WMD Counterproliferation & CB Initiatives

1. WMD Counterproliferation & CB Initiatives COL Jim De Paz Strategic Plans & Policy, J-5 Nuclear & Counterproliferation Division

2. Joint Staff Organization J-3 Operations J-5 Strategic Plans & Policy Nuclear & Counterproliferation Division J-34 Combating Terrorism • LTC Perry Williams • COL Jim De Paz • MAJ(P) Mike Bolluyt • CPT Sean Kirschner J-8 Force Structure, Resources & Assessment Weapons Technology Control Division Wargaming, Simulation and Analysis • LTC Don Bailey • MAJ(P) Dave Wilcox

3. Agenda • Counterproliferation Strategy (Ends, Ways, Means) • Counterproliferation Core Capabilities (Pillars) • Current Guidance • Counterproliferation & Chemical-Biological Initiatives • Decontamination Policy • Restoration of Operation (RestOps) ACTD • Sea Port CB Vulnerability Study

4. Counterproliferation “The activities of DOD across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation of WMD, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection & analyses, with particular responsibility for ensuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with WMD or missiles.” - DOD Directive 2060.2, 9 July 1996, “Department of Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation”

5. ENDSDOD Counterproliferation Goals • CP efforts integrated and focused to: • Preventproliferation of NBC weapons & means of delivery • Stop and Roll back proliferation where it has occurred • Deter & prevent use of NBC weapons against the US, its allies, and US & allied forces • Prepare US military forces, planning, doctrine & training to operate effectively against the threats posed by NBC weapons & means of delivery • Manage the consequences and mitigate damage resulting from use of NBC materials or weapons - DOD Directive 2060.2, 9 July 1996, “Department of Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation”

6. WAYS Key Counterproliferation Tasks • Support US Government nonproliferation efforts • Detect & monitor efforts to proliferate NBC weapons & means of delivery • Deter & preventthe proliferation & use of NBC weapons & means of delivery • Interdictefforts to proliferate or use NBC weapons & means of delivery • Defendthe US, its interests, forces, allies & friends from the use & effects of NBC weapons & means of delivery • Respond to use of NBC weapons using the full range of military capabilities - DOD Directive 2060.2, 9 July 1996, “Department of Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation”

7. MEANS Military Forces, Resources, and Supplies • Conventional Military Forces - • AF:Strategic attack, air interdiction, offensive and defensive counterair • Navy/MC:Maritime and air interdiction, land attack/interdiction, defensive counterair, TMD • Army/MC:Counterfire, TMD, deep attack/interdiction, NBC recon/detection/decontamination • Nuclear forces - Significant deterrent; part of comprehensive response consideration • Special Operations Forces - flexibility of providing support across the operational spectrum. Organized into 4 mutually supporting core capabilities

8. Core Capabilities • Counterforce:Operations that divert, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary’s capability to develop, manufacture, stockpile or employ WMD before it can be used. • Active Defense:Measures taken to detect, divert, or destroy enemy WMD and delivery means while enroute to their target • Passive Defense: Actions taken to protect US, allied, and coalition forces against WMD effects, including measures to detect and identify NBC agents, individual and collective protection equipment, NBC medical response, vaccines for BW defense, NBC decontamination capabilities, doctrine, and training. • Consequence Management: DOD activities across the spectrum of conflict, in support of the US Government lead federal agency, that comprise essential services and activities required to manage or mitigate damages or other consequences or problems resulting from the employment of WMD.

9. STOP/ROLL BACK MEANS WAYS CP Strategy PDD 13 NSS / NMS DOD CP POLICY CPG CJCSI 5113.02 CONPLAN 0400 ENDS PREVENT PROTECT PROLIFERATION PREVENTION COUNTER WMD EMPLOYMENT C O N S E Q U E N C E M A N A G E M E N T DEFENSE PASS I VE D E F E N S E C F O O U R N C T E E R ACTIVE DETECT DISSUADE DENY INTERDICT DESTROY DEFEND C4ISR / IO / Interoperability/ Readiness / Mobility / Sustainment

10. Current Guidance • To ensure the institutionalization of CP throughout the military services and the combatant commands. • To provide CINCs, Component Commanders & JTF Commanders guidance to support accomplishment of CP tasks. Strategic planning guidance Theater guidance Operational & tactical tasks Strategy and policy CP Charter How to Accomplish CP Tasks at Operational Level of War CP Strategy JP 3-01 JP 3-05 JP 3-07 JP 3-11 JP 3-12 CONPLAN 0400 UJTL Doctrinal gap JP 3-40 NMS JV2010/ JV2020 JSCP QDR JPD DPG TEP

11. Current Initiatives

12. Decontamination Policy • Lack of adequate policy may impact TPFDD flow by limiting transit through APODs/SPODs • Objective is to develop DoD, national, and international policies for strategic lift assets • Operations in theater and between theaters • Returning to CONUS • Development of interim chemical exposure policy in 1999 did no address the full requirement • Policy used lack of indications on existing military chemical detectors as guidance to state “all clear” for military personnel • Acceptable risk assumed by civilian crews and civil authorities is lower than military personnel engaged in operations

13. Decontamination Policy • OSD-sponsored Low Level Working Group formed to develop chemical exposure data to support policy between FY02-07 (possibly beyond POM) • J5 Nuc&CP sponsoring an interim decon policy, using existing peacetime chemical agent safety standards employed by Army • Addresses DOD policy but not national or international policy development • Requires specialists and high tech equipment to execute (above and beyond military standards) • Policy is currently undergoing preliminary staffing; expected final staffing and approval by Sep 01

14. Restoration of Operations ACTD • What is RestOps? • Exercise technology and CONOPS in CB environment with the objective restoring combat operations • DTRA - PACOM - PACAF • Osan AFB, ROK • Residuals • Effective use of CB technologies • Improved CONOPS • Improved ability of fixed sites to restore combat operations • Estimated $57M (FY00-FY04)

15. RestOps Potential Benefits • Improved site response to CBW threat/attack • Integrated sensor/early warning network • Better decontamination capability • Improved medical response • Better understanding of operational impact of CB • Quicker recovery of site operating tempo • Sortie generation • Throughput of personnel/equipment

16. RestOps Milestones/Metrics • FY01: Complete Joint Chemical Field Trials and technology assessments. Develop and conduct the Baselining Exercise. Refine methodology for operational capability assessment and plan for technology transition. Measure and establish the baseline for performance degradation of operations. • FY02: Conduct preliminary Demonstrations. Achieve improved Restoration of Operation from the baseline measured during the baseline exercise. • FY03: Final Demonstrations and military assessments. Achieve greater improvement of Restoration of Operations from the baseline and preliminary demonstration.

17. Sea Port CB Vulnerability Study • JROC tasked DTRA to addresses CENTCOM and TRANSCOM concerns (Jan 01) regarding port CB defense shortfalls • TRANSCOM requested key SPOD/SPOE CB protection data (CONOPS; CB defense plans) • CENTCOM requested transportable CB package and CONOPS that would support TPFDD flow into the SPODs/APODs of a CB contaminated theater

18. Sea Port CB Assessment • Three types of ports selected for CB Assessment (Ammo, POL, General) • Six SPOD locations selected based on CINC recommendations: • Ammo: Sunny Port, NC & Tengan Pier, Okinawa • POL: Mina Al Jubayl, SA & Payas, Turkey • General: Pusan, ROK & Ash Shuayba, Kuwait • Port assessments by DTRA/JSIVA team began in Jan 01 and expected to be completed by Dec 01 • Estimated cost $1.3M

19. Assessment Focus Areas • Preparation and readiness for CB event • Command and Control • Facility support / infrastructure • Utilities (power, water, sewer) • Shelter construction and airflow / filtration • Communication architecture, to include alert warning • Port Operations • Cargo handling, traffic flow, berthing, fueling, staging • Workforce characteristics & capabilities in CB environment

20. Deliverables from DTRA • Develop a prototype CB defense CONOPS for seaports • Conduct six vulnerability assessments and provide site-specific port CB defense plans • Develop generic port CB defense plan templates for three ports • Define contents of transportable “fly away” CB package and evaluate effectiveness in exercise

21. Questions?