1 / 35

CHINA’S EMERGING SUPER POWER STATUS - IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

“But China obscures” you say. I reply. “China obscures but there is clearness to be found; look for it” Pascal, Pensees. CHINA’S EMERGING SUPER POWER STATUS - IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA. INTRODUCTION INDIA AND CHINA. INDIANS DO NOT HAVE A STRATEGIC CULTURE AND DO NOT THINK STRATEGICALLY.

juniper-octavio
Download Presentation

CHINA’S EMERGING SUPER POWER STATUS - IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. “But China obscures” you say. I reply. “China obscures but there is clearness to be found; look for it” Pascal, Pensees

  2. CHINA’S EMERGING SUPER POWER STATUS - IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

  3. INTRODUCTION INDIA AND CHINA

  4. INDIANS DO NOT HAVE A STRATEGIC CULTURE AND DO NOT THINK STRATEGICALLY. REPORT BY RAND CORPORATION (1996)

  5. THEHYPOTHESIS “China will emerge as a super power by 2015 AD and if so, what are implications for India and how to meet this Challenge”

  6. AIM TO EXAMINE EXACT STATUS OF CHINA AS A SUPER POWER BY 2015 AD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND ARRIVE AT A SUITABLE STRATEGIC RESPONSE

  7. SCOPE PART 1 - CHINA, A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE PART 2 - CHINA AND THE WORLD PART 3 - SINO INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE PART 4 - VAIDATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS PART 5 - INDIA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE CONCLUSION

  8. PART 1 - CHINA , A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE BIRTH OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

  9. “THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE STOODUP. THEY WILL NEVER BE HUMILIATED.”MAO ZEDONG

  10. CHINESE PERSPECTIVEON NATIONAL SECURITY • CHINESE SENSE OF IMPERMANENSE • GONG (ASSENT) • SHOU (DECLINE) 2. RELATIONSHIPS

  11. 3. COMPREHENSIVENESS. • BAOGUO (PRESERVE THE STATE). • BAOZHANG (PRESERVE THE RACE). • BAOJIAO (PRESERVE CIVILISATION). • BAOMIN (PRESERVE THE PEOPLE). 4. DETERMINISM. 5. STRONG STATE AND STRONG NATION.

  12. GEOSTRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

  13. ASSETS 1.LARGE LAND MASS. 2. VAST MANPOWER. 3. NATURAL RESOURCES. 4. PENINSULAR PROJECTION IN EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEA. 5. NATURAL BARRIERS. CHINESE CRESCENT OF INFLUENCE

  14. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

  15. FOUR POINT MODERNISATION PROGRAMME • INDUSTRY • SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY • DEFENCE FORCES • AGRICULTURE

  16. SEVEN LARGEST ECONOMIES BY 2010 AD USA - $ 7, 859 b JAPAN - $ 3, 714 b CHINA - $ 3, 791 b GERMANY - $ 1,525 b FRANCE - $ 1,410 b INDIA - $ 1, 330 b UK - $ 949 b

  17. DEFENCE FORCES - FORCE COMPARISON USARUSSIAJAPANCHINAINDIA TROOPS 1.37 m 1.00 m .23 m 2.48 m 1.1 m MBT 7684 15500 1080 8300 3414 APC 17800 10062 840 5500 1500 ARTY 5699 6299 770 14500 4175 SUBMARINES 76 70 16 71 16 AC CARRIERS 12 1 - - 1 AC 4994 1800 330 4041 774 ICBM/SLBM 1165 1363 - 450 - (DS)

  18. PLA MODERNISATION PROGRAMME • DOWN SIZING. • NEW EQUIPMENT. • SU 30 FLANKERS AND SU 27 AC. • SU 27 CARRIER BORNE AC. • XIA CLASS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE WITH SLBMs. • AC CARRIER.

  19. CHINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

  20. PART 2 - CHINA AND THE WORLD • OVERVIEW. • SINO – US RELATIONS. • SINO – RUSSIA RELATIONS. • RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN UNION. • TAIWAN FACTOR • CHINA PAK NEXUS. • RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. • COMMENTS.

  21. PART 3 - SINO INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE • CHINA’S PERCEPTION OF INDIA. • IMPLICATION ON INDIA’S SECURITY. • FUTURE RELATIONS. • THE STRATEGIC DIVIDE

  22. PART 4 - VALIDATION OF HYPOTHESIS

  23. CHINESE INTENTIONS SHORT TERM AIMS • CONSOLIDATE THE NATION STATE. • ENSURE UNHINDERED ECONOMIC PROGRESS. • CREATE A SUPPORT BASE IN COMITY OF NATIONS. • STRIVE FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHOLOGICAL PARITY. • IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS.

  24. LONG TERM AIMS • ACHIEVE PARITY WITH USA. • CONTROL WORLD AND ASIAN AFFAIRS. • RESOLVE BORDER DISPUTES. • ENSURE CULTURAL, ETHNIC AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

  25. AIMS AGAINST INDIA • ENSURE ENCIRCLEMENT. • FORCE PARITY BY PAKISTAN. • BENIGN FRONT. • PREVENT INDIA’S NUCLEAR POWER STATUS. • COLLUSIVE SUPPORT FROM INDIA’S NEIGHBOURS. • LIMITED TO FULL SCALE WAR.

  26. CHINESE CAPABILITIES • ECONOMY. • TECHNOLOGY. • DEFENCE FORCES.

  27. VALIDATION OF HYPOTHESIS

  28. “ It is only a matter of Time” Paul Kennedy (Rise and Fall of Great Powers)

  29. PART 5 - INDIA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE • A GEOGRAPHICAL DISADVANTAGE. • STRATEGIC ENCIRCLEMENT.

  30. STRATEGIC RESPONSE • NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DETERRENT. • CONVENTIONAL FORCE PARITY. • ENHANCE DEFENCE BUDGET. • TRI-SERVICE DOCTRINE. • INDIGENOUS R & D. • DEVELOP ECONOMY. • DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. • IMPROVE INFRASTRUCTURE IN BORDER AREAS

  31. STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT

  32. CONCLUSION

  33. “ A man cannot be too careful, in the choice of his enemies” Oscar Wilde

More Related