Основы конституционного строя: Типы систем правления

1. Prof. Dr. Petra Stykow Основы конституционного строя: Типы систем правления

2. http://worldpolities.org./ Карта политий мира МГИМО-Университет/Институт общественного проектирования

3. Regime Types(Shugart 2006) „Pure“ parliamentarism • executiveauthority, consistingof a prime ministerandcabinet, arises out ofthe legislative assembly • theexecutiveisat all timessubjectto potential dismissal via a voteof „noconfidence“ by a majorityofthe legislative assembly Presidentialdemocracy • The executiveisheadedby a popularlyelectedpresidentwhoservesasthe „chiefexecutive“ • thetermsofthechiefexecutiveandthe legislative assemblyarefixed, and not subjectto mutual confidence • The presidentnamesanddirectsthecabinetandhassomeconstitutionallygrantedlaw-makingauthority

4. Semi-presidentialgovernment(Duverger 1980, adapted) • apresident who is popularly elected, • the president has considerable constitutional authority, • there exists also a prime minister and cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority

5. ParliamentarySystem PresidentialSystem President presidentialcabinet Executive Prime ministerandcabinet Legislature (Congress) Legislature (Parliament) Electorate Electorate checksandbalances Institutionaldivisionofpowers– functional „entanglement“ ofpowers(separate institutionssharingpowers) Institutional „entanglement“ ofpowers(fusionofpowers, unifiedgovernment) Basic Forms of Executive-Legislative Relations (Shugart 2006) Executive hierarchicalrelationship (arrowindicatingselectionof „agent“ by „principal“) transactionalrelationship (nosubordination but competition)

6. Do institutions matter? Isthere a „best design“ forexecutive-legislative relations, a modelthat „fitsit all“?

7. The VirtuesofPresidentialism • Directmandate: thepresidentisgenerallyelecteddirectlybythepeople > makesthepresident's power morelegitimatethanthatof a leaderappointedindirectly • Separation ofpowers: twoparallel structures > thisarrangementallowseachstructuretosupervisetheother, preventingabuses (checksandbalances) • Speed anddecisiveness: a presidentwith strong powerscanusuallyenactchangesquickly vs. thefusion-of-powersarrangementslowsthesystem down • Stability: a president, byvirtueof a fixedterm, mayprovidemorestabilitythan a prime ministerwhocanbedismissedatany time.

8. The PerilsofPresidentialism Tendency towards authoritarianism — presidentialism is not constitutionally stable > presidentialism has fallen into authoritarianism in every country it has been attempted, except the United States • immobilism because of two parallel structures > this creates undesirable gridlock + reduces accountability by allowing the president and the legislature to shift blame to each other • the two parallel structures have competing claims to legitimacy > how gridlock situations are to be resolved? • fixed terms of office > impedimentsto leadership change (an unsuitable president cannot be removed from office before his term has expired) > presidential regimes are more rigid than parliamentary systems • encourages a winner-takes-all outcome (polarization) • encourages populist candidates • encourages the president to place himselfabovepolitics, personalizationof power, survival of the regime becomes associated with the survival of the president in office > opposition to the president becomes associated with opposition to the regime itself > presidents encouraged to be intolerant of political opposition Conclusion: “presidentialism seems to involve greater risk for stable democratic politics than contemporary parliamentarism” (Linz 1994: 70)

9. Presidentialismnot always a problem – but in combinationwithcertainotherinstitutions/featuresofpoliticalsystems (!) • “the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes stable democracy difficult to sustain” (Mainwaring 1993: 199) • “regimes with great presidential legislative powers are problematic, as are those in which authority over cabinets is shared between assembly and president” (Shugart/Carey 1992: 156) • …

10. Constitutional Forms of Executive-Legislative Relations: Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

11. Semi-Presidentialism(s) premier-presidential Cabinet president-parliamentary President hierarchicalrelationship (arrowindica-tingselectionof „agent“ by „principal“) Legislature hierarchicalrelationship (arrowindica-tingaccountabilityof „agent“ to „principal“ whomayterminatedelegatedauthority) Electorate transactionalrelationship(nosubordination ) Shugart, Matthew S. (2005): Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns. In: French Politics 3, S. 323-351.

13. The Perilsof Semi-presidentialism? • cf. presidentialism: tendency towards authoritarianism — personalization of power, president–parliament gridlock, president abovepolitics, intolerant of political opposition • cohabitation: When supporters of one or the other component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of legitimacy. • potential fordividedminoritygovernment: When neither the president nor the prime minister, nor any party or coalition, enjoys a substantive majority in the legislature this can lead to instability characterized by shifting legislative coalitions and government reshuffles, on the one hand, and continuous presidential intervention and use of reserved powers, on the other.

14. Kontrol‘najaTochka • Analysis ofConstitution: type ofgovernment • Quality of Democracy (Politatlas, Freedom House, Polity, Bertelsmann) • Constitution: • When? Constitutional models: domestic – foreign? What was contenious? Why? • Amendmentsconcerningexecutive-legislative relations? When? Reasons? • Powers: President, parliament, premier-minister/government (assessmentofstrength – byconstitution) • Major differencesbetween Constitutional provisionsandpoliticalpracticeconcerningexecutive-legislative relations • Example (choose an importantone, andonlyone): majorproblem in executive-legislative relationship(> countryreports: Freedom House, Polity, Bertelsmann…) • Overall assessment: goodfordemocracy? Goodforefficiencyofgovernment? Potential ofconflicts?

15. «Политический атлас современности» (2008) http://worldpolities.org/ Polity IV(since 1800)http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm Country reports: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm#eur Freedom House Index (since 1971): http://www.freedomhouse.org Country reports: //www.freedomhouse.org/regions/central-and-eastern-europeeurasia Bertelsmann Transformation Index http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de Country reports: http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/ecse/ Measuring Democracy

16. Bibliography • Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations • Shugart, Matthew Søberg (2006). Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations. In: R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman (Hrsg.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, S. 344–365 • Perils of Presidentialism • Juan J. Linz, 1990: The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy 1(1), 51–69 • Juan J. Linz, 1990: The Virtues of Parliamentarism, Journal of Democracy 1(4), 84–91. • Juan J. Linz, 1994: Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3–87. • Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, 1993: Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation. Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism, World Politics 46, 1–22. • Matthew SøbergShugartand John M. Carey, 1992: PresidentsandAssemblies. Constitutional Design andElectoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) • Scott Mainwaring, 1993: Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy. The DifficultCombination, Comparative Political Studies 26(2), 198–228; • Scott Mainwaringand Matthew S. Shugart, 1997: Conclusion: Presidentialismandthe Party System, in Scott Mainwaringand Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialismand Democracy in LatinAmerica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 394-43