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The Role of the IAEA Safeguards Inspector

The Role of the IAEA Safeguards Inspector. ORNL Global Nuclear Security Technology Division Nuclear Nonproliferation Summer Seminar Series. Brian D. Boyer Nonproliferation Team Leader/ Project Leader International Safeguards Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Nonproliferation Division

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The Role of the IAEA Safeguards Inspector

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  1. The Role of the IAEA Safeguards Inspector ORNL Global Nuclear Security Technology Division Nuclear Nonproliferation Summer Seminar Series Brian D. Boyer Nonproliferation Team Leader/ Project Leader International Safeguards Los Alamos National Laboratory Nuclear Nonproliferation Division July 21 2009

  2. Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) • Negotiations Concluded in 1968 • Entered into Force in 1970 • 189 States Including 5 Declared Nuclear Weapon States (USA, Russia, U.K., France, China) plus Taiwan (China) • DPRK signed but withdrew • INFCIRC/153 agreements / Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) • Trust but verify!

  3. INFCIRC 153 (Corr.) Para. 28: The Safeguards Technical Objective The Key Goal of the Safeguards Inspector Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) “Traditional Safeguards” INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) Para. 28: The Safeguards Technical Objective … the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materialfrom peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection… The Inspector is the person in charge on making this happen: • Timeliness • Significant Quantities • Deterrence by Risk of Early Detection 3

  4. Flughafen Wien- VIE The Safeguards Inspector’s Future Home Away From Home Personal Data….139 days spent here in 5 years for duty travel The Inspector’s Journey - Day One ARRIVAL IN VIENNA Flughafen Wien (June 2006)

  5. IAEA Headquarters-ViennaLearning the Ropes of the Agency and Wien

  6. ICAS - Introductory Course on Agency Safeguards 39th ICAS (Spring 1997) - Rear- Araujo (Brazil), Yanez Carrera (Cuba), Derrough (France), Ayers (USA), Ajjeh (Jordan), Pellechi (USA) Front - Alexandrian (Armenia), Tsvetkov (Belarus), Boyer (USA), Ochiai (Japan)

  7. 1. Introduction to IAEA Safeguards 2. Nuclear Material Accountancy 3. Inspections of Item Facilities 4. Inspection Documentation Package 5. Containment and Surveillance 6. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) 7. Inspections of Bulk-Handling Facilities 8. Administrative Matters FIELD EXERCISE - Comprehensive Inspection Exercise Training – CIET Since 1997 The Additional Protocol – INFCIRC/540 (Corr.) ICAS Provides the Inspector His RolesRoles for the Novice SG Inspector } The Accountant Inspector The Investigative Inspector }

  8. Introduction to IAEA Safeguards • The safeguards system • Significant Quantity • Timeliness • Material Goals • Safeguards approaches • Safeguards criteria • Inspector activities • Initial inspection • Ad Hoc inspection • Routine inspection • Special inspection • Legal aspects • Strengthened Safeguards System SAFEGUARDS APPROACH FOR LWR

  9. “Material and Timeliness Goals” Guidance to IAEA Graded Safeguards Material Goals Probability of Detection Timeliness Goals

  10. Nuclear Material Accountancy • Concepts of accountancy • Declarations – basis of everything • The principle of independent verification • Started as a marriage of principles and practices borrowed from • Property accounting • Statistical quality control • Financial accounts auditing • Code 10 Reporting - drudgery • PIL = Physical Inventory Listing • ICR = Inventory Change Report • MBR = Material Balance Report The Inspector Doing his Accountancy Karl-Heinz Czock In memoriam to a good friend d. 27.09.2008

  11. Inspections of Item Facilities • Reactors – inspectors spend lots of time at reactors • Light Water Reactors (LWRs) • PWR, BWR, VVER • On-Load Reactors (OLRs) • CANDU • RBMK (Ignalina, Chernobyl) • Other Types of Reactors • Fast Breeder • PBMR • GEN IV concepts • Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies (RRCAs) • Storage facilities – Spent Fuel storage (AFRS) LWR Spent Fuel Safeguards Boyer (SGOC) and Akilimali (SGOA) at CLAB (Sweden)-ICVD Training 1999 LWR Fresh Fuel – Item Form

  12. Inspection Documentation Package • The IDP – documentation • Details! • Verification methods • PIL, ICR, MBR – declarations must be verified • CIR - Computerized Inspection Report • The Logsheet • Statement on Inspection Results - 90a Statement • Statement on Conclusions - 90b Statement • Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) • Statistics • MUF = PB + R – S – PE • Random sampling concepts The Inspector Doing Verification Statistical Sampling of FF Population

  13. Containment and SurveillanceComplementary Measures to MC&A • Maintain “Continuity of Knowledge” (CoK) • Use Containment • Use Surveillance

  14. Non Destructive Assay (NDA) • Agency must verify State’s declaration • NDA - Means of material verification • Radiation signals • Gamma Rays • Neutrons • Materials of interest • U • Pu • Sampling plans – Random basis with Detection Probability • Random Low (RL) = 20% • Random Medium (RM) = 50% • Random High (RH) = 90% • Three levels of defects to detect: • Gross defect • Partial defect • Bias defect Gamma Rays Ge detector (U or Pu) Neutrons HLNC (Pu)

  15. Inspections of Bulk Handling Facilities • Bulk Handling Facilities – Categories • Natural and LEU Conversion and Fuel Fab Plants • Fabrication Plants Handling Direct-Use Material • Reprocessing Plants • Enrichment Plants • Material in bulk • More challenging inspection regime • More effort for IAEA • MUF = PB + R – S – PE ≠ 0 Gamma Ray Measurement of UF6 Cylinder UF6 – Bulk Form

  16. Administrative Matters • Travel • Designation for country • Laissez-Passer • Visas • Travel procedures • Occupational health and safety • Radiation worker qualification and rad limits • Medical certificate – needed for travel • Physicals • Whole Body Counting • Urinalysis – for radiation exposure • Dosimetry • Security of safeguards information SGOA Director – D. Perricos (Greece) SGOB Director – D. Schriefer (Germany) 39th ICAS Being Briefed by Directors on… The Life of an Inspector – May 1997

  17. Key to Transparency and TrustSafeguards Confidential = Protection of Information • What Needs to be Protected? • Design of a nuclear facility • Nuclear material information • Quantity • Location • Composition • Movement of nuclear material • Safeguards approach or goals for a specific facility • Results of a specific inspection

  18. Comprehensive Inspection Exercise Training 39th ICAS- June, 1997 - Loviisa, Finland - Twin VVER440 reactors Exercise - Practice LWR Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)

  19. Strengthened Safeguards SystemPost 1991 Gulf War – SSS Inspection Role THE UPDATED OBJECTIVES “the safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and that there is no undeclared nuclear material and activities (BOG, March 1995)” • Consequences • Additional Protocol / Complementary Access • Emphasis on information based safeguards • Increased transparency measures • The Investigative Inspector The Investigative Inspector

  20. The Inspector’s Key RoleAccess to Facilities – Travel and Inspections • Interim Inspections • Physical Inventory Verification • Design Information Verification • Random Inspections • LFUA • ELFUA • SNRI • AP Complementary Access • Special Inspections

  21. IAEA Dept. of Safeguards Operational Divisions (Circa 1997) – Inspection Destinations Toronto (SGOB) Vienna (HQ) Tokyo (SGOA)

  22. Roles - IAEA Country Officer / Facility Officer B. Boyer Country Officer 2001- Poland B. Boyer – SGOC1.2 Country Officer Facility Officer for all Polish Facilities Additional Protocol Activities State Level Issues of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

  23. Personal Note: The Inspector’s Trail’s End Last Inspection December 2001 89 trips - 469 days in the field Co-ordinated 38 inspections Received 5.99 mSv radiation dose Approximately twice one year’s background Received a lifetime of education FRANCE – Last Inspection Cape La Hague Next Stop BNL Dec 2001

  24. Auf Wiedersehen - February 2002The Inspector – Int’l Civil Servant/Diplomat IAEA HQ - Vienna (Feb 2002) The best word to know in all languages: Danke, Dziękuję, Hvala, СПАСИБА, Merci, Dêkuji, Köszi, Dekui, Multumesc, Dank U, Kiitos, Grazie, Gracias, Blagodarya, Dakujem Thanks!

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