Testimony and the Value of Knowledge Martin Kusch <mphk2@cam.ac.uk>

1. Testimony and the Value of KnowledgeMartin Kusch<mphk2@cam.ac.uk>

2. A Communitarian Form of Value-Driven Epistemology Guiding assumption: Human cognizers are highly gregarious and deeply interdependent. One central claim: Knowledge is a collective good.

3. Central resources and allies: [1] Genealogy of Knowledge: Craig, Williams [2] Sociology of Knowledge: Barnes, Shapin

4. Central opponent: Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (2003)

5. Cf. Kvanvig, The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992) Do not “divorce epistemological concerns from the realities of social interaction” (Kvanvig 1992: 178).

6. Kvanvig: The Value of Knowledge and the • Pursuit of Understanding (2003) • A satisfactory account of knowledge must explain both its nature and its value. • Value-scepticism about knowledge: there is • no knowledge-specific epistemic value.

7. The argument by elimination … • [1] E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property that renders the truth of the belief objectively likely (e.g. reliabilism).

8. The argument by elimination … • [1] E.g., knowledge is true belief plus a property that renders the truth of the belief objectively likely (e.g. reliabilism). • Objection: the Swamping Argument: The epistemic value of a true belief “swamps” the value of using a method that makes the belief likely to be true.

9. [2] Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier cases.

10. [2] Knowledge is (subjectively) justified true belief plus a fourth condition blocking Gettier cases. Objection: Fourth conditions are ever more “complex, ad hoc and gerrymandered …” But to solve the problem of epistemic value, we need “simpler proposals in which the value of the condition is intuitively obvious”.

11. Craig’s Genealogy of Knowledge (1990) • Method: Construct a hypothetical historical narrative of the process in which the concept knowledge was synthesised. • Question I: Why was an ancestor of knowledge • (i.e. “protoknowledge”) of value in the epistemic state of nature? • Question II: How did we get from protoknowledge • to our knowledge?

12. Part I of Craig’s Genealogy: • “Inquirers” need to classify “informants”. • “Protoknowers” are good informants if they: • fit the needs of the inquirer, • are honest towards the inquirer, • convince the inquirer, • are understandable to the inquirer, • are detectable by the inquirer (on the • basis of “indicator properties”). • (But these are not necessary and sufficient …)

13. Part I of Craig’s Genealogy (cont’d): • protoknowledge differs from knowledge: • it is tied to testimony, • it is not a fully public concept, • it does not figure in self-attributions, • it is not undermined by luck.

14. Part II of Craig’s Genealogy: “objectivisation”: [a] Self-attributions [b] Recommending protoknowers to others: higher standards [c] “Recommended” as an indicator property: dilution of the detectability requirement [d] Group action: dilution of the link to testimony

15. Three “Kvanvigian” Objections The SwampingObjection (2003: 86) The epistemic value of true belief swamps the epistemic value of true belief coming from a tagged good informant.

16. The Social Objection What are the social consequences of knowledge attributions? And why should we ignore the conceptual needs of the informants?

17. The Relevance Objection • Where are the marks of the history of knowledge? And what is history to do with us?

18. Three Modifications of Craig’s Genealogy – to block the three objections: [1] The institution of testimony as a collective good, underwritten by intrinsic values. (Williams) [2] Protoknowledge attributions are attributions of honour. (Barnes and Williams) [3] Attributions of knowledge are intertwined with attributions of freedom. (Barnes and Shapin)

19. ObjectionsModifications SwampingOne: Intrinsic values Social Two: Honouring Relevance Three: Freedom

20. Modification [1]: Williams’ genealogy of the institution of testimony [a] real vs. imaginary genealogy [b] a genealogy of testimony [c] the virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity” [d] the testimonial system as a collective good [e] the virtues as intrinsic values: stable from the inside

21. Intrinsic values … - central in our shared system of values; - cannot be identified by means of Moore’s “method of absolute isolation”.

22. Modification [1] blocks the Swamping Objection • [a] The institution of testimony is not of merely instrumental value to us. • [b] The value of the institution of testimony is not swamped by the value of true belief.

23. [c] Williams is right about intrinsic values: • Cf. Frankena’s list: “life, … health, … happiness, … love, friendship, cooperation … peace …”

24. Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge and Honouring • [a] The collective good of the testimony system is secured by means of a system of sanctioning. • [b] A new free-rider problem?

25. Modification [2]: Barnes and Williams on Knowledge and Honouring • [a] The collective good of the testimony system is secured by means of a system of sanctioning. • [b] A new free-rider problem? • [c] Interactionism: talk is a “free resource”. • [d] The deference-emotion system (Scheff) • [e] New: Protoknowledge attributions as honouring.

26. Modification [2] against the Relevance Objection • [a] The role of honouring in knowledge attributions: • the evidence of epistemologists and sociologists • Epistemic injustice (M. Fricker) • Knowledge as credit (Greco, Riggs, Sosa) • Knowledge and moral concerns (Zagzebski) • “Honorific uses of ‘knowledge’” (Kvanvig) • “Knowledge” is used to encourage good testimony (Reynolds) • The moral force of knowledge (Durkheim, Bloor)

27. More on the Relevance Objection • Marks of protoknowledge in knowledge? • to know + interrogative constructions • testimonial metaphors • evidence tells us things • sensory organs tell us things or deceive us • being informed • martyrion and martys • discovery

28. Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin • on Knowledge and Freedom • [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of • freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. • protection from the demand to investigate further.

29. Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin • on Knowledge and Freedom • [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of • freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. • protection from the demand to investigate further. • [b] We often give the good informant concerning topic • t discretion over the social practice to do with t.

30. Modification [3]: Barnes and Shapin • on Knowledge and Freedom • [a] Attributions of knowledge are attributions of • freedom from (certain forms of) interference. E.g. • protection from the demand to investigate further. • [b] We often give the good informant concerning topic • t discretion over the social practice to do with t. • [c] The informant has a need to distinguish between • good and bad inquirers: the “protofree” can be • influenced by reports in rational ways.

31. Modification [3] against the Social Objection • and the Relevance Objection • [a] Williams on knowledge and freedom • Primo Levi’s reflections: • to lie to someone is to violate their freedom; • the freedom to believe the truth must be • shared; • - to follow the dictates of nature is not to be unfree.

32. [b] Shapin (1994): Early-modern natural philosopher: the reliable testifier is a free man – a “gentleman”. Maxims: “(i) assent to testimony which is plausible; (ii) assent to testimony which is multiple; (iii) assent to testimony which is consistent …” “Assent to testimony from sources of acknowledged integrity and disinterestedness.” Gentlemen were truth-tellers …

33. [c] Linking the imaginary to the real genealogy – understanding the performative character of knowledge attributions: • Precisely because knowledge attributions come • with (a degree of) honour and freedom, gentlemen will deny knowledge to the “domestics”.

34. Tentative Conclusions • [1] A communitarian value-driven epistemology is possible.

35. Tentative Conclusions • [1] A communitarian value-driven epistemology is possible. • [2] There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge are collective goods: the costs are carried indi- vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively.

36. Tentative Conclusions • [1] A communitarian value-driven epistemology is possible. • [2] There is a sense in which (bodies of) knowledge are collective goods: the costs are carried indi- vidually the benefits are enjoyed collectively. • [3] The collective good of knowledge can exist only if the testimonial system is of intrinsic value (or the values underwriting it are intrinsic in Williams’ sense).

37. [4] Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a link – at least a historical link – between the epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the realities of social life.

38. [4] Craig’s genealogy makes plausible that there is a link – at least a historical link – between the epistemic value of (proto-)knowledge and the realities of social life. • [5] Protoknowledge is epistemically more valuable than true belief. The latter does not swamp the former since the testimonial system is itself of intrinsic value.

39. [6] Craig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it with • (a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testi- • monial system as a collective good, • (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free resource, and • (c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions • are honouring.

40. [6] Craig’s proposal is strengthened by combining it with • (a) Williams’ suggestions concerning the testi- • monial system as a collective good, • (b) Barnes’ ideas on verbal interaction as a free resource, and • (c) the proposal that proto-knowledge attributions • are honouring. • [7] If we want to explain our intuitions about the • links between knowledge and freedom, we need • to analyse the conceptual needs of the informant alongside those of the enquirer.

41. Further Objections Objection A: Knowledge is not like clean air. Objection B: We need to understand why individual items of knowledge are valuable. Objection C: Knowledge does not factorise. Objection D: What about Gettier? Objection E: What about understanding?