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ALCIDE DE GASPERI

ALCIDE DE GASPERI. A Statesman for Europe. Matteo Luigi Napolitano. Effects of WW2. The Second World War is a war never conceived before , and this for many reasons . If at the end of WW1 the communist danger is proxy to zero due to Russian weakness .

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ALCIDE DE GASPERI

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  1. ALCIDE DE GASPERI A Statesman for Europe Matteo Luigi Napolitano

  2. Effects of WW2 • The Second World War is a war neverconceivedbefore, and this for manyreasons. • Ifat the end of WW1 the communistdangerisproxy to zero due to Russian weakness. • The situation istotallydifferentafter the WW2, with a USSR very strong, presentingherselfas the realwinner of the war. • Hence the Europeanunificationprocessafter WW2 gainsitsmomentumas a anticommunist and an antisovietprocess.

  3. Yes to American helpifEuropeanismgrows • UK ForeignMinisterBevinwants a Western Europeanpolitical union withoutrenouncing to American economic help (ERP). • In any case Bevindoesnotwant to make an anti-soviet alliance. • He doesprefer an anti-germanalliance or even a regionalalliancebased on art. 51 of the UN Chart. • France, on her part, wants a sharp anti-Germanalliance.

  4. The developments • The Prague coup (February 1948). • France changesher position, since an anti-Germandirectivemakes no sense. • In thisframework, Italybecomesveryimportant in order to create a new Western allianceconceivedas an anti-soviet bulwark. • Invitation to Italy to adhere to the future BrusselsPact. • President Truman supportsthispact.

  5. What Italy is going to do? • Alcide De Gasperi refuses the invitation to enter in the theBrusselsPact. Why? • De Gasperi thinksthat the new Western Pactistoomuchmilitary and toolittleEuropeanist. • De Gasperi doesnot share the emotional anti-Germanapproachthat France wants to give the new Pact. • De Gasperi cannotengageItalybeforeItalianpoliticalelections of April 1948.

  6. After Italian Elections • After Italian Political Elections of 1948, De Gasperi fine-tunes his position on the Western Union. • He declares that Italy could enter in a Western Unione only on a parity level: namely he aims at revising the Italian Treaty of peace of 1947. • This is not accepted by the British and French partners.

  7. De Gasperi, a first-hour European? • Thismovedoesnot put De Gasperi among the followers of a total Federal Europeanist idea. • Europeanthemesget no muchattention and time in Italy’s 1948 Parlamentariandiscussions. • In factItalianParliament , whentreatingaboutinternationaltopics, reaffirmsItalianrights to pre-fascistcolonies or even on the Trieste Free Territory.

  8. The shifting point • Italian position shifts when discussions on a North Atlantic Alliance grow up and the Federalists launch a programme regarding the United States of Europe. • At this point De Gasperi undestands that Italy needs to get involved in a European building process, by renouncing to part on her national sovereignty .

  9. Beyond the Brussels Pact • De Gasperi’s and Sforza’s Europeanism goes beyond the Brussels Pact by a Federalist idea by degrees, based mainly on functions: • a) To make the OEEC a permanent structure. • b) To collaborate also in cultural and social fields. • c) To create common institutions in the OEEC.

  10. De Gasperi changes his mind • Great Britain and US do not share Italianvision. • De Gasperi fearsisolation. • De Gasperi Address on the moral basis of democracy in Europe (20 November 1948) and on the importance of Christendom. • De Gasperi meets Spaak in Bussels: anyproject on a future European Community shall be consideredonlywithin the BrusselsPactmembers (hence: only the French and the Britishprojects are in pole position - not the Italianone).

  11. De Gasperi’ssupportto the building of Europe • De Gasperi and Sforza praise the British project, but reaffirm Italy’s right to be considered on an equal foot among the partners (December 3, 1948). • This does mean no more to aim at revising the Italian Peace Treaty. • Italy is invited to make part of the future Council of Europe (27-28 January 1949).

  12. Italy in the Western System • Question of the participation of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty. • Monnet’sproposal of a new kind of European union. • De Gasperi’saddressat Sorrento (Juin 14, 1950): he invites France and Western Germany to buildassoonas possibile a Europe based on peace and justice. • Italian line: no more deviations, loyalty and Europeanism. • April 18, 1951: CECA Treaty.

  13. Opposition to the CECA in Italy • Socialists and communists. • Italian industrialists . • The Trieste problem. • Delays in ratifying the CECA Treaty. • De Gasperi underlines mainly the Franco-German reappacification nature of the Treaty, rather that its «Communitarian» nature.

  14. De Gasperi and the EuropeanArmyproject • De Gasperi feelsthat the Council of Europe isrisking to die ifitfails to givingitself a more concrete aspect. • De Gasperi’sproposal to by-pass the prohibition to discussmilitaryquestions in the Council of Europe issupported by Churchill. • Acheson Plan to increase American forces in Europe if a stableEuropean force with a Germancontingentiscreated (15 August 1950). • Italysupportsthisplan.

  15. Towards the EDC • Pleven Plan (October 27, 1950). • France wants to make the plandepending on the Schuman Plan for the CECA (Schuman Plan), but the US raiseobjections to thispurpose, sincethiswouldmeanfurtherdelays. • Italymakesitclearthatonly by developing the Atlantic Community itispossible to create a EuropeanDefence Community.

  16. The EDC • French ancientfears. • The role of the US vis-à-vis the EDC buldingprocess. • Santa Margherita Ligure meeting (February 12-13, 1951). De Gasperi supports the Pleven Plan. • De Gasperi formshisseventh Cabinet and alsotakes for himself the ItalianForeignMinistry (July 26, 1951). • September 1951: De Gasperi travel to the US. • Strasbourg Assembly (December 10, 1951): De Gasperi’sproposal to give the new Community a common «parliament» whichwouldapprove a EuropeanConstitutionwithinsixmonths from hisbirth.

  17. The EDC - 2 • Atlantic Council in Lisbon (february 1952). • Paris Treaty (May 27, 1952). • De Gasperi’sproposal to unify the two CECA and EDC Assemblies and to makeit possibile that CECA Commissionstudy a plan for a federalbicameral Assembly (July 26 and 27, 1952). • Thisproposalisdeveloped by De Gasperi in Aquisgrana, on September 24, 1952

  18. EDC Failure • Delays in ratifying EDC Treaty. • Thishappenswhile CECA Commissionhasalreadyprepared a text of EuropeanConstitution(complying with the art. 38 or the EDC Treaty). • The US do notconsiderpositivelyItalian and French delays (January 31, 1953). • Trieste question. • Italianpoliticalelections. Failure of the Scelba Law and De Gasperi resignation (June 1953). • Failure of the EDC.

  19. Conclusions • De Gasperi’sEuropeanismis • Western-oriented. • NotFunctionalist tout court. • Notfederalist tout court. • Based on a carefulreminding of the errorsEuropeanStates made in the recentpast. • Europe as a common heritage. • Italyas a strong defender of a Western democratic Europe.

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