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Comprehensive Discussion of PEDv. 2014 Pork Management Conference June 19, 2014 Dr. Harry Snelson AASV. Disease Discovery. Looks like TGE… Acts like TGE…. Ain’t TGE. PEDV Timeline – May 2013. Outcome of retrospective testing & on-boarding PEDV PCR .

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comprehensive discussion of pedv

Comprehensive Discussion of PEDv

2014 Pork Management Conference

June 19, 2014

Dr. Harry Snelson


disease discovery

Disease Discovery

Looks like TGE…

Acts like TGE….

Ain’t TGE


* for the weeks prior to 6-17-13, laboratories were able to provide diagnostic case submissions and number of premises testing positive for PEDv. Starting 6-17-13, the data are limited to ONLY diagnostic case submission numbers (aka Swine Accessions)

clinical signs
Clinical Signs
  • Clinically indistinguishable from TGE
    • Alpha coronavirus
    • Fecal-oral pathogen
    • Profuse diarrhea and vomiting
    • High mortality rates in neonatal pigs
    • High morbidity, lower mortality as pigs age
  • Not zoonotic, not a food safety concern
  • PCR – ready quickly
  • Serology
    • IFA
    • ELISA
  • No VI – virus is difficult to grow
  • Bioassay to prove infectivity/viability
    • Time consuming
    • Expensive
    • Lacks sensitivity
ped virus
PED virus
  • New to North America
  • In Europe in 1970’s
  • Current virus present in Asia
    • U.S. virus 99+ % similar to 2012 isolate from Anhui Province in China
  • U.S. swine herd naïve, 100% susceptible
  • No vaccine
  • Easily transmitted
  • USDA designated PED a “transboundary” disease
    • Not reportable
    • Non-regulatory
    • Production disease like PRRS or PCV
    • Turned the response over to the swine industry
  • NPB, NPPC and AASV coordinated effort with USDA to understand the epidemiology and develop a response strategy
  • Transmitted via contaminated manure
  • Concentrated on elevating biosecurity
aasv response
AASV Response
  • Collaboration with producer groups, state/federal/international animal health officials
  • Outreach/education of veterinary members
    • Meeting at WPX
    • Website updated weekly
    • Collaborate with NPB on research efforts and educational outreach to producers
  • Epidemiology efforts
    • Initial introduction survey
    • RRT participation
veterinary survey
Veterinary Survey
  • Concern: How did this virus come into the U.S.?
  • Objective: Identify any risk factors potentially associated with the introduction of the PEDv into the U.S. swine herd
  • Survey designed by AASV, NPB, NPPC & USDA-CEAH
  • Administered by practitioners, data transferred to CEAH via link designed by FAZD at Texas A&M
  • Data analyzed by CEAH
  • Questionnaire examined > 100 variables
  • 25 case herds, 18 matched control herds
survey results
Survey Results
  • Only seven variables were considered significantly likely to have some association with the introduction of PEDv
  • These seven risk factors were associated with the process of feeding the animals.
  • Did not implicate any specific finished feed, feed ingredient, feed manufacturer or ingredient supplier.
  • Development of 3 working groups
    • Biocontainment
      • How to limit spread off an infected premises
    • Biosecurity Transport
      • Review, modify, recommend biosecurity plans for transport, shows/exhibitions, producers
    • Packing Plant
      • Recommend biosecurity principles for packing plants, buying stations, etc
  • These working groups have developed a number of guides targeting biosecurity published on NPB website
  • Pork Board -- $3 million for PEDv research
    • Rapid response to research call
    • Research objectives
      • Diagnosis
      • Pathogenesis
      • Environmental stability
      • Epidemiology
      • surveillance
    • Shortened timeline
      • 13 days to identify and initiate research projects
      • Progress updates every two weeks
      • Six month deadline
  • NPB, NPPC and AASV funded a study by Dr. Jim Lowe to look at transmission in harvest plant lairage.
lairage study
Lairage Study
  • Trailers do become contaminated at packing plants due in part to movement of drivers
  • The more contact that occurs, the higher the rate of contamination
  • Dr. Matthew Turner surveyed cull sow buying stations in NC
    • Minimal biosecurity in place
    • Virus present, likely transmission occurring
    • Willingness on the part of the managers to make changes
future research focus for ped
Future research focus for PED
  • Funding:
    • NPB - $650,000
    • AFIA - $100,000
    • Genome Alberta - $500,000
    • NGFA - $60,000
  • Formation and duration of immunity after infection; What level of immunity is needed for full protection?
  • Can immunity be overwhelmed?
  • Continued development and implementation of surveillance strategies for PED
  • Evaluate strategies for trailer disinfection
feed as a possible vector
Feed as a possible vector
  • AASV survey identified feed as likely associated with the introduction
  • Feed has anecdotally been associated with outbreaks
  • Numerous bioassays on suspect feed and ingredients have been unable to confirm feed as a source

Feed Testing

May-June, 2013:  NVSL tested feed, mineral and vitamin premixes and dried

plasma samples.  Laboratory testing results (PCR) were negative except for dried

plasma products.

June, 2013:  NVSL conducted a bioassay using a vitamin premix and plasma. 

The bioassay pigs did not show evidence of infection through testing of the feces

and serology.

July, 2013:  NVSL conducted a bioassay using dried plasma that was obtained

from the blender.  The bioassay pigs did not show evidence of infection through

testing of the feces and serology.

Feb., 2014:  NVSL tested dried plasma from the manufacturer. 

The samples were positive utilizing the real time PCR assay, and confirmatory testing is being conducted utilizing the nested PCR.

March, 2014:  The bioassay for the last group of plasma samples is currently on test. 

feed as a possible vector1
Feed as a possible vector
  • Private research– has been able to transmit PEDv via feed to naïve pigs
  • Canada achieved a positive bioassay using spray dried porcine blood plasma but not feed pellets
educational outreach
Educational Outreach
guidelines for diagnosis of ped virus
Guidelines for Diagnosis of PED Virus
  • Lab diagnosis needed for determining site status
  • Managing biosecurity or biocontainment
  • Specifics of specimen collection
    • Feces
    • Oral fluids
canadian experience
Canadian Experience
  • January 23 – PEDv confirmed in Ontario
  • February – CFIA announces PCR positive feed
    • Positive bioassay with U.S. origin porcine blood plasma
    • Negative feed bioassay
  • Has since spread to multiple farms in Ontario and one each in Quebec, Manitoba, and PEI
what we ve learned
What We’ve Learned
  • Although similar to TGE, PEDv is a different bug
    • More active in warmer environments
    • More difficult to control in a sow herd
    • Clinical picture can be more severe
    • Apparently no cross protection with TGE or PRCV
    • Huge amounts of virus are present
  • Holes in our defense layers – obviously exist but hard to identify
    • Biosecurity at all levels should be evaluated
    • Particular emphasis on transport, packing plants
what we ve learned1
What We’ve Learned
  • VDLs responded quickly but challenges with ability to communicate effectively
    • Tools exist today to facilitate this communication
      • FAZD has done an excellent job working with industry to facilitate the transfer of information
    • VDLs and NAHLN have stepped up to try to provide weekly data on new cases but…
      • Without PINs the data is suspect
      • Current mechanism is too labor intensive and archaic
what we ve learned2
What We’ve Learned
  • The use and ability to capture PINs would significantly improve data sharing
  • Challenges exist with defining roles government and industry with transboundary diseases
  • We are seeing “rebreaks” in 30 – 40% of herds
  • Swine Deltacoronavirus introduction???
swine deltacoronavirus
Swine Deltacoronavirus
  • Clinically looks like TGE/PED but tests negative
    • Differential PCR available
  • 1st seen in Hong Kong in 2012
  • Identified in Ohio in February
  • Identified in Canada in March
  • Dr. Matt Ackerman – Swine Vet Services
  • Dr. Rodger Main – ISU VDL
  • Dr. Brian McCluskey – USDA CEAH