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Diversion Mechanisms

Diversion Mechanisms. Class 20. Diversion. Diversionary principles lie deep in the heart of juvenile court ideology and practice since inception At one time, diversion was seen as balancing need for control and intervention with stigma avoidance Institutionalized widely in late 1970s

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Diversion Mechanisms

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  1. Diversion Mechanisms Class 20

  2. Diversion • Diversionary principles lie deep in the heart of juvenile court ideology and practice since inception • At one time, diversion was seen as balancing need for control and intervention with stigma avoidance • Institutionalized widely in late 1970s • Research suggested that diversion had little effect on recidivism • Flow control mechanism retained by the juvenile court and its bureaucratic arms for cases that do not fall into the jurisdiction of the prosecutors • At “apprehension” or referral, there is a discretionary moment when either the prosecutor or a juvenile intake officer decides whether to process the case formally or informally. • Youth can be detained prior to screening, use of detention prior to diversion varies

  3. Who are screeners? Structure of decision making and gate-keeping varies from state to state and place to place within states • Prosecutors • Juvenile court intake staff (usually affiliated with probation function) • Does it matter? • Interactions between juvenile court screeners and prosecutors vary from state to state • Confidentiality of interactions between probation “screeners” and youth • If “informal adjustment,” there are still obligations that can be imposed • Counseling • Referral to a social service or other agency • Probation obligations

  4. Legal Structure and Practice • Formality of Rules • CA Court Rule 1404 – procedural • CA Court Rule 1405 – criteria • Legal sufficiency of charge(s) • Seriousness • Persistence of problem leading to crime • Parent and child attitudes • Age, maturity (“sophistication”) • Prior record • Victim interests • Other circumstances • Criteria for Informal Disposition • Need for court intervention vs. family resources and capability • Court needs more time for longer observation and evaluation of child

  5. Minnesota Statute § 388.24 (1997) • Probable cause • Prosecutor as gate keeper • Emphasis on restorative justice • Programs do their own screening to assist prosecutor’s decision • Tx goals, D/A assessment, counseling and other remedial services, restitution supervision • Provide information to court on progress • What is missing in these statutes?

  6. Washington Statute §13.40.070 (1998) • Prosecutorial discretion • Probable cause • Allocation decision – juvenile court or informal disposition • Allocation decision codified similar to CA criteria • Devolves to probation staff if NOT a felony • Notice to parents of charges • Washington Statute §13.40.070 (1998) • Behavioral contract that specifies obligations • Max of 6 mos for misdemeanor or 1 yr for felony • “Reasonable” expectation of ability to make monetary restitution • Due process, including right to counsel • AN ENTIRE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTED!

  7. Trends • Trend toward formality: filing of juvenile court petition in lieu of informal supervision • Sickmund study (1999): 45% processed informally, 53% of those (27% overall) receive some type of intervention or obligation • Race effects

  8. Social and Legal Tensions • Right to Diversion? Not really, statutes only speak to eligibility • 28 Wash.App 580, 624 P.2d 1180 (1981) • Net widening? Defense of net widening? • Special interests of court in child development and welfare • It’s voluntary • Involvement of community agencies in quasi-legal function of supervision and reporting – transfer coercive power to social service or mental health agency • Effectiveness of services, liability of child and family is dependent on capacity of social service agency • Balance of evidence from experiments suggests that diversion is ineffective, if not iatrogenic

  9. Who is better suited to run a diversion program – prosecutor or court (via probation arm)? • Sound screening decisions • Operational management of diverse network of services • Supervision authority • Does admission of guilt (required in many tx programs) create risk or prejudice in subsequent court actions for this or later charges? • Does juvenile have right to counsel to decide whether to accept a diversion offer? Is waiver “voluntary” and “intelligent”? • Liability of child who rejects diversion offer? Is the youth subject to harsher penalties compared to obligations of diversion program? • Yes (State v McDowell, 102 Wash.2d 341 (1984) • But can’t escalate misdemeanor into a felony charge in lieu of a diversion agreement • Confidentiality of diversion records?

  10. What should be the length of diversion period? • Longer than would a ‘normal’ disposition span? • When does intensity of services become punitive and subject to procedural due process? • What should be the consequences of failure? • Does diversion, whether successfully completed or not, constitute a “prior”? What is increased liability if failure in diversion for next case? • State v Quiroz, 107 Wash.2d 791 (1987) (finding that diversion counts as a “prior” in future court matters as a sentencing enhancement) • But see: In Re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650 (Minn.Ct.Ap. 1993) • How should the termination decision be structured? What is success? Can it be spelled out contractually? Do agencies become powerful quasi-legal actors that determine whether there will be further punishment ? Is this good or bad?

  11. Current Practices • Florida Program • Denver Program • Like Drug Courts? • How is service delivery system regulated? • Accountability diffusion? • Worth the money?

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