A Resurgent Russia?

1. A Resurgent Russia?

2. 7th largest economy (before the crisis) • 1/3 or more of global natural resources • A nuclear superpower • A space superpower • A permanent member of UNSC • A member of G8 • A key international actor across Eurasia (involved in more international organizations and projects than any other state except US)

3. Comprehensive national power (CNP) • (Social Sciences Center, Beijing, 2006): • United States 90.62 • Britain 65.04 • Russia 63.03 • France 62.00 • Germany 61.93 • China 59.10 • Japan 57.84 • Canada 57.09 • South Korea 53.20 • India 50.43

4. "Russia is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks." • Attributed to Talleyrand, Metternich, and Churchill • Putin, May 2002: • "Russia has never been as strong as it has wanted to be and never as weak as it is thought to be."

5. Pierre Morelle, EU Special Rep to Central Asia: • “I am struck by the contrast between our interdependence and the problems in our relations which remain unresolved. It is a contrast between practical cooperation and psychological confrontation. Ties between the two worlds are strengthening on a scale which was unthinkable in the past – and yet psychological tensions remain. Even though experience implies that it is better to learn together – and even if we experience disappointments, we will achieve a lot if we move forward working together.” • Март 2008 :: Пьер Морель.По одну сторону стола. • http://sr.fondedin.ru/new/admin/print.php?id=1206353430&archive=1206354399

6. Why this psychological confrontation • No one in 1999 expected that Russia would experience this turn of fortunes • And no one expected that the West would be confronting such a formidable array of challenges as today without ready solutions to deal with them • So, on the Western side, there is discomfort and unease about Russia’s resurgence • And a desire to find ways to delegitimize it (“Russia is not playing by the rules”)

7. In Russia, there was a recovery of self-confidence • And a a belief that while being a Western client was bad for Russia, putting Russia’s own interests first and driving hard bargains with the Westdoes bring results • But also: like winning huge in a lottery and scrambling to find ways to spend the money • Assertiveness mixed with insecurity, a fear that this moment is fleeting, that things may change for the worse very quickly

8. Part of Western unease about Russia’s resurgence is that it was happening amid signs of relative decline of the West • It can be too easily pictured as a zero-sum game • But it is anything but a zero-sum game – as the current economic crisis demonstrates • Tremendous exaggeration of: • The degree of differences between interests • And of the ability to succeed without cooperation from the other side • Russia cannot, and does not plan to, thrive on Western troubles • Neither can the West hope to gain by undercutting Russia’s resurgence • Win-win is possible – but both sides do need new thinking

9. Western concerns • Russia is authoritarian again • A revival of Russian imperialism • Russia is using resources as leverage in foreign policy • Conclusion: • A containment of Russia is necessary • NATO is a natural instrument for this • It’s a new Cold War

10. Russian concerns • The West wants to undermine the current regime – that is, stability • The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s influence • The West wants to control Russia – in particular, to grab Russia’s resources • The West is not playing fair • NATO continues to expand, despite Russian objections – or even because of Russian objections • Conclusion: Russia needs to be strong and vigilant. Prepare for confrontations with the West

11. Both sets of concerns do reflect some realities • On both sides, there are forces – neocons, siloviki – which see the world through the prism of zero-sum games • And they feed on each other • And there are vested interests feeding this Manichean view • And there is the organizing power of simplistic, binary thinking – Us vs. Them • Ironically, both believe in American omnipotence • Perhaps, this is the cardinal flaw

12. But, apart from the logic of zero-sum thinking, the accumulating Western and Russian mutual concerns are a fact of life – • And they stem from the fact that important changes have taken place, while thinking and policies on both sides have not caught up with these changes • But we are much better equipped today to develop new security concepts and new international policies through joint efforts - dialog, negotiations between Russia and the West, Russia and NATO

13. So, let us discuss both sets of concerns to see where they are coming from – and what follows from them • 1. Russia is authoritarian again • Yes, 20 years after Gorby persuaded the CP to hold competitive elections… • Is it a matter of concern? Of course • Has a communist system been restored? • Do Russians feel unfree? • What are the exact parametres of Putin’s authoritarianism? • Why has the auth. regression taken place? • How far can it go? • What can be expected in the coming years? • What should the West do?

14. 2. Revival of Russian imperialism • What exactly is Russia doing? • Russia’s military power – traditionally, a key element of Russia’s power • Contrast w. USSR and the preceding Romanov Empire • Defence spending, 2006 (SIPRI) • $35 bln (1.7% of GDP, USSR – 25%) • Canada – 1.1% of GDP • US - $580 bln (16 times more than Russia, 4.4% of GDP)

15. NATO – Russia military balance • Total armed forces personnel 3:1 • Military aircraft 10:1 • Tanks 3:1 • Artillery 2:1 • Naval ships 2:1 • Submarines 3:1 • Aircraft carriers 19:1 • How real is this picture? • Partly • And - Russia’s rebuilding its military • Questions about Russian military power

16. How is Russia maintaining its influence in Eurasia? • The post-Soviet space is characterized by a growing tendency of all states in the area to assert their national interests, as they are perceived by the ruling elites – and to form partnerships and associations with other states based on these perceptions. • The post-Soviet space remains largely open for wider international cooperation. The defining pattern of international politics in the area is not centralized control exercised from Moscow, but rather a set of complex multiplayer games in which Russia is only one of the players. Its dominant role in CSTO and EurAsEC is limited by the ability of most other members to pursue multivector foreign policies, and its influence in SCO is shared with China, which provides the other members with considerable room for maneouver.

17. Russia’s interests were not well served by some of the methods employed by Moscow and mistakes it has made in its newly assertive policy in the post-Soviet space, which have generated anti-Russian trends in the politics of several neighbouring countries, Georgia being the prime example. • But it seems that no matter how exactly Russia would have tried to reassert its interests in the area, intensification of geopolitical competition was inevitable. In that competition, Russia’s main assets are security, economic and cultural ties with post-Soviet states.

18. The Network Principle • The Russians are discovering that what works for Russia is networking • Not hegemony, not building imperial hierarchies • But networking • Based on pragmatic pursuit and matching of national interests • In the growing network of Russia’s ties with the world, the west is only one segment, even if the most important

19. Business expansion is top priority for the Kremlin • Russian business is trying to expand into every market available • And the post-Soviet space is a natural market for it • Europe, North America? Complaints about obstacles being put in the way • Moscow has tried to limit freedom of operations for foreign multinational corporations inside Russia and in the post-Soviet space – with limited success • From time to time, Moscow tries to pressure some neighbouring countries – again, with minimal success • Withdrawing subsidies – a sign of failure of hegemony

20. Sphere of influence? Does Moscow have a right to express concerns about events and especially government decisions in neighbouring countries? • Imagine Canada joining CSTO and agreeing to let Russia build BMD radars and missiles on its territory • Imagine US reaction • Imagine Ottawa saying: We are a sovereign nation, you cannot dictate to us how we assure our security • Oh, but this is America – and that is Russia. • We cannot tell the Russians that their security concerns are less legitimate than American

21. 3. Energy security • Definitely, the current trends are working in favour of Russia, as well as other energy suppliers – and they do undermine Western economies – as well as China’s and Japan’s • A bit of zero-sum game, supply-demand, market logic • Role of the Russian state – typical of energy markets today • Issue: not whether energy trade is “politicized” (because it always is) – but what specific policies are pursued • Boils down to the question of whether Russia is a mere gas station or a sovereign country where the national government must have a say in how its natural resources should be used • NATO expansion vs. gas supply? • Yes, as a final argument • But let us not allow events to get to this stage

22. Now to the Russian concerns

23. 1. The West is undermining stability in Russia • Oh, really? • Western support of Putin has been one of the major causes of his success – the West has helped the rise of Putin and shares responsibility for Putinism • Western critique of Russia’s retreat from democracy is fully justified – not just as a prudent policy, but also as maintenance of international legal regime re human rights • No real interference or pressure • And it’s not just the West, but Russian democrats, too • Russian leaders should admit that it has compromised a number of key norms of democratic governance, for whatever reason – and they should commit themselves to restoring these norms, because Russian democracy is needed by the Russians themselves • And don’t get paranoid – it’s no longer the Cold War

24. 2. The West wants to prevent the rise of Russia’s influence • Partly true, but is there such a united policy of the West? • No – not yet, at least • The overall attitude remains ambivalent • Different countries have different attitudes • Some are traditionally wary of Russia, others not • There is both competition and cooperation • If EU is looking for ways to reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies, it’s not an anti-Russian policy, it’s good business practice • We cannot abolish competition • But we can regulate it together to prevent it from threatening everyone’s security • And we should be able to expand our cooperation • Does the West need a strong Russia? • Of course!

25. 3. The West wants to grab Russia’s natural resources Russia needs to sell It is a matter of deals And of regimes Current Western policy is, indeed, aimed at achieving maximum market freedom And yes, the West would like to have unimpeded access to resources in Russia and elsewhere So would China and India – every country that relies on imports of raw materials, energy, etc. But is such unimpeded access a realistic goal? Sovereign states will continue to assert their rights Western policy is evolving, pragmatic International energy security is a key interest for everyone – and appropriate regimes need to be created collectively

26. 4. NATO enlargement Takes place based on shared interests Provides security An organization of democracies Russia has opposed it from day one NATO has heeded some of Russia’s concerns But perhaps not enough And perhaps enlargement has acquired an inertia which has generated unnecessary tensions And we can certainly start a new dialog about it Let’s discuss our mutual concerns Let us create a NATO-Russia audit panel to examine the relationship

27. Russia-West • Obsolete assumptions • What is “the West”? • Is Russia needed to give “the West” coherence? • But will Western interests be served by treating Russia as a rogue state? • Need to rethink – but only together • The West needs self-critique, not smugness • The West is confronted with huge problems • The global center of economic gravity is shifting from Atlantic to Pacific – and the West cannot do anything about it • What is Western unity? • Against whom? • For whom? • Mobilizing the West against the Rest is lunacy

28. Russia won’t be drawn into an anti-Moslem alliance • It won’t be drawn into an anti-China alliance • And it won’t be drawn into an anti-Western alliance • Russia wants to retain maximum freedom of action – • But what is that maximum? • International constraints are very tight even for the US

29. Current tensions between Russia and the West • Partly – a natural process of sorting out interests • Do we need to introduce elements of military power in this process? • It’s like putting your gun on the table when you’re discussing a business deal • The other side will do likewise… • It creates an unhelpful atmosphere • So, let’s keep competing and keep talking • But let’s not turn it into preparations for war • It won’t be like Iraq or Afghanistan • No one is winning in those wars – but at least the rest of the world is alive • A war between NATO and Russia will be humanity’s last war in the sense that there will be no humanity left after it • Mutual interests – mutual vulnerabilities in all spheres

30. 4 modes of relationships: • Integration • Cooperation • Competition • Conflict

31. In the 1990s, the West’s influence was growing both inside Russia and around it. • The result: growing opposition to Western pressures and interference • In the 2000s, Russia has been trying to become more independent • A tough, “realist” approach to IR • The world as an increasingly anarchic place, disorder is growing, every one has to guard their interests • But at the same time, Russia has become more deeply integrated with the West than ever before • On both sides, the rise of concerns and frictions reflects the fact of that deepening of integration • A divorce is not an option

32. The dominant trends • No desire to confront the West • Recognition of Western concerns • Relations with the West are top priority • But also: • Primacy of national interests, emphasis on independence • Multivector foreign policy • Pragmatism • Emphasis on business • Readiness for dialog, for development of joint solutions to problems

33. Western countries, including Canada, do andwillinfluence the ongoing debates in Moscow one way or another – • By their own actions, or inactions • Both individually and collectively • A key factor in these debates – assessing the state of the world • How is it perceived by Russian policy-makers, interest groups, public opinion? • There is no aspect of world politics or the world economy which would not affect Russia in one way or another

34. If the idea of containment of Russia gains ground, it is unlikely to result in a more cooperative, more pro-Western Russia • Quite the contrary outcome can be expected • Anti-Western elites in Russia are strong and active • Let us not push Russia toward totalitarian mobilization • Antagonizing Russia won’t solve any of Western problems • It will only create new ones • The world cannot afford zero-sum games between the West and Russia - • Because the two sides are too well-armed, and their arsenals remain trained primarily on each other • And there is no good reason why Russia and the West should be in confrontation - • Because mutual interests between Russia and the West far outweigh any differences and considerations of competition

35. We have to accept the fact that the world is confronted with a formidable range of challenges which we do not know how to deal with • We are mired in obsolete thinking • We are only pretending that we are dealing with the problems

36. Global disorder is surging • New role for the state is inevitable • Retreat of the state is over • Does it mean a retreat from democracy and the rise of new authoritarianism? • Not necessarily. In the 20th century, democracy was saved by the policies of a democratically activist state • Does it mean more competition? • Not necessarily. In 1648, proclamation of national sovereignty was viewed as salvation from war and chaos

37. New forms of cooperation between states are necessary • Our capability for collective action is too limited • Neither Russia, nor the West are interested in fostering global disorder • Perhaps, we are coming to the real end of the Cold War

38. Terms of the deal • Priority of cooperation over competition • Construction of a new world order • Mutual security • Which means taking each other’s interests and concerns into account • No hegemony • No ideological wars • Competition by the rules • Primacy of international law

39. Huge agenda for joint actions • Arms control and disarmament – prospects for NPT, START, SORT, INF, CFE? • Struggle against international terrorism • Energy policy • Climate change • The food crisis • The unfolding water crisis • The crisis of democracy, human rights under attack