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Clear-Hold-Build

Create a secure physical and psychological environment.Establish firm government control of the populace and area.Gain the populace's support.. FM 3-24, Ch. 5, p. 18. Objective of CHB. 2. Planning, training, organizing, and equipping both civil and military forces. Preparing for Clear-Hold-Build.

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Clear-Hold-Build

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    1. Clear-Hold-Build 1 Time Required: ~30 minutes-1 hour depending on discussion ---------- Task: Provide understanding of concepts underlying clear-hold-build (CHB) ---------- Learning Objectives: CHB operations are simultaneous, not sequential (C and H and B, not C then H then B) CHB is a way to describe COIN operations that build legitimacy and gain control over the population; there are other ways to describe them (e.g., ISAF: shape-clear-hold-build) IE is essential at all phases of CHB CHB should be by, with, and through the HN ---------- Nathan: slides 1-3, 10-11, 14, 16-18 Niel: 4-9, 12-13, 15, 19-28Time Required: ~30 minutes-1 hour depending on discussion ---------- Task: Provide understanding of concepts underlying clear-hold-build (CHB) ---------- Learning Objectives: CHB operations are simultaneous, not sequential (C and H and B, not C then H then B) CHB is a way to describe COIN operations that build legitimacy and gain control over the population; there are other ways to describe them (e.g., ISAF: shape-clear-hold-build) IE is essential at all phases of CHB CHB should be by, with, and through the HN ---------- Nathan: slides 1-3, 10-11, 14, 16-18 Niel: 4-9, 12-13, 15, 19-28

    2. Objective of CHB 2 Takeaway: CHB is not just another staff process; it is a means to build legitimacy and establish control over the population. ---------- The population is STILL key (see objective of CHB, from FM 3-24) ex: Surge in Baghdad (2007) Clear and hold and build are not phases: one does not begin where another ends: we must think about holding and building while we clear, and we cant forget about clearing and holding while we build, etc. ex: Falluja 2004 and 2005 ex: IDF Operation Defensive Shield (2002) and successive raids Most govts, most of the time, conduct some form of CHB operationsits what govts do; we just call it CHB in the sphere of COIN in which the military is engaged ex: Mexican govt sending military in to Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez ex: Police patrols in US citiesTakeaway: CHB is not just another staff process; it is a means to build legitimacy and establish control over the population. ---------- The population is STILL key (see objective of CHB, from FM 3-24) ex: Surge in Baghdad (2007) Clear and hold and build are not phases: one does not begin where another ends: we must think about holding and building while we clear, and we cant forget about clearing and holding while we build, etc. ex: Falluja 2004 and 2005 ex: IDF Operation Defensive Shield (2002) and successive raids Most govts, most of the time, conduct some form of CHB operationsits what govts do; we just call it CHB in the sphere of COIN in which the military is engaged ex: Mexican govt sending military in to Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez ex: Police patrols in US cities

    3. Preparing for Clear-Hold-Build 3 Takeaway: Units must prepare for CHB in conjunction with HN, Joint, Multinational, and NGOs. ---------- Objective of preparation: get to build with the whole-of-govt still involved; unless we do this, we may have to re-clear CHB is conceptualized differently in different Aos ex: ISAF: shape-clear-hold-build ex: Canadian approach: define-shape-clear-hold-build-enable Typical preparatory activities include establishing waystations, conducting joint/combined training, and beginning IE operations ---------- In Afghanistan, ISAF has instituted a Shape phase, in order to [shape] the environment before an operation through meetings with local shuras and other leadership. Source: NATO Parliamentary Report, 2326 October, 2008 ---------- Photo caption (US Army Flickr Photostream): U.S. Army Soldiers, Armed Forces of the Philippines soldiers, Philippine National Police and local government officials look on as a bulldozer clears away a landslide on an important road that connects many villages during a joint AFP and U.S. humanitarian mission in the southern part of the Mindinao province of the Philippines Sept. 9, 2007. U.S. Forces are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines that supports the AFP in their war on terror efforts and humanitarian missions in their county. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael Larson) (www.army.mil) Takeaway: Units must prepare for CHB in conjunction with HN, Joint, Multinational, and NGOs. ---------- Objective of preparation: get to build with the whole-of-govt still involved; unless we do this, we may have to re-clear CHB is conceptualized differently in different Aos ex: ISAF: shape-clear-hold-build ex: Canadian approach: define-shape-clear-hold-build-enable Typical preparatory activities include establishing waystations, conducting joint/combined training, and beginning IE operations ---------- In Afghanistan, ISAF has instituted a Shape phase, in order to [shape] the environment before an operation through meetings with local shuras and other leadership. Source: NATO Parliamentary Report, 2326 October, 2008 ---------- Photo caption (US Army Flickr Photostream): U.S. Army Soldiers, Armed Forces of the Philippines soldiers, Philippine National Police and local government officials look on as a bulldozer clears away a landslide on an important road that connects many villages during a joint AFP and U.S. humanitarian mission in the southern part of the Mindinao province of the Philippines Sept. 9, 2007. U.S. Forces are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines that supports the AFP in their war on terror efforts and humanitarian missions in their county. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael Larson) (www.army.mil)

    4. Ramadi: June 2006March 2007 AO Topeka Ready First Combat Team (RFCT) 4

    5. Ramadi: June 2006 Most violent city in Iraq per capita Up to 50 attacks/day Less than 100 police report to work in city of 400,000 Most of downtown firmly under AQIZ control 5

    7. Initial ISF Set: June 2006 7

    8. Information Engagement 8 Takeaway: we conduct IE ops at all times during CHB, and we engage at least four different audiences. ---------- IE ops are NOT limited to the population; we also want to engage insurgents, our own counterinsurgent forces, and regional/international actors. During clear ops, IE ops focus on getting buy in from the population and setting the stage for insurgent surrender. During hold ops, IE ops focus on counterinsurgents dedication to maintaining control over the populace. During build ops, IE ops focus on bolstering long-term legitimacy, highlighting insurgent failuresTakeaway: we conduct IE ops at all times during CHB, and we engage at least four different audiences. ---------- IE ops are NOT limited to the population; we also want to engage insurgents, our own counterinsurgent forces, and regional/international actors. During clear ops, IE ops focus on getting buy in from the population and setting the stage for insurgent surrender. During hold ops, IE ops focus on counterinsurgents dedication to maintaining control over the populace. During build ops, IE ops focus on bolstering long-term legitimacy, highlighting insurgent failures

    9. Changing the Narrative We took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying. COL Sean MacFarland, Military Review, MarchApr 2007 9

    10. Force and Capacity 10

    11. Clear 11 Takeaway: The priority during clear is offensive operations. ---------- During clear, counterinsurgents remove, eliminate, or displace guerrilla forces, not the entire insurgent infrastructure. During clear, the counterinsurgent typically establishes combat outposts (COPs), even though this is technically a defensive operation. IE ops take place throughout CHB, although there is a different focus to them during clear than there is during hold and build.Takeaway: The priority during clear is offensive operations. ---------- During clear, counterinsurgents remove, eliminate, or displace guerrilla forces, not the entire insurgent infrastructure. During clear, the counterinsurgent typically establishes combat outposts (COPs), even though this is technically a defensive operation. IE ops take place throughout CHB, although there is a different focus to them during clear than there is during hold and build.

    12. 12 Decisive Operations: Overview Jun 11-0 JUL 11-30 AUG 11-61 SEP 11-92 OCT 11-122 NOV 11-153 DEC 11-183 JAN 11-214 FEB 11-245Jun 11-0 JUL 11-30 AUG 11-61 SEP 11-92 OCT 11-122 NOV 11-153 DEC 11-183 JAN 11-214 FEB 11-245

    13. 13 We know HOW to build a combat outpost, but do we know WHERE or WHEN? Takeaway: Theres no magic staff procedure for knowing where and when to place a combat outpost (COP); the counterinsurgent must simply be able to see the problem from the different perspectives: population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents. ---------- Many manuals will tell you HOW to set up a combat outpost, but none will tell you where to do so. The counterinsurgent should analyze the problem from three perspectives: population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents. Population: What are the environments critical nodes? Where is the insurgencys base of support? ASCOPE. Insurgents: Why is the insurgent where he is? How does being there bolster his operational support? Counterinsurgents: How will putting a COP in location X help separate the insurgents from the population? What key infrastructure must be protected first? WHEN should we use combat outposts? When HN does not have the capability to hold ground, when the position does not need to be permanent, when the COIN narrative supports the establishment of COPs Takeaway: Theres no magic staff procedure for knowing where and when to place a combat outpost (COP); the counterinsurgent must simply be able to see the problem from the different perspectives: population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents. ---------- Many manuals will tell you HOW to set up a combat outpost, but none will tell you where to do so. The counterinsurgent should analyze the problem from three perspectives: population, insurgents, and counterinsurgents. Population: What are the environments critical nodes? Where is the insurgencys base of support? ASCOPE. Insurgents: Why is the insurgent where he is? How does being there bolster his operational support? Counterinsurgents: How will putting a COP in location X help separate the insurgents from the population? What key infrastructure must be protected first? WHEN should we use combat outposts? When HN does not have the capability to hold ground, when the position does not need to be permanent, when the COIN narrative supports the establishment of COPs

    14. Hold 14 Takeaway: The priority during hold is defensive operations. ---------- As during clear, IE ops continue during hold. As much as possible, HN forces should portion of CHB. ex: Sons of Iraq ex: Irish cops in Little Italy (NY) An important stability operation occurs during hold: populace and resource control. Takeaway: The priority during hold is defensive operations. ---------- As during clear, IE ops continue during hold. As much as possible, HN forces should portion of CHB. ex: Sons of Iraq ex: Irish cops in Little Italy (NY) An important stability operation occurs during hold: populace and resource control.

    15. Holding Ramadi 15

    16. Population Control Required to separate insurgents from the population Many tools: Census ID cards Biometrics Vehicle registration Curfews Food control Control of movement 16 Takeaway: Population control measures are necessary to separate insurgents from the population. ---------- The key to knowing if we have separated insurgents from the population is to know who is supposed to be where and when. ex: Census, drivers license, home title, vehicle registration in the US ex: Task Force Dragon (see COIN Reader II): every op had intel focus There are many tools in the population control tool bag ex: Checkpoints, informants, biometrics in Palestinian territories Ask yourself, Is there an aspect of population control that I am doing that the HN could do instead? At the end of the day, they will be controlling the population, not you. In order to be most effective, population control measures (even though they are a stability operation) must be begun during hold, not build. ---------- Photo caption (Flickr): U.S. Army Spc. Osvaldo Hernandez, from Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, enters a local into a handheld interagency identity detection equipment system during a cordon and search in Barla, Afghanistan, Sept. 6, 2007. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel) (Released) ---------- Original MAJ Niel Smith notes: To defeat an insurgency that moves among the population, we must establish administrative and social controls to limit his movements. We must gain relevant understanding of who lives where, owns what, and to whom they are related. Measures such as forgery-resistant identity cards and vehicle licensing reduces insurgencys mobility. In extreme circumstances, programs such as gated communities proved successful in de-escalating violence between factions. Portable computer databases and biometric measures have added greatly to our toolkit in the current conflict, identifying criminals and adding to human terrain databases. However, we have not undertaken basic census measures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is puzzling given modern automation and biometrics which make the task easier than ever. How many SVBIEDs could be prevented by simple vehicle licensing and registration, backed by a system to run the tags at a checkpoint or VCP as any U.S. police officer would do? Population control measures make it nearly impossible for an insurgent to remain anonymous. See David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice pp. 81-85. Physically separating violent neighborhoods using a combination of walls and checkpoints was a key pillar in reducing sectarian violence in Baghdad during 2007-2008. It has also been applied earlier in other cities on a smaller scale. ---------- Takeaway: Population control measures are necessary to separate insurgents from the population. ---------- The key to knowing if we have separated insurgents from the population is to know who is supposed to be where and when. ex: Census, drivers license, home title, vehicle registration in the US ex: Task Force Dragon (see COIN Reader II): every op had intel focus There are many tools in the population control tool bag ex: Checkpoints, informants, biometrics in Palestinian territories Ask yourself, Is there an aspect of population control that I am doing that the HN could do instead? At the end of the day, they will be controlling the population, not you. In order to be most effective, population control measures (even though they are a stability operation) must be begun during hold, not build. ---------- Photo caption (Flickr): U.S. Army Spc. Osvaldo Hernandez, from Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, enters a local into a handheld interagency identity detection equipment system during a cordon and search in Barla, Afghanistan, Sept. 6, 2007. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel) (Released) ---------- Original MAJ Niel Smith notes: To defeat an insurgency that moves among the population, we must establish administrative and social controls to limit his movements. We must gain relevant understanding of who lives where, owns what, and to whom they are related. Measures such as forgery-resistant identity cards and vehicle licensing reduces insurgencys mobility. In extreme circumstances, programs such as gated communities proved successful in de-escalating violence between factions. Portable computer databases and biometric measures have added greatly to our toolkit in the current conflict, identifying criminals and adding to human terrain databases. However, we have not undertaken basic census measures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is puzzling given modern automation and biometrics which make the task easier than ever. How many SVBIEDs could be prevented by simple vehicle licensing and registration, backed by a system to run the tags at a checkpoint or VCP as any U.S. police officer would do? Population control measures make it nearly impossible for an insurgent to remain anonymous. See David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice pp. 81-85. Physically separating violent neighborhoods using a combination of walls and checkpoints was a key pillar in reducing sectarian violence in Baghdad during 2007-2008. It has also been applied earlier in other cities on a smaller scale. ----------

    17. Build 17 Takeaway: The priority in build is stability operations. ---------- As with clear and hold, IE ops are key (remember message-driven ops). During build, we are establishing the base of state effectiveness for the long term. We should build human infrastructure as well as physical infrastructure.Takeaway: The priority in build is stability operations. ---------- As with clear and hold, IE ops are key (remember message-driven ops). During build, we are establishing the base of state effectiveness for the long term. We should build human infrastructure as well as physical infrastructure.

    18. Human and Physical Infrastructure Human infrastructure is more critical than physical mentor local leaders Good governance matters Help and protect those that help you 18 Takeaway: Human infrastructure is more critical than physical infrastructure in counterinsurgency. ---------- We know how to build physical infrastructure, but if COIN is to be ultimately successful, we need to build effective human infrastructure for the long-term. Effective local leadership is the key to stability ex: Tal Afar, 2005-06 (see below) Once competent local leaders are developed, do not fail to provide adequate protection and security for these individuals as they become obvious targets. ex: Sheik Sittar Albu Risha (see below) ---------- Original MAJ Niel Smith notes: Human infrastructure is more critical than physical infrastructure in counterinsurgency. The mechanics of rebuilding economic and physical infrastructure are well-known. Often overlooked is investment in human infrastructure. Looking at our success stories, stability in those cities was provided through effective local political and military leadership that was mentored and developed. When resurgent suicide bombers threatened to tear Tal Afar apart along sectarian lines in 2006 and 2007, local leaders such as the mayor and his police chiefs acted decisively to prevent retaliation and reduce tension. Once competent local leaders are developed, do not fail to provide adequate protection and security for these individuals as they become obvious targets. Respected local leaders make the difference between success and failure. Mayor Najim Abdullah Al-Jabouri represents what capable local leaders can accomplish when empowered. Unfortunately, Tal Afar government agencies still struggle to maintain legitimacy due to lack of resourcing from the Iraqi Government and a massive coalition troop reduction. Further information on the current situation in Tal Afar can be found at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hPCpMCKe6t5d4pdtEuNSE-MDjM3wD92K65181. A prime example was of Sheik Sittar Albu Risha, founder of the Anbar Awakening movement. US forces went so far as to emplace tanks at the entrance to his house to protect this key leader. Ultimately, Al Qaeda managed to kill Sheik Sittar on September 13, 2007, too late to stop the movement he started. Takeaway: Human infrastructure is more critical than physical infrastructure in counterinsurgency. ---------- We know how to build physical infrastructure, but if COIN is to be ultimately successful, we need to build effective human infrastructure for the long-term. Effective local leadership is the key to stability ex: Tal Afar, 2005-06 (see below) Once competent local leaders are developed, do not fail to provide adequate protection and security for these individuals as they become obvious targets. ex: Sheik Sittar Albu Risha (see below) ---------- Original MAJ Niel Smith notes: Human infrastructure is more critical than physical infrastructure in counterinsurgency. The mechanics of rebuilding economic and physical infrastructure are well-known. Often overlooked is investment in human infrastructure. Looking at our success stories, stability in those cities was provided through effective local political and military leadership that was mentored and developed. When resurgent suicide bombers threatened to tear Tal Afar apart along sectarian lines in 2006 and 2007, local leaders such as the mayor and his police chiefs acted decisively to prevent retaliation and reduce tension. Once competent local leaders are developed, do not fail to provide adequate protection and security for these individuals as they become obvious targets. Respected local leaders make the difference between success and failure. Mayor Najim Abdullah Al-Jabouri represents what capable local leaders can accomplish when empowered. Unfortunately, Tal Afar government agencies still struggle to maintain legitimacy due to lack of resourcing from the Iraqi Government and a massive coalition troop reduction. Further information on the current situation in Tal Afar can be found at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hPCpMCKe6t5d4pdtEuNSE-MDjM3wD92K65181. A prime example was of Sheik Sittar Albu Risha, founder of the Anbar Awakening movement. US forces went so far as to emplace tanks at the entrance to his house to protect this key leader. Ultimately, Al Qaeda managed to kill Sheik Sittar on September 13, 2007, too late to stop the movement he started.

    19. So, Does It Work? 19

    20. HN Police in Ramadi [COL MacFarland] agreed to set up police stations in their areas, but only if the sheiks would provide 100 men to serve as police elsewhere in the city. Last year there were roughly 100 police patrolling Ramadi. Now there are about 4,000. And where there were once 4 outposts, there are 24, where Americans and Iraqis live together. NPR All Things Considered, 22 Feb 07 20

    21. Insurgent Groups: AO Topeka 21

    22. Insurgent Attack Trends: AO Topeka 22

    23. RFCT Cache Finds: As of 12 Feb 2007 23

    26. Initial ISF Set: June 2006 26

    27. Outposts: February 2007 27

    28. Conclusion This is news the world doesn't hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious "Sunni Triangle," is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction. Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007 28

    29. Questions? 29

    30. Engaging HNSF Tactical Decision Game

    31. Scenario Your unit has just moved into its AO; the previous unit did not have an effective working relationship with local HNSF. You know some of the HNSF are involved with insurgents and/or militias In one month, your unit will conduct CHB operations. What is your plan for motivating the HNSF and gaining trust before these operations begin?

    32. Solution #1

    33. Solution #2 33

    34. Case Study: Tal Afar To win in counterinsurgency, the local population must execute the long-term answer; our role is to set conditions that allow Iraqis to independently succeed we set conditions for the return of ISF, who were fearful of operating in a dangerous neighborhood, which, in turn, set conditions for the return of displaced residents. The continued peace [in Tal Afar] is a testament to what ISF can do when U.S. forces serve in a committed support role. Company Commander, Tal Afar, Iraq, 2006 34

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