Intelligence and Security Informatics: An Information Economics Perspective. Lihui Lin, Xianjun Geng, Andrew B. Whinston School of Management, Boston University Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, University of Texas June 3, Tucson. Agenda.
Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.
Lihui Lin, Xianjun Geng, Andrew B. Whinston
School of Management, Boston University
Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, University of Texas
June 3, Tucson
One particular model, signal or signal jamming, is used to deal with one problem.
Senders of information may have different characteristics, but are homogeneous in their incentives and information structure.
Intelligence and Security Informatics:
Must determine the correct model to use: signaling or signal-jamming; signals or noise.
Senders of information not only differ in characteristics, but are also heterogeneous in their incentives and information structure, which means one type of model cannot fully describe the problem.ISI: Unprecedented Complexities
Fully aligned with receiver
Between fully aligned and fully opposing
(by the sender)Related Theories
Geng, Lin and Whinston (2003):
a sender-receiver framework for knowledge transfer