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Introduction Client Motivations  Tasks Categories Crowd Motivation Pros & Cons

Crowdsourcing. Introduction Client Motivations  Tasks Categories Crowd Motivation Pros & Cons Quality Management Scale up with Machine Learning Workflows for Complex tasks Market evolution  Reputation Systems ECCO, March 20,2011 corina.ciechanow@pobox.com

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Introduction Client Motivations  Tasks Categories Crowd Motivation Pros & Cons

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  1. Crowdsourcing • Introduction • Client Motivations  Tasks Categories • Crowd Motivation • Pros & Cons • Quality Management • Scale up with Machine Learning • Workflows for Complex tasks • Market evolution  Reputation Systems • ECCO, March 20,2011 • corina.ciechanow@pobox.com • http://bitsofknowledge.waterloohills.com

  2. Introduction • June 2006: Jeff Howe created the term for his article in the Wired magazine "The Rise of Crowdsourcing". • Elements:At least 2 actors:- Client/Requester - Crowd or community (an online audience)A Challenge:- What has to be done? Need, task, etc.- Reward: money, prize, other motivators.

  3. Ex: “Adult Websites” Classification • Large number of sites to label • Get people to look at sites and classify them as: • G (general audience) • PG (parental guidance) • R (restricted) • X (porn) [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  4. Ex: “Adult Websites” Classification • Large number of hand‐labeled sites • Get people to look at sites and classify them as: • G (general audience) • PG (parental guidance) • R (restricted) • X (porn) Cost/Speed Statistics: • Undergrad intern: 200 websites/hr, cost: $15/hr • MTurk: 2500 websites/hr, cost: $12/hr [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  5. Client motivation • Need Suppliers:Mass work, Distributed work, or just tedious work Creative work Look for specific talent Testing Support To offload peak demands Tackle problems that need specific communities or human variety Any work that can be done cheaper this way.

  6. Client motivation • Need customers! • Need Funding • Need to be Backed up • Crowdsourcing is your business!

  7. Crowd Motivation • Money €€€ • Self-serving purpose (learning new skills, get recognition, avoid boredom, enjoyment, create a network with other profesionals) • Socializing, feeling of belonging to a community, friendship • Altruism (public good, help others)

  8. Crowd Demography(background defines motivation) • The 2008 survey at iStockphoto indicates that the crowd is quite homogenous and elite. • Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers come mainly from 2 countries: a) USAb) India

  9. Crowd Demography

  10. Client Tasks Parameters 3 main goals for a task to be done: • Minimize Cost (cheap) • Minimize Completion Time (fast) • Maximize Quality (good) Client has other goals when the crowd is not just a supplier

  11. Pros • Quicker: Parallellism reduces time • Cheap, even free • Creativity, Innovation • Quality (depends) • Availability of scarce ressources: Taps on the ‘long tail’ • Multiple feedback • Allows to create a community (followers) • Business Agility • Scales up!

  12. Cons • Lack of professionalism: Unverified quality • Too many answers • No standards • No organisation of answers • Not always cheap: Added costs to bring a project to conclusion • Too few participants if task or pay is not attractive • If worker is not motivated, lower quality of work

  13. Cons • Global language barriers. • Different laws in each country: adds complexity • No written contracts, so no possibility of non-disclosure agreements. • Hard to maintain a long term working relationship with workers. • Difficulty managing a large-scale, crowdsourced project. • Can be targeted by malicious work efforts. • Lack of guaranteed investment, thus hard to convince stakeholders.

  14. Quality Management Ex: “Adult Website” Classification • Bad news: Spammers! • Worker ATAMRO447HWJQ labeled X (porn) sites as G (general audience) [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  15. Quality ManagementMajority Voting and Label Quality • Ask multiple labelers, keep majority label as “true” label • Quality is probability of being correct

  16. Dealing with Quality • Majority vote works best when workers have similar quality • Otherwise better to just pick the vote of the best worker • Or model worker qualities and combine Vote combination studies [Clemen and Winkler, 1999, Ariely et al. 2000] show that complex models work slightly better than simple average, but are less robust. • Spammers try to go undetected • Good willing workers may have bias  difficult to set apart.

  17. Human Computation Biases • Anchoring Effect: “Humans start with a first approximation (anchor) and then make adjustments to that number based on additional information.” [Tversky & Kahneman, 1974] • Priming: Exposure to one stimulus (as stereotypes) influences another [Shih et al., 1999] • Exposure Effect: Familiarity leads to liking...[Stone and Alonso, 2010] • Framing Effect: Presenting the same option in different formats leads to different answers. [Tversky and Kahneman, 1981]  Need to remove sequential effects from human computation data…

  18. Dealing with Quality • Use this process to improve quality: 1.Initialize by aggregating labels (using majority vote)2. Estimate error rates for workers (use aggregated labels)3. Change aggregate labels (using error rates, weight worker votes according to quality) Note: Keep labels for “example data” unchanged4. Iterate from Step 2 until convergence • Or Use exploration‐exploitation scheme:– Explore: Learn about the quality of the workers– Exploit: Label new examples using the quality  In both cases, significant advantage on bad conditions like imbalanced datasets and bad workers

  19. Effect of Payment: Quality • Cost does not affect quality [Mason and Watts, 2009, AdSafe] • Similar results for bigger tasks [Ariely et al, 2009] [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  20. Effect of payment in #tasks • Payment incentives increase speed, though [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  21. Optimizing Quality • Quality tends to remain the same, independent of completion time [Huang et al., HCOMP 2010]

  22. Scale Up with Machine Learning Build an ‘Adult Website’ Classifier • Crowdsourcing is cheap but not free – Cannot scale to web without help  Build automatic classification models using examples from crowdsourced data

  23. Integration with Machine Learning • Humans label training data • Use training data to build model

  24. Dealing w/Quality in Machine Learning Noisy labels lead to degraded task performance Labeling quality increases Classification quality increases

  25. Tradeoffs for Machine Learning Models • Get more data  Improve model accuracy • Improve data quality Improve classification

  26. Tradeoffs for Machine Learning Models • Get more data: Active Learning, select which unlabeled example to label [Settles, http://active-learning.net/] • Improve data quality: Repeated Labeling, label again an already labeled example [Sheng et al. 2008, Ipeirotis et al, 2010]

  27. Model Uncertainty (MU) • Model uncertainty: get more labels for instances that cause model uncertainty – for modeling: why improve training data quality if model already is certain there?(“Self‐healing” process:[Brodley et al, JAIR 1999] , [Ipeirotis et al NYU 2010])– for data quality, low‐certainty “regions” may be due to incorrect labeling of corresponding instances

  28. Quality Rule of Thumb • With high quality labelers (80% and above): One worker per case (more data better) • With low quality labelers (~60%) Multiple workers per case (to improve quality) [Sheng et al, KDD 2008; Kumar and Lease, CSDM 2011]

  29. Complex tasks:Handle answers through workflow • Q: “My task does not have discrete answers….” • A: Break into two Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs): – “Create” HIT – “Vote” HIT • Vote controls quality of Creation HIT • Redundancy controls quality of Voting HIT Catch: If “creation” very good, voting workers just vote “yes” – Solution: Add some random noise (e.g. add typos)

  30. Photo description But the free-form answer can be more complex, not just right or wrong… TurkIt toolkit [Little et al., UIST 2010]: http://groups.csail.mit.edu/uid/turkit/

  31. Description Versions • A partial view of a pocket calculator together with some coins and a pen. • ... • A close‐up photograph of the following items: A CASIO multi‐function calculator. A ball point pen, uncapped. Various coins, apparently European, both copper and gold. Seems to be a theme illustration for a brochure or document cover treating finance, probably personal finance. • … • A close‐up photograph of the following items: A CASIO multi‐function, solar powered scientific calculator. A blue ball point pen with a blue rubber grip and the tip extended. Six British coins; two of £1value, three of 20p value and one of 1p value. Seems to be a theme illustration for a brochure or document cover treating finance ‐ probably personal finance.

  32. Collective Problem Solving • Exploration / exploitation tradeoff (Independence/or not) – Can accelerate learning, by sharing good solutions – But can lead to premature convergence on suboptimal solution [Mason and Watts, submitted to Science, 2011]

  33. Independence or Not? • Building iteratively (lack of independent) allows better outcomes for image description task…In the FoldIt game, workers built on each other’s results • But lack of independence may cause high dependence on starting conditions and create Groupthink [Little et al, HCOMP 2010]

  34. Exploration/Exploitation? • With high quality labelers (80% and above):

  35. Exploration/Exploitation?

  36. Group Effect • Individual search strategies affect group success: Players copying each other make less exploring  lower probability of finding peak on a round

  37. Workflow Patterns • Generate / Create • Find • Improve / Edit / Fix  Creation • Vote for accept‐reject • Vote up, vote down, to generate rank • Vote for best / select top‐k  Quality Control • Split task • Aggregate Flow Control • Iterate  Flow Control

  38. AdSafe Crowdsourcing Experience

  39. AdSafe Crowdsourcing Experience • Detect pages that discuss swine flu • – Pharmaceutical firm had drug “treating” (off-label) swine flu • – FDA prohibited pharmaceuticals to display drug ad in pages about swine flu • Two days to comply! • • Big fast-food chain does not want ad to appear: • – In pages that discuss the brand (99% negative sentiment) • – In pages discussing obesity

  40. Adsafe Crowdsourcing ExperienceWorkflow to classify URLs • Find URLs for a given topic (hate speech, gambling, alcohol • abuse, guns, bombs, celebrity gossip, etc etc) • http://url‐collector.appspot.com/allTopics.jsp • • Classify URLs into appropriate categories • http://url‐annotator.appspot.com/AdminFiles/Categories.jsp • • Mesure quality of the labelers and remove spammers • http://qmturk.appspot.com/ • • Get humans to “beat” the classifier by providing cases where • the classifier fails • http://adsafe‐beatthemachine.appspot.com/

  41. Market Design of Crowdsourcing • Aggregators: • Create a crowd or community. • Create a portal to connect a client to the crowd • Deal with workflow of complex tasks, like decomposition in simpler tasks and answer recomposition •  Allow anonymity •  Consumers can benefit from a crowd without the need to create it.

  42. Market Design: Crude vs Intelligent Crowdsourcing • Intelligent Crowdsourcing uses an organized workflow to tackle CONS of crude crowdsourcing.  Complex task is divided by experts,  Given to relevant crowds, and not to everyone • Individual answers are recomposed by experts into general answer • Usually covert

  43. Lack of Reputation and Market for Lemons “When quality of sold good is uncertain and hidden before transaction, prize goes to value of lowest valued good” [Akerlof, 1970; Nobel prize winner] • Market evolution steps:1. Employers pays $10 to good worker, $0.1 to bad worker2. 50% good workers, 50% bad; indistinguishable from each other3. Employer offers price in the middle: $54. Some good workers leave the market (pay too low)5. Employer revised prices downwards as % of bad increased6. More good workers leave the market… death spiral http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Market_for_Lemons

  44. Reputation systems • Great number of reputation mechanisms • Challenges in the Design of Reputation Systems- Insufficient participation- Overwhelmingly positive feedback- Dishonest reports- Identity changes- Value imbalance exploitation (“milking the reputation”)

  45. Reputation systems [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  46. Reputation systems • Dishonest Reports1. Ebay “Riddle for a PENNY! No shipping‐Positive Feedback”. Sets agreement in order to be given unfairly high ratings by them.2 “Bad‐mouthing”: Same situation but to “bad‐mouth” other sellers that they want to drive out the market. • Design incentive‐compatible mechanism to elicit honest feedbacks [Jurca and Faltings 2003: pay rater if report matches next; Miller et al. 2005: use a proper score rule to value report; Papaioannou and Stamoulis 2005: delay next transaction over time] [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

  47. Reputation systemsIdentity changes • “Cheap pseudonyms”: easy to disappear and reregister under a new identity with almost zero cost. [Friedman and Resnick 2001] • Introduce opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. Increase the difficulty of online identity changes • Impose upfront costs to new entrants: allow new identities (forget the past) but make it costly to create them

  48. Challenges for Crowdsourcing Markets • Two‐sided opportunistic behavior1. In e‐commerce markets, only sellers are likely to behave opportunistically. 2. In crowdsourcing markets, both sides can be fraudulent. • Imperfect monitoring and heavy‐tailed participationverifying the answers is sometimes as costly as providing them.- Sampling often does not work, due to heavy tailed participation distribution (lognormal, according to self‐reported surveys) [Panos Ipeirotis. WWW2011 tutorial]

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