sanctions
slide3

Compliance? Not always

(e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Michael, 2006; Mulder et al., PSPB 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 1997)

  • Compliance in absence of surveillance?
  • Rule should convince people that cooperation is good for all / “awareness” of social dilemma
when does a rule sanction get internalized
When does a rule/sanction get “internalized”?
  • Little research
  • Sanctions, sanction severity, punishment versus reward

(Thogersen 1997; Mulder et al., 2009; Mulder, 2008)

  • Who installs the rule
leaders authorities
Leaders / authorities
  • Impact leaders in group behavior: Trust, self-sacrificing leadership, legitimacy, procedural justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1997; Tyler et al, 2000; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003)

 Group versus self interested leader

slide6

Leader installs a rule or sanctions

Leader perceived

as group-interested

Leader perceived

as self-interested

“cooperation is good for all

/ morally correct” etc.

“cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more”

No compliance, or only compliance when supervised

Compliance, even without supervision

study 1 experimental real interactions
Study 1: experimental, real interactions
  • Bogus leadership style questionnaire: e.g. “If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for everyone”, If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for myself”  “group score” and “self score”
  • Public good dilemma (groups of 4, each 20 x 20cent coins, coins contributed to group multiplied by 1,5 and divided equally)
  • Leader: another participant. Either high group score and low self score (group interested leader condition) or the other way around (self interested leader condition).
  • Leader could fine other group members with €2

(Leader + sanction pre-programmed. Fine was distributed when contribution was lower than 12).

results caught fish in kilos
Results: Caught fish in kilos

Post-hoc: paired comparisons within columns

results intented duration of break in minutes
Results: Intented duration of break in minutes

Note: Within columns, cells that do not share a letter in the superscript differ significantly, planned comparison, p < .05.

study 4 2 leader x 3 rule lab experiment
Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment
  • PG dilemma: pts typed in choice and explanation
  • Resource dilemma (different groups):

- 5 persons, one of which the leader (random) and 4 “normal group members”

- leader able to impose self-chosen rule

- information on leader: choice + explanation in previous PD game.

- Group benefitting leader condition: contributed 100

Self-benefitting leader condition: contributed 0.

“I just went for the group interest (my own self interest). If I (the group) would earn less by doing that, I don’t mind very much. By donating everything, the group (I) simply earns (earn) the most.”

study 4 2 leader x 3 rule lab experiment1
Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment
  • Pool of 40 lottery tickets (“owned by leader”)
  • Each “normal” group member could take from pool (0-10)
  • What was left in pool: doubled and equally divided among all 5.
  • Rule manipulation:

No-rule condition: Leader did not install a rule

Rule condition: Leader: “I install the rule that you do NOT take any tickets from the pool. So, the rule will be: leave all tickets in the pool.”

  • Rule condition: some leaders able to supervise, some are not.

Rule with supervision: your leader has the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions

Rule without supervision: your leader does not have the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions

  • Decision on number of lottery tickets to take (0-10)
slide16

Leader installs a rule or sanctions

Leader perceived

as group-interested

Leader perceived

as self-interested

“cooperation is good for all

/ morally correct” etc.

“cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more”

No compliance, or only compliance when supervised

Compliance, even without supervision

conclusions
Conclusions
  • Successfulness of rules/sanctions depends on who installs them.
  • Let rules or sanctions be imposed by authorities who have built credits, with a pro-social appearance, etc.
  • Structural solutions may fail to make structural changes