Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia

1. Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia Jaime Burnell International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore

2. "Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory." Letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2 August 1939

3. Diving Instruction Manual Recovered from Afghanistan “Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam” “ Wa a’iddu lahum mastata’tum min quwwatin wa min ribatilkhaili ” And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war

4. Overview • The Context • The Geography of Threat • Importance of SEA SLOCs • Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain • Intention, Capabilities and Opportunities • Groups with maritime terrorist capabilities in SEA • Response

5. Southeast Asia • Ground zero of maritime threats, both from piracy and terrorism • Home to several Islamist Terror Groups • Al Qaeda network • Planning for USS Cole attack • Planning for attack against US naval facilities and assets • KMM plan to attack an US ship in 2001 • Plan to attack an US ship in Surabaya, Indonesia • SuperFerry 14 ( February 2004) – worst maritime disaster

6. Geography of Threat • Straits of Malacca: The busiest shipping line in the world - linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific • Sunda and Lombok • The Singapore Straits • Located within or astride geographic archipelagoes, inhibited with large populations with less than ideal social, political and economic conditions • Narrow channels, shallow reefs and thousands of tiny islands - ideal for piracy and other water-borne crimes

7. Maritime Terrorism • Terrorist attacks against maritime sectors generally rare- 1.9% of all international incidents over last 30 years • Due to: • Most terrorists are tactically conservative • Little experience of the maritime environment • Requires specialist equipment and skills • Profusion of other fixed land targets offering higher visibility and greater ease of access • Overall impact potential low- unless very high profile (USS Cole) and sensational (Achille Lauro, 1985) than media-accessible land targets.

8. High Profile Maritime Attacks • 1974- Hijacking of a Greek freighter in Karachi (Pakistan) • 1985- Seizure of the Achille Lauro • February 2000- Bombing of a Phillipine ferry (45 killed) • October 2000- Suicide attack against USS Cole (17 Killed) • October 2000: LLTE Suicide attack against SL navy • October 2002- French Tanker Limburg 158,000 t. of crude oil • February 2004- Superferry 14 • Potential targets- Queen Mary 2

9. Factors Increasing Perceived Threat Tactical • Restricted operational space on land - Target hardening of land based targets and aviation sector • Opaque and amorphous environment • Vast areas of un-policed waters • Lax port security, poor coastal surveillance, profusion of targets, trend toward ‘skeleton crews’ • Terrorists showing increasing tactical sophistication • Increased terrorist resource constraints • Increasing terrorist-criminal nexus esp. piracy

10. Factors Increasing Threat Potential Perceptual/Psychological/ Systemic • Maritime Sector as conduit of Global activity • Perception as alternative venue for mass casualty attacks, targeting LNG carriers/terminals, refineries, petrochemical installations, cruise ships and passenger liners • Copy CatPhenomenon: Precedent of USS Cole bombing- generated enormous political capital, underscored vulnerability of vessels at port • Lack of a coordinated International Response

11. Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain When rising interests meet with capability

12. Motivation/Intention • Terrorist Groups known to be using shipping for transport of banned and contraband goods as well asfor human smuggling • A shift in strategy towards economic targets –Limburg, Bali, Kenya, Pakistan, Al- Khobar, Istanbul • Al Qaeda:- Inclination to target businesses - smuggling bombs including nuclear or radiologicaldevices • Demonstrated capability to deliver the same tactics time and time again • Can replicate land capabilities in the maritime domain

13. Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist capability • The number of contemporary terrorist groups with a maritime capability is few • The best known are: • PIRA • LTTE • Al Qaeda • The Contras • Palestinian Groups – PFLP, Hamas • ASG, GAM, MILF

14. Very Limited Medium to High Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) • ASG- Basilan Island • Hybrid group – about 50% traditional mariners • Links with AQ, JI and LTTE

15. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) • Nadzmi Sabdullah, @ “Commander Global,” planned many maritime operations including the kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001. • Galib Andang, @ “Commander Robot,” led the 2000 Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid.

16. ASG Attacks • Sasa Wharf, Davao City- 02 April 2003 • Filipina Princess • Superferry 15 • These ships were pier-side Sasa wharf, Davao City when it was bombed

17. ASG Attacks • SuperFerry 14 - February 2004 • Joint operation by ASG, JI and RSM • Worst maritime terrorist act

18. Moro Islamic Liberation Front • Largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippines • Strong links to Al-Qaeda/JI • Demonstrated capability • Our Lady Mediatrix (2000) • Small arms attack on Philippine Navy Ship (2000) • Sasa Wharf, Davao City Bombing (2003) • Allegedly made enquires with North Korea for a possible sale of a mini submarine • Intent limited to their Area of Operations Very Limited Medium to high

19. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) “Free Aceh Movement” • Straits of Malacca - Singapore, West Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Myanmar and into the Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka • Contacts with smuggling syndicates ( narcotics people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and pirate gangs operating across the Straits of Malacca Very Limited Medium to high

20. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) • Sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang (Malaysia) and Islamic mariners in Southern Thailand (PULO) • ‘Kidnap for Ransom’ • Tirta Niaga IV, Exxon Mobil Tender • September 200- claimed protection money from the users of the straits

21. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) • Indonesian Marines burn suspected GAM crafts • Impact of Tsunami • Peace Agreement

22. Al Qaeda • Estimated to have 15 to as many as 300 vessels of varying sizes • “Prince of the Sea” - Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda Al-Nasheri mMasterminded the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden • A 180-page file listing “targets of opportunity,” included large cruise liners sailing from Western ports • Diving manual recovered from Afghanistan -“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam”

23. Al Qaeda Attacks • Plotted an attack on the British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal as it passed through the Gibraltar Straits to participate in the US led coalition war against Iraq – supported by Salafia Jihadia • Plan to attack NATO ships in the Straits of Gibraltar, thwarted by the Moroccan authorities • Plans to bomb the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain • February 2002 plan to hijack a passenger airliner and crash it onto a US warship in the Indian Ocean (AQ Ass. Groups in SA)

24. Jemaah Islamiyah • No dedicated maritime organization • Used maritime domain extensively for sending recruits to training camps in Philippines • Conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi Naval Base • Increasing coordination between JI, ASG, MILF and RSM

25. New Configurations- New Threats • SEA terror groups – ASG/MILF/JI currently enhancing their underwater capabilities • 2 JI members reportedly training 23 ASG and MILF elements in scuba diving & underwater demolition skills • Upon completion of the training, the graduates will be divided into groups - each tasked to conduct underwater bombings against seaports and vessels in Mindanao • Capability can be replicated elsewhere

26. Conclusion • Must focus on degrading the land capabilities of the groups • To change focus: from the land to the sea instead of just ‘At Sea’ - "securing the littoral" • Interdiction and constant disruption of the LIMO capabilities  thereby degrading of "capabilities" and minimising the "opportunities" of the asymmetric maritime threats

27. The risk of terrorist attack can perhaps never be eliminated, but sensible steps can be taken to reduce the risk. The issue here is how seriously do the governments take the threat of maritime terrorism…Post-Limburg, we cannot continue to hope for the best and ignore the lessons.“ (International Maritime Bureau (IMB)of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)