Stability, Security and Development

1. Stability, Security and Development GP3200 May 23, 2012 Social Well-Being Dr Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Outline • Social Well Being • Social Conditions of Trust and Cooperation • Humanitarian Assistance • Refugees and Internal Displacement • Iraq Case Study – Development at the Local Level • Vocational Training • Microfinance

3. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation I • Important to examine how sufficient cooperation among previously warring parties can be achieved so that S&R efforts can be successful • Much depends on the context of the conflict • Composition of fighting parties • Political aims and economic and social backdrops • International interventions • To facilitate long-term S&R, post conflict interventions needed to establish basic institutional structures that promote cooperation among groups, particularly prone to competition and conflict • Trust is a key enabler of cooperation – • Key question is: • how can useful degrees of trust and cooperation be created in a post-conflict environment?

4. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation II • Key Concepts: cooperation, trust, distrust, social capital, and social reconciliation. • Cooperation – coordination of efforts or activities to produce a mutually beneficial outcome • Some level of cooperation among parties previously engaged in violent conflict is essential if S&R is to succeed • Cooperation not a zero sum game – makes it different from competitive behavior or violence • Conflict experts typically think of intergroup relationships as falling along a cooperative-to competitive spectrum • Positive cooperative group relations characterized by trust and good feeling • Negative or competitive relationships by distrust and negative social attitudes toward the other group(s)

5. Characteristics of Competitive and Cooperative Relationships

6. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation III • Cooperation can increase vulnerability • Willingness of groups to cooperate depends on their expectation of the other’s likelihood of also cooperating • Reason trust plays such a powerful role in cooperation • Groups more likely to be cooperative when there has been • History of cooperation • When structural conditions provide incentives for cooperation or • When positive attitudes exist about the trustworthiness of the other group • Because attitudes affect expectations, interventions to improve attitudes are important • Trust Defined • – positive expectations about the actions of another party or belief in and willingness to act on the basis of the words and actions of another

7. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation IV • Trust critical to S&R because • it affects cooperation, reducing uncertainty by providing expectations about the behaviors of peoples and groups. • Trust across groups is key to facilitating conflict resolution • Reduces the need for monitoring and punishment of parties in cooperation • While trust is not a necessary condition for peace, it is necessary if the peacemaking process is to take hold • Two Main Types of Trust • 1. Calculation-based is a kind of trust that stems form assessing (whether correctly or not) that trust is justified – for a very concrete set of issues in a very concrete context – because it seems to be in the interest of the other party • Such trust is inherently rational and requires neither emotions nor affinity between parties • Only factor -- interests are best served by cooperation.

8. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation V • As a result, efforts to increase calculation based (rational) trust should be concerned with: • Incentive structures • Guarantees and • Building a history of repeated and positive interactions • Such trust is usually “thin” in that if the situation or issue changes the trust may vanish quickly – it is not necessarily transferrable • 2. Relationship-based trust stems from positive expectations about another’s behavior based on personal experience and ties • Relational ties may be made by group membership – if the other party is: family, tribe, community etc they are trustworthy (which might or might not be accurate)

9. Factors Affecting Intergroup Trust and Cooperation

10. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation VI • Relational-based trust may be relatively “thick” but it need not be. Emotions play a role • Key point is that relationships enjoying high levels of this “thick” trust typically require less monitoring to ensure compliance than relationships with thinner trust • It is this “ thicker” trust that helps perpetuate longer-term stability • Developing thicker forms of trust in post-conflict situations requires that social identities become more inclusive and open • Means breaking down negative stereotypes that portray individuals from other groups as subhuman, untrustworthy or incapable of honorable behavior • Creating new and inclusive identities such as a national identity that include all members of all groups may be useful for creating cooperation and trust.

11. Comparison of Types of Trusts

12. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation VII • Implications: • In most post-conflict situations, building calculation-based trust will be the immediate aim. • That opens the door to building relationship –based trust, which is stronger and more enduring over time • Trust and Distrust • Distrust is a postive expectation that an agent will be have negatively • Not only do post-conflict societies lack trust, they are deeply distrusting • This does not change quickly even if groups have enough trust to cooperate for specific narrow purposes. • Four cases defined by low or high trust and low or high distrust.

13. Characteristics of Trust, Distrust and Combinations

14. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation VIII • Trust and Distrust • Bottom right cell (low trust, high distrust) all to characteristic of many post conflict societies • Not merely that parties lack trust; rather they are seriously worried about each other • Even an optimistic projection for a post-conflict society might anticipate very high degrees of distrust for years • Occurs despite success in finding particular issues and actions on which trust and cooperation can be obtained • Example: -- after WWII nations of Western cooperated in forming NATO in 1949 • Elements of distrust remained strong for years – especially Germany and its neighbors – even some distrust in Greece today • Those involved in social aspects of S&R should distinguish sharply between short, medium and long term goals – with the latter being dependent on developments long after interveners are gone

15. Optimistic Timeline for Building Trust and Reducing Distrust

16. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation XI • Horizontal and Vertical Trust • An important distinction exists between “vertical” trust (that between state and society) and “horizontal” trust – trust across groups within society, as between ethnic groups. • Horizontally: • the provision of services decreases competitive behavior and • the consistent enforcement of rule of law and justice decreases information asymmetry and risk in personal and business interactions • Increasing trusting and trustworthy behavior. • Vertically as states become more able to perform vital functions: • they build a history of positive interactions with society that affect perceptions of state legitimacy and encourage acceptance of state authority • Wider processes of state-building and improving state capacity to deliver services equitably and uniformly, enforce justice and rule of law, and provide common security • All are integral to building both types of trust

17. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation IX • Social Capital • Provides a layer of social reconstruction that encompasses both trust and cooperation. • Two definitions: • Social capital includes trust, as well as other social and cultural norms, values and institutions that promote cooperation and collective action (Fukuyama) • Social capital includes the shared values and rules for social conduct expressed in personal relationships, trust and a common sense of “civic” responsibility, which make a society more than just a collection of individuals (World Bank) • While interventions should focus on cooperative behavior as an outcome, building positive social capital is an important component of post-conflict social reconstruction

18. Dimensions of Social Capital

19. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation X • Positive social capital enhances both the frequency and quality of cooperative behavior by reducing uncertainty about outcomes and interactions • It provides mechanisms to accumulate goodwill between parties that facilitates political and economic cooperation • Rebuilding depleted social capital is vital to reconstruction and is part and parcel of conflict resolution • Social capital also has economic and political payoffs that reinforce the reconstructive process over time – • Critical to the development of markets and national economic integration of Iraq.

20. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation XI • Social reconciliation • Process of (re)building functioning, stable intergroup relationships that reinforce nonviolent means of interaction • A major goal of social reconciliation is to promote tolerance • Doing so is essential to building even limited trust and cooperation • Over time, with luck it may also lead to healing, empathy, and acceptance • Linkages • The reciprocal, self-reinforcing nature of social reconciliation, cooperation, trust and social capital suggests “cocktail effects” • in which overall benefits to trust-building from several social programs can be significantly more than the sum of the programs’ individual values

21. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation XII • Concepts best seen through examples: • The benefits to political and economic development can be improved by encouraging a variety of different interventions: • Sierra Leone – the National Youth Council lobbied the government to establish a National Youth Commission as part of the peace agreement • When the government was unresponsive, the council threatened to establish one independently • This move received massive media attention and elicited a large public response • The Sierra Leonean government acquiesced and established the commission • Here the ability of civil society to improve government responsiveness was enhanced by media coverage.

22. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation XIII • Example from South Africa – media coverage of the truth commission • Media exposure of the truth commission spread the message of justice to a much larger number of people • Brought the process of justice and reconciliation closer for many than would have been possible otherwise. • Civil society organizations also helped contribute to the effectiveness of the commission by providing local information and support • Reciprocally the truth commission improved perceptions of state legitimacy by providing legitimate local channels for conflict resolution and mediation.

23. Social Conditions: Trust and Cooperation XIV • There is a substantial potential for such synergies in S&R • Example: situation in which civil society organizations that deliver health services increase trust and social capital • Which in turn strengthens the ability of the local watchdog agency to monitor government responsiveness • Whose findings are relayed via the local media • Which moves the government to act which increases perceptions of government legitimacy • Which increases security and decreases mistrust • Which promotes more cooperation • Another example: • Situation in which peace education socializes young people to have more accepting attitudes • Brings integrated media programs into the home • Where they have an opportunity to affect patterns and other adults

24. Possible Intervention-Program Linkages

25. Humanitarian Assistance Overview I • Overview • Humanitarian assistance is provided to save lives and alleviate suffering caused by conflict or other human-made or natural disasters • Provided by national governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and militaries and combatant groups • Some groups provide assistance for purely altruistic or humanitarian reasons: others may provide aid to attain political goals • If the host government is incapable of responding to needs and if security concerns limit what civilian assistance providers can do, military personnel often called upon to help

26. Humanitarian Assistance Overview II • Even when civilians are actively involved, military personnel may play a supporting role in helping ensure that assistance is provided effectively • The commander has a moral and legal obligation to the civilian population in his or her area of responsibility (AOR) • Understanding the humanitarian situation and who is taking what action with regard to it is also critical to SA. • Providing humanitarian assistance requires resolving a series of problems

27. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems I • 1. Getting relief to victims can be hard • Civilian international relief agencies have become adept at determining requirements needed after a disaster • Many agencies have substantial stockpiles ready for an emergency • However transportation and distribution remain major challenges • People may live in remote areas with poor transport links – conflict has often destroyed what networks existed • The roads that exist may be controlled by insurgents or criminals or be mined • Local police, customs officers, government officials, and militias may demand payments to facilitate free movement of relief supplies or individuals working for humanitarian relief organizations

28. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems II • 2. Refugee camps can make conflict worse • In many countries refugee camps fell under control of insurgents who • abused residents, controlled supplies, and used the camps as recruiting grounds and bases for insurgent attacks against the host-nation government • 3. Humanitarian assistance is used as a political and security tool • Both armed groups party to the conflict (such as insurgents) and peace-keepers often provide assistance in part to gain the support of local population • In the aftermath of its 2006 conflict with Israel, Hezbollah played a lead role in reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, including one year’s rent to affected families • U.S. military units also provide assistance, both to meet needs and to gain public support • However provision of assistance in a discriminatory fashion violates U.S. government policy, international humanitarian guidelines and international law • It can also perpetuate inequalities and foster discontent/conflict

29. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems III • 4. Ineffective host government responses to disasters may foster support for an insurgency • In an insurgency, the support of the local population is the ultimate objective of each party • If armed groups opposed to the government visibly do a better job of responding to a disaster than the government • Public support for the government weakens • The position of the insurgents strengthens • On the other hand, security forces that support the local government will strengthen the government’s position, if they effectively provide humanitarian assistance • Combatants may compete with one another to provide assistance even as they engage in combat • Although U.S. government guidance for humanitarian assistance requires that aid be given to those who need it, U.S. forces may be seen both by aid recipients and other assistance providers as having a political as well as humanitarian purpose.

30. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks I • Key Tasks for the host government, civilian assistance agencies and NGOs include: • Determine what needs to be done and coordinate efforts • Help displaced people survive and eventually resettle • Distribute relief • Make sure that relief supports, not undermines, longer- term development goals • 1. Determine what needs to be done • If the host government is able to function, its primary task is to work with relief agencies to determine what needs to be done and to coordinate the relief efforts offered by other countries and agencies • If it is incapable of coordinating this effort, and international organization like the UN may take on this role • The host government and its agencies may be the only institutions that have detailed information on the situation – host government is responsible for transferring this information to assistance providers.

31. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks II • 2. Help Displaced People Survive and Eventually Resettle • If large numbers of people flee, host government should provide or help identify safe locations for shelter • If camps are needed, host government or assistance providers should help set them up • The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the most expertise in the area. • Organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) may also be involved • Who does what will be a senior policy-level decision, but military leaders at operational and tactical level should be prepared to help their civilian counterparts involved in these efforts • by providing security and • in some cases transportation or other logistical support

32. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks III • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Security is a key concern • If displacement lasts more than a brief period, schools will also be needed in addition to assistance with earning money • In cases where the displaced are not living in camps or other temporary shelters, such assistance can be provided as part of development assistance to the broader community • In these cases, important to make sure that the needs of the displaced are neither ignored nor appear to take precedence over the needs of the long-term population • The displaced can also be employed in short-term jobs in construction and the clinics and schools for their communities. • If the displaced cannot return home quickly it is usually better that they be integrated into the surrounding community, rather than housed in temporary shelters such as camps

33. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks IV • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Camps are often recruiting grounds for insurgents who may take over the camp and monopolize its resources • Programs to assist refugees and the internally displaced need to be designed so that they do not perpetuate or reignite the conflict • Ethnic cleansing, continued violence and the ability the ability to enforce property rights will affect what is possible • Donors and the host government should design programs to help the displaced return home or find new permanent homes • They can also provide cash grants or vouchers to pay for travel, seeds, and tools to help people resume their livelihoods. • Donors and the host government may have to work with local governments and leaders to integrate the displaced into new communities which may not be fully welcoming.

34. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks V • 3 Distribute Relief • Host government should permit humanitarian assistance to be given to anyone who needs it. • According to international law, neither it nor the foreign providers of assistance can deny or use aid to punish or reward particular groups • This principle of neutrality protects (albeit not fully) relief agencies that operate in conflict zones from being seen as aligned with combatants and targeted. • Relief supplies can be an especially valuable commodity during disasters and can be used for personal gain or as leverage to induce desired behavior • Used to be wide spread use of religious groups to distribute assistance. Practice had to be abandoned because cases of aid only going to that religious denomination or people being forced to join a religious group • Cases of organizations ordering more supplies than needed in order to sell the surplus • Militias and other armed groups can also use aid to fund their operations • One of major sources of revenue for militias in Somalia is providing protection for aid delivery or diverting the aid.

35. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks VI • 4. Make sure relief supports, not undermines, longer-term development goals • Many relief activities have longer term impacts • Newly constructed infrastructure often becomes permanent after the crisis subsides • Seeds and other agricultural support provided to meet needs will affect what farmers grow • How the displaced are or are not reintegrated in a given area or assisted to return will help define the future economy of to the their place of refuge and the area they fled • Host government should consult with agencies that are providing relief to ensure that the aid provided is positioned to best support the future development of the country • Care should also be taken to protect against the potential negative effects of food aid on local agriculture • Food aid, particularly arriving late in a humanitarian crisis may serve to drive down prices of local crops hurting farmers and providing disincentives for future production

36. Potential Army Tasks • In a situation where humanitarian assistance needs to be provided the Army can expect to be involved in the following tasks: • Provide immediate relief and supply management, logistical, and transport support to assist the delivery of relief if civilian groups are incapable of doing so • Coordinate with other groups • Provide security for the population at risk • Protect roads, ports, airports warehouses, relief personnel and critical infrastructure • Provide technical assistance and training

37. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study I • Small water purification in Iraq • Working in consultation with the local PRT, a brigade combat team installed a number of small water purification units throughout Dhi Qar province in Iraq • These successfully reduced water-borne illnesses and infant mortality • However to keep the units running, trained technicians, replacement parts, and coordination with the Iraqi government would be necessary • The BCT worked with the PRT to hand off the project to them • The PRT then worked to staff the units with technicians and link them into the Iraqi government supply system • Coordination and effective assignment of tasks and resources resulted in a successful project

38. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study II • Necessity of civilian guidance in relief operations • As increasing numbers of Iraqis have been displaced, U.S. commanders have often known what their tasks should be to respond to the problem • The absence of clear U.S. government guidance led units to do what they could, when they could • They provided water, temporary shelter etc to people forced from their homes because of combat operations • Reportedly some U.S. military units tried to prevent Iraqis from fleeing their homes • The first of these acts is appropriate; the second is not. Under international law, people have the right to flee violence or other crisis, and should not be prevented from doing so • Over time cooperation between senior military personnel and USAID improved efforts by providing more oversight and guidance, although uncertainties remained.

39. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIa • Providing security for humanitarian assistance in Somalia • The initial mission of the UN security force in Somalia was to help ensure that humanitarian aid could be provided to over 1.5 million people at immediate risk of starvation in the wake of war and drought. • Warlords were attacking humanitarian convoys and supply ships, seizing supplies and controlling their distribution. • Supplies were not getting through to camps for Somalis who had fled the fighting and drought • The initial military mission under UN mandate, Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was successful • UNITAF protected humanitarian convoys, distribution centers, ports and airports. Key facilities were secured • UNITAF troops built and repaired roads and bridges, dug wells, and set up hospitals • Aid began to flow throughout the country preventing widespread starvation

40. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIb • Somalia (contd.) • The presence of the U.S. contingent at the head of UNITAF was especially important in convincing warlords to stop attacking aid deliveries and facilities. • This security assistance saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people • The mission ran into trouble when the objectives expanded to bring warlords to heel and create a single national government while dramatically reducing U.S. forces. • The subsequent mismatch between resources and goals resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. military forces and eventually all UN forces as well • Somalia lapsed back into conflict

41. Refugees and Internal Displacement I • Main issues – Refugees and International Displacement • Interested in the issues surrounding refugees and internationally displaced persons (IDPs) and how to cope with them • amongst key challenges for those working in conflict-affected states • What factors that lead to individuals and/or whole communities becoming refugees or to their displacement? • many and varied causes • Want to examine • complexity of the problems caused by refugee flows and displacement and • their impacts on conflict dynamics and process of development and security

42. Refugees and Internal Displacement II • Terminology: differences between refugees and IDPs • Differ in important ways with implications for: • responsibilities of the states and • international community under international law • U.N. defines a refugee as an individual who: • Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion is outisee3 the country ofhis nationality and is unable to or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country. • Refugees are recognized as those who have crossed an international border and are no longer under the legal protection of their home country • By crossing the border refugees are automatically covered by international treaties and entitled to protection by agencies such as Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees -- UNHCR.

43. Refugees and Internal Displacement III • Asylum is a process under which a determination is made of an individual’s situation to decide whether they are classed as refugees under the terms of international law • IDPs are those who have fled from their homes, but remain within their country of origin • Usually fleeing violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters. • Therefore considered legally under the protection of their home state and national authorities responsible for their humanitarian assistance. • In practice these populations are often fleeing from a state which is responsible directly or through failures to provide protection for their insecurity • Main IDP populations identified by UNHCR during 2008 were Iraq, Sudan, the DRC, Somalia and Colombia. • IDPs are not granted refugee status as they have not crossed an international border – however some of the approaches used to care for them are similar to those of refugees

44. Refugees and Internal Displacement IV How have states and other agencies dealt with refugees? • The use of refugee and IDP Camps • Temporary camps, particularly in dealing with refugees have been one of most effective ways of administering displaced populations • Especially in short-term emergencies where existing host country facilities overwhelmed, • Or in long-term protracted situations wither refugees are unable to return home – or unable or unwilling to settle in their home state or resettle in a third country • Camps usually set up by international agency such as UNHCR or by NGOs. They often provide • focal point for refugees • central location for delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid and • for longer term establishment of basic services such as clinics and schools

45. Refugees and Internal Displacement V • Camps represent a pragmatic response to the needs of both refugees and host countries which often lack resources and capacity to deal with large influxes of people. • One particular concern as set out in the Convention, the Protocol and other guidance is security • Security ostensibly the responsibility of the host state, but again resources and type of armed forces required to secure a camp are considerable • Refugee camps may provide a way to target assistance, but they also provide a ready target for those seeking recruits for militias and rebel groups and the resources they attract are similarly sought after • Disease is also a pressing concern, particularly in the early stages of establishing camps • Estimated that up to 9 percent of Rwandan refugees who fled into Zaire during 1994 genocide died within a month of arrival

46. Refugees and Internal Displacement VI • Camps have been criticized as a form of “warehousing” of refugees, especially in cases where host countries unable or unwilling to guarantee some of the rights enshrined in international law • Often the camp population becomes dependent on humanitarian aid and assistance • As one report for UNHCR notes “If it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, as the years go by, they progressively waste the same lives.” • Urban Refugees • UNHCR reported that in 2009 over half of refugees covered by its mandate now live in cities rather than camps. • Cities may seem as relatively attractive options by those who have been displaced – present potential opportunities for work and avoid the isolation of refugee camps. • However, many displaced persons lack permissions to work and wind up in the informal sector for very low pay.

47. Refugees and Internal Displacement VII • Where displaced groups cluster together in neighborhoods defined by ethnicity, nation or religion – Iraqi refugees in Syrian and Jordanian cities, friction can develop with the local population. • Often these groups are vulnerable to harassment and detention by state security forces, to criminal violence and to exploitation. • While some of thee threats are undoubtedly also features of life in refugee camps, in an urban context the element of protection is often lacking. • Solutions to Displacement • Three main solutions to displacement of people across borders • 1. voluntary repatriation to country of origin – often argued the most desirable • Issues involve some support for reintegration and the resolution of barriers to return such as disputes over property which has been damaged or occupied.

48. Refugees and Internal Displacement VIII • 2. Local integration – process by which refugee is integrated into host country eventually acquiring citizenship • Difficult end to achieve because of: • The relative poverty in of many countries in which refulgee camps are located • The size of some of the refugee cams concerned and • Particularly in cases of conflict-induced displacement • 3. Resettlement – allows for refugees to be relocated to a third country, neither their home country nor the host to which they fled • Intended to facilitate burden sharing assuring country of first asylum is not expected to shoulder the burden of production and support alone

49. Refugees and Internal Displacement IX • Summary Points • One of the greatest costs of conflict is enforced migration of civilian population • This is seen in international migration across borders but also in internal displacement away from conflict affected areas to areas regarded as safe – usually urban areas • Forced migration of vulnerable people imposes huge costs on the receiving community in basic service provision and emergency relief but also in social costs such as crime or disease • The costs of migration are disproportionately felt by the most vulnerable, particularly women and children who may be subject to domestic or systemic violence within camps. • There are significant costs in maintaining migratory populations, many of which may pose threats to host countries through their links to transnational criminal networks.

50. Iraq Case Study • International Displacement and Recovery