armored un manned ground system augs n.
Download
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS) PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS)

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 31

Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 82 Views
  • Uploaded on

Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS). Prepared for: Dr. Jerrell Stracener, EMIS 7305 Prepared by: Scott Shaffer Due Date : April 28, 2011. Agenda. Introduction Background (scope, problem) Directed Changes in Analysis Description Benefit & Objective Approach

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS)' - langer


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
armored un manned ground system augs

Armored Un-Manned Ground System (AUGS)

Prepared for: Dr. Jerrell Stracener, EMIS 7305

Prepared by: Scott Shaffer

Due Date: April 28, 2011

agenda
Agenda
  • Introduction
    • Background (scope, problem)
    • Directed Changes in Analysis
    • Description
    • Benefit & Objective
  • Approach
  • Ground Rules & Assumptions
  • Key Requirements
  • Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
  • Analysis Overview
    • Reliability Analysis
    • Cost Analysis
  • Results/Conclusion
background
Background
  • Scope:

To design and evaluate a vehicular system that meets a new requirement to support soldiers conducting military operations in Iraq. Soldiers fighting in Iraq need the most modern equipment that will allow them to remain at a safe distances while searching for and engaging the enemy. At the research laboratory for soldiers, the director tasked each division chief to assemble a team of engineers in order to develop and verify the AUGS as a suitable design option.

  • Problem:

No immediate solution is available to soldiers to conduct standoff surveillance, detect mines and engage the enemy using remote controls. The AUGS has been chosen as a possible solution. The AUGS must excel in both reliability and cost in order to maximize the number of continuous operating hours. Army guidance dictates that all equipment must be capable of operating in the most remote locations and across a variety of environments.

directed changes in analysis
Directed Changes in Analysis
  • Initial plan was to evaluate the AUGS for reliability and maintainability.
  • Current plan for this project is to evaluate five performance measures for reliability, and then recommend program costs. (Even though the team realized cost can be affected by many other factors besides the analysis in this project).
  • Final plan evaluated four of the five performance measures. With the add on of additional equipment, power requirements reached the “goal” value, which became the only measure evaluated asa pass or fail requirement.
description
Description
  • Goal:
    • For the Army to be able to plan, design and field the AUGS for extended combat operations.
  • Method:
    • Use calculations from EMIS7305 to evaluate reliability of the AUGS.
    • AUGS will be fielded and structure according to the Army Life Cycle Model. (generates a WBS)
    • Other teams are also evaluating the AUGS, so our team must haveviable test data and calculations.
    • If the team’s solution is chosen, it must be the clear winner over all other submitted AUGS analysis’.
  • Risks:
    • C4 integration equipment changes.
    • Exceeding cost thresholds.
    • Change in WBS.
    • Bad test data from manufacturer or ATEC.
benefit objective
Benefit & Objective
  • Benefit:
    • Improve my overall reliability analysis of a “real-world” project and contribute additional, outside analysis on a work project.
  • Objective:
    • Evaluate the AUGS design plan for reliability and cost. Once the team has collected all the necessary data, calculations will be made using techniques from EMIS7305. This analysis by no means serves as the sole final recommendation to the project, but serves as an interim report to the final recommendation due 31 August 2011. This analysis will be the initial evaluation on the project, and the team expects updates from the director based on additional changes in July.
approach
Approach
  • To evaluate the reliability of the following five performance measures:
    • Mine detection capability (C.R.E.W.)
    • Remote communication range (SINCGARS 1523E Radio)
    • C4I system interoperability (mix of systems)
    • Jamming GPS tracking (satellite based systems)
    • Power requirement (ability to reach “goal”)
  • Evaluate cost associated with the following:
    • Cost per AUGS
    • Three year support contract
ground rules assumptions 1 of 2
Ground Rules & Assumptions (1 of 2)
  • All GOTS & COTS items function properly.
  • Failure rate is constant.
  • Reliability and failure rate constant across all types of environments.
  • Exponential model is utilized for the analysis.
  • MTTR begins immediately after failure.
  • All items come on and function continuously at time = 0; all items turn off and stop functioning at time = t.
  • All equipment and testing items used for measurements are compatible for use with the evaluated performance measures.
  • All testing conducted using military standards for communication equipment, channels and defined ranges.
  • Using non-secure communications will behave the same as if using secure communication (non-encrypted verses encrypted channels).
  • No failures occur during analysis.
  • MANPRINT factor has already been optimized for all items involved
  • If directed to change analysis because of AUGS changes, more time will be allocated to conduct second evaluation.
  • No new IED defeat and C4I systems will be introduced before June 2011.
ground rules assumptions 2 of 2
Ground Rules & Assumptions (2 of 2)
  • Schedule demands will be contractor’s responsibility, even if sub-contracted from the prime contractor’s office.
  • The power supply technology maturity may require an upgrade after August 2011, but no earlier.
  • Cost per AUGS is dependent on FRP delivery of contractor; assume that the contractor will meet the monthly delivery requirement and cost is constant.
  • Each performance measure is tested over the same amount of time.
  • If performance measure values in Figure 2 are proven to be invalid, the GPO will provide additional time to conduct a new analysis.
  • Director will provide more dollars if required to complete team analysis.
  • Each team member will work full-time on the analysis until complete.
  • Time allotted from contract award to FRP is two years.
  • Contractor must be able to deliver 37 AUGS per month until reaching 300 units; must also be prepared to deliver another 100 AUGS as requested by the Army.
key requirements
Key Requirements
  • Key system requirements extracted from CDD, but not approved for public release. These requirements are a “must have” in order to move past Milestone C:
    • AUGS must be able to communicate (data, video, voice) with a minimum un-manned, line-of-site range of 1000m. Voice communications for manned-mode will communicate within the capabilities of the current army tactical ASIP radio.
    • AUGS shall achieve interoperability through seamless integration of Joint and Service C4I systems installed or mounted in the vehicle.
    • AUGS must be capable of accommodating current and future IED detection/defeat equipment. These systems will be mounted on AUGS according to their specifications (typically top and front of vehicles).
    • Remote control capability must have protection against the threat of a system overrun/jam. In case of system overrun/jam attempts, the operator must be able to immediately detect location of threat source.
    • Mine detection capability of AUGS must be able to detect mines that are remotely operated (RF signal), wire signal activated, or pressure activated.
    • Cost per AUGS is not to exceed $300,000.
    • Three-year service support (minus initial unit cost) must not exceed $45,000.
slide12
WBS

First two levels provided by PMO, 3rd level provide by contractor.

analysis overview 1 of 3
Analysis Overview (1 of 3)
  • Tasks: To evaluate the reliability and cost of each performance measure of the AUGS.
  • Method:
    • Use exponential model to evaluate reliability; failure rate and time values gathered as a part of each package of test data
    • Tests conducted in a relevant, but controlled environment.
    • Most test data collected from manufacturers and ATEC due to lack of resources/time with team
    • Conduct analysis of reliability of all performance measures in a series and series/parallel configuration
  • End State: Provide an analysis of the reliability and cost factors of the AUGS, and then use this analysis to evaluate the Rs(t) of the AUGS.
analysis overview 2 of 3 performance measures
Analysis Overview (2 of 3) - Performance Measures -

Conversion into Percentages

Only analyzing on achieving the Goal of 1,500 Watts.

analysis overview 3 of 3 description of performance measures
Analysis Overview (3 of 3)- Description of Performance Measures -
  • Mine detection: value measured based on how many mines were detected during a subsystem test with the manufacturer. The test values are consolidated from manufacturer tests, but not re-tested by the team.
  • Remote communication range: the team was able to obtain a GOTS SINCGARS 1523E Radio for testing the range. These results were obtained directly by the team in an open grass field.
  • C4I system interoperability: data is estimated based on what systems may potentially be available in the next 2 years. Though estimating these values will be difficult, it must be evaluated in order to assess the future integration potential of the AUGS.
  • Jamming GPS tracking: the GPS system provides a military grid coordinate (8-12 digits preceded by a two-letter identifier) of the jamming source. Grid coordinates are measured in possible increments of 8, 10 or 12 digits. The ability of this system to report more exact locations was tested by ATEC (Army Test and Evaluation Command). The more digits in the measurement signify a more exact location. This data was provided to us o/a 24 March 2011; unbeknownst to the team until then, we learned that ATEC only evaluated on the system’s ability to measure at least 8 digit grids.
  • Power requirement: the military always wants to reduce the power requirements of any system. As a result of lower power requirements, the overall weight of the AUGS will be reduced and will also put less strain on gas consumption. Lower power requirements of all the subsystems will reduce the support costs of the AUGS over its lifespan. This measure changed during the process of the team analysis, and now the measure is evaluated on whether it can/cannot rely on 1,500 Watts of power.
reliability analysis 1 of 9 mine detection test conducted by manufacturer
Reliability Analysis (1 of 9)- Mine Detection, Test Conducted by Manufacturer-
  • Test collection environment:
    • Ground material for roads was a mix of dirt and sand.
    • Mines used for detection were simulated but based on similar metallic, 2 feet wide mines reportedly found in Iraq.
    • Mines were buried approximately 2 feet below surface of roads. Mines were buried in various locations across road in order to test all points on detector.
    • Mine detector was attached to the front of a civilian truck and driven at a constant speed of 30 mph (speed requirement dictated by PMO). If the mine detector “detected” a mine, the vehicle would stop in order to verify if in fact there was a mine at that location. After verification, the vehicle would continue down the course.
    • Test course was 3 miles long with 100 mines buried along the route.
    • The mine detector was driven across the course 100 times for a total of 30hrs.
  • Test Results:
    • t (hours) = 30
    • Failure Rate (, failures/hour) = .1/30 = .00333
reliability analysis 2 of 9 singars radios test by team
Reliability Analysis (2 of 9)- SINGARS Radios Test by Team -
  • Test collection environment:
    • Used man-portable radio configuration (no external power source)
    • Frequency Modulation
    • No data encryption
    • Test data range modified for low power source: 800meters (goal), 694 m (planned) & 533 m (threshold)
    • Tested in 4 or 8 hour increments
  • Test Results:
    • t (hours) = 1200
    • Failure Rate (, failures/hour) = .143/1200= .000119
reliability analysis 3 of 9 c4i interoperability
Reliability Analysis (3 of 9)- C4I Interoperability -
  • Test collection environment:
    • Too difficult for team or ATEC to evaluate
    • Used .99 reliability to assume that all equipment must be interoperable for AUGS to be successful
  • Results:
    • R(t) = .99
reliability analysis 4 of 9 gps jamming tracking tested by atec
Reliability Analysis (4 of 9)- GPS Jamming & Tracking Tested by ATEC -
  • Test collection environment:
  • Test was conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.
  • The jammer/tracker was installed on an MRAP (more realistic measure of vehicle height, shape and material effects on jammer/tracker).
  • Terrain was hilly, and a mix of sand and dirt.
  • Only one type of jammer (unclassified) was used for the testing.
  • Testing was conducted across the entire course with the jammer signal remaining stagnant (similar to what occurs in combat operations in Iraq).
  • Jammer was turned on/off at increments of 5 minutes to allow the vehicle and GPS tracker to reset and begin movement again.
  • The course for testing was very suited for signal gathering. Instead of evaluating for 8,10 or 12 digits reports, ATEC measured for 8 digit or better. Anything less was reported as a failure. This is also how the team measured the reliability even though the percentages were gathered using the ability to report certain number of grid digits.
  • Test Results:
    • t (hours/day) = 256 hrs total in 16 days.
    • # of days tested in 90 day period = 16 (one day per week)
    • Failure Rate (, failures/hour) = .15/256 = .000586
reliability analysis 5 of 9 power requirement test by team
Reliability Analysis (5 of 9)- Power Requirement Test by Team -
  • Test collection environment:
  • Only evaluated the ability to surge to 1,500 W
  • Used simulation program (simulate a AUGS with a certain power requirement for the engine) to arrive at test data
  • Any surge (1,500 W for 2 seconds) that short-circuited was a failure
  • Test Results:
    • t (hours) = 800
    • Failure Rate (, failures/hour) = .33/800 = .000412
reliability analysis 7 of 9 r t calculations on performance measures
Reliability Analysis (7 of 9)- R(t) Calculations on Performance Measures -
  • Reliability Equation: R(t)=e -t
    • Rmine detection = e –(.00333*30) = .999
    • Rcommunication = e –(.000119*1200) = .796
    • RC4 interoperability = .99(assumed based on Army requirements)
    • RGPS tracking of jammer = e –(.000586*256) = .861
    • Rpower support = e –(.000412*800) = .719
  • Results: Mine detection and C4I excelled in their respective categories. One concern for the PMO is that the low reliability for SINCGARS shows an issue with the current equipment in the Army.
reliability analysis 8 of 9 series reliability of augs
Reliability Analysis (8 of 9)- Series Reliability of AUGS -

Rs(t) = (Rmine detection)*(Rcommunication)*(RC4 interoperability)*(RGPS tracking of jammer)*(Rpower support)

Rs(t) = (.999) * (.796) * (.99) * (.861) * (.719) = .487 (Total AUGS Reliability)

reliability analysis 9 of 9 series parallel reliability of augs
Reliability Analysis (9 of 9)- Series/Parallel Reliability of AUGS -

Updated reliability estimates:

Rcommunication = 1 – (1-e –(.000119*1200))(1-e –(.000119*1200))= .958

RGPS tracking of jammer = 1 – (1-e –(.000586*256))(1-e –(.000586*256))= .981

Updated AUGS reliability using equation (3) again after parallel models already applied:

Rs(t) (series and parallel models) = (.999) * (.958) * (.99) * (.981) * (.719) = .668

(Total AUGS Reliability with additional SINCGARS Radio and GPS Tracker)

cost analysis
Cost Analysis
  • Analysis/evaluation based on the reliability of each performance measure and the total system reliability.
  • Seeing how unreliable the system is, the team recommendation would be a contract of the following:
    • The $250K cost per AUGS
    • The higher cost of $45K for a3-year service support contract
    • Recommend allowing for more space inside the AUGS vehicle for redundancy in equipment. (high costs, but more reliable)
  • Reliability is more important than cost when lives of soldiers are at risk.
results conclusion 1 of 2
Results/Conclusion (1 of 2)
  • The analysis conducted by the team leads to the following conclusions:
    • If the AUGS is used in its current configuration with all the systems on board, the overall reliability is approximately .487.
    • If the AUGS (in its current configuration) is augmented by the addition of one more radio and GPS tracker in parallel to their counterparts, the AUGS reliability will be improved and equal to approximately .668. In this modified configuration, reliability is improved by 37.1%.
results conclusion 2 of 2
Results/Conclusion (2 of 2)
  • The results of this analysis cannot confirm that this option is viable at this stage of the AUGS program. On the other hand, we can confirm that our recommendation will in fact improve the overall AUGS reliability.
  • Another option briefly mentioned during the analysis was to replace some or all of the sub-systems with more modern, reliable systems. At the time of this analysis, the team was not able to research what other systems are available on the market as substitutes.
  • Cost is always a factor, but in this case the PMO must weight the costs of buying a system with low reliability that will surely need support in the near future. This type of system may cost less up front, but the support costs may be very high if the contractors know their products will fail more often than not. Other programmatics (See WBS) may also have cost affects as a result of a system with low reliability.