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A Computationally Friendly Combinatorial Auction: Why Ask Wochnick When You Can Watch The Clock Tick?. David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science George Mason University October 20, 2014. Costs of Using Combinatorial Auctions. Computation

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a computationally friendly combinatorial auction why ask wochnick when you can watch the clock tick

A Computationally Friendly Combinatorial Auction: Why Ask Wochnick When You Can Watch The Clock Tick?

David Porter, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith

Interdisciplinary Center for Economics Science

George Mason University

October 20, 2014

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

costs of using combinatorial auctions
Costs of Using Combinatorial Auctions
  • Computation
    • Solution Time
  • Complexity
    • Cognitive and Participation Costs
      • Placing Bids
      • Interpreting Results (Transparency)
  • Incentives
    • Strategic Bidding
      • Threshold

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

combinatorial auctions with price information
Combinatorial Auctions with Price Information
  • Determine accepted and rejected bids (Primal)
  • Signals are based on pseudo-dual prices
    • Prices that signal rejection
    • Prices that signal acceptance
    • Ambiguous signals

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

combinatorial auctions with price information1
Combinatorial Auctions with Price Information
  • Trade-offs
    • Computation
      • Still an issue
    • Complexity
      • Prices help guide decisions
      • Prices are not perfectly transparent: still need to ask Wochnick
    • Incentives
      • Experiments
        • Harder (overlaps/synergies)problems have higher efficiencies

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

clock auction
Clock Auction
  • Clock Auctions
    • Eliminate Jump Bidding
    • Simplicity
  • Features
    • Price Posted
    • Demand Registered
    • Prices Increased based on Excess Demand
    • No IDs, etc.

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

combinatorial clock auction
Combinatorial Clock Auction
  • Basic Design Features (1999)
    • Prices per object
    • Submit demand (packed, etc.)
      • Excess Demandi = Number of Participants bidding on i
      • Increase Price until only 0 or 1 for each excess demand
        • Fill by doing full optimization
          • If 1 is reallocated  excess demand

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

combinatorial clock auction1
Combinatorial Clock Auction
  • Tradeoffs
    • Computation
      • No Computation required until end
      • Good Upper bound
      • Dominated bids calculation during rounds
    • Complexity
      • Price information guidance is unambiguous
    • Incentives?

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

experiments with the clock
Experiments with the Clock
  • Environments

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

experiments with the clock1
Experiments with the Clock
  • Environments

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

auction treatments
Auction Treatments
  • Mechanisms
    • SMR
    • Combo Auction (Plott)
    • Clock

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

results
Results

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions

extensions
Extensions
  • Moving the Clocks
  • OR/Eliminate past rounds
    • Dealing with budget constraints
  • Exchange
    • Seller commitment and buy-back

Dave Porter: Clock Auctions