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PLA Modernization: Transformative Military Modernization and Operational Capabilities

Explore the transformative modernization journey of the Chinese Armed Forces over two decades, focusing on pivotal milestones, strategic directions, capability-based assessments, and paradigm shifts. Discover how the PLA is evolving into a force with regional conventional force projection capabilities.

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PLA Modernization: Transformative Military Modernization and Operational Capabilities

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  1. PLA ModernizationForeign Service InstituteNov 2013 DAVE FINKELSTEIN, CNA

  2. POINT 1 THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES ARE DISPLAYING TODAY ARE THE FRUITS OF FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS, PLANS, AND PROGRAMS PUT INTO PLACE TWO DECADES AGO.

  3. 1993: THE WATERSHED YEAR “MILITARY STRATEGIC GUIDELINES FOR THE NEW PERIOD” • PROGRAMMATIC BLUEPRINT FOR LONG-TERM MODERNIZATION OF PLA • CAPABILITIES-BASED & • CONTINGENCYBASED FORMER CCP SECRETARY GENERAL JIANG ZEMIN

  4. CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENT • GALVANIZING IMPACT OF DESERT STORM • ENDS PLA DEBATES ABOUT TECHNOLOGY & REFORM • LESSONS OF KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, CHECHNYA, CYBER ATTACKS ON ESTONIA, GEORGIA • MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS IN 2002 & 2004

  5. BUILD A PLA TO FIGHT THIS KIND OF WAR “LOCAL WARS UNDER MODERN INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS” • LIMITED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES & GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE • SHORT IN DURATION BUT DECISIVE IN OUTCOME • HIGH-INTENSITY OPERATIONS TEMPO • LOGISTICS-INTENSIVE • C4ISR & NEAR-TOTAL BATTLE SPACE AWARENESS • OPERATIONS IN ALL BATTLE SPACE DIMENSIONS • NON-LINEAR OPERATIONS & VULNERABLE REAR AREAS • PRE-EMINANCE OF JOINT SERVICE OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS

  6. CONTINGENCY-BASED ASSESSEMENT TAIWAN AS MSD LITTORAL /MARITIME CONCERNS “MAIN STRATEGIC DIRECTION”

  7. “MAIN STRATEGIC DIRECTION ” & “IMPORTANT STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS” ? PREPARE FOR “LOCAL WAR UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS”

  8. POINT 2 – EVEN WITHOUT TAIWAN…. …THE CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENT WOULD STILL IMPEL THE PLA TO HIGH-TECH CAPABILITIES & FOCUS ON THE MARITIME & AEROSPACE DOMAINS

  9. WHY? • MOST PRESSING CONTIGENCIES ARE MARITIME AND AEROSPACE IN NATURE • IF PLA CAN BUILD A MILITARY FOR THE TAIWAN CONTINGENCY, IT CAN ALSO DEAL WITH OTHERS • “BIG POWER” STATUS • A MILITARY BEFITTING AN EMERGING POWER • “STICK” AS WELL AS “CARROT” • EXPANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS • GLOBAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & SECURITY INTERESTS

  10. PRC DEFENSE WHITE PAPER – APRIL 2013 “It is a strategic task of China's modernization drive as well as a strong guarantee for China's peaceful development to build a strong national defense and powerful armed forces which are commensurate with China's international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests.”

  11. POINT 3 WHAT THE LEADERS OF THE PLA ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IN MILITARY MODERNI- ZATION IS NOTHING SHORT OF TRANS- FORMATIVE RELATIVE TO THE PLA’S PAST.

  12. PARADIGM SHIFTS FOR PLA SU-27 AIRCRAFT PURCHASED FROM RUSSIA • STRATEGICALLYSEEKING TO EXTEND OPERATIONAL REACH EAST OFF THE LITORRAL & BEYOND • ORGANIZATIONALLYGIVING INCREASING EMPHASIS TO NAVY, AIR FORCE, & TECHNICAL BRANCHES • OPERATIONALLY AND DOCTRINALLYTRAINING FOR JOINT, HIGH OPS TEMPO CAMPAIGNS • CONCEPTUALLYLEARNING TO UTILIZE HIGH-TECH ASSETS IN DYNAMIC OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

  13. “THREE PILLARS OF REFORM” • HARDWARE & TECHNOLOGIES • SYSTEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS • OPERATIONAL-LEVEL DOCTRINE

  14. SYSTEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS • COMMISSIONING • PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION • PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT • NCO CORPS • RECRUITMENT • DOWNSIZING • UNIT RESTRUCTURING • NEW C2 RELATIONSHIPS • EQUIPMENT R & D SYSTEM • LOGISTICS • FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

  15. DOCTRINE FOR A NEW TYPE OF CAMPAIGN FROMLONG CAMPAIGNS OF ATTRITIONBASED ON CONCENTRATION OF FORCES (MASS) AGAINST ENEMY’S WEAKEST SECTOR & ASSETS… ….TO ….SHORT “CAMPAIGNS OF PARALYSIS”TO LEVEL THE TECHNOLOGICAL PLAYING FIELD BY CONCENTRATING PLA’S BEST CAPABILITIES AGAINST ENEMY’S MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS.

  16. PARADIGM SHIFT IN OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FROM TO

  17. POINT 4 THE PLA IS NOT YET BUILDING A FORCE FOR SUSTAINED GLOBAL FORCE PROJECTION.

  18. HOWEVER…. IT IS BUILDING A MILITARY FOR REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE PROJECTION IN THE MARITIME & AEROSPACE DOMAINS. 2012 — CHINA COMMISSIONS FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER

  19. POINT 5 MOREOVER, THE PLA IS DEVELOPING SELECTED POCKETS OF CAPACITY THAT HAVE GLOBAL REACH.

  20. STRATEGIC REACH • NUCLEAR FORCES • LIQUID FUELED TO SOLID FUELED • SILO-BASED TO ROAD MOBILE, and SUBMARINES • QUESTIONS ABOUT NUCLEAR DOCTRINE PERSIST • CYBER WARFARE • PRC AS EMERGING WORLD-CLASS CENTER OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY • OPERATIONS IN OUTER SPACE • INCREASING FOOT PRINT IN OUTER SPACE • DEMONSTRATED INTEREST IN COUNTER SPACE

  21. POINT 6 THE PLA IS AT THE INCIPIENT STAGES OF BECOMING AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

  22. 24 DEC 2004: “NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS” “THE PLA IS TRANSFORMING FROM A MILITARY TRADITIONALLY FOCUSED ON THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY TO A MILITARY PREPARED TO DEFEND CHINESE INTERESTS.” Interview with PLA General HU JINTAO BECOMES CMC CHAIRMAN IN 2004

  23. XI JINPING TAKES CMC IN 2012

  24. EXPANDING NATIONAL INTERESTS "WE HAVE BEEN WITNESSING A REMARKABLE SURGE IN ISSUES CONCERNING OVERSEAS RESOURCES, STRATEGIC ROUTES ON THE SEA AND CITIZENS LIVING ABROAD, SO THE ARMED FORCES MUST STRENGTHEN THEIR OVERSEAS OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES TO SAFEGUARD OUR COUNTRY'S OVERSEAS INTERESTS.” MG CHEN ZHOU CHINA DAILY, 17 APRIL 2013

  25. INCIPIENT EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITIES • ANTI-PIRACY OFF HORN OF AFRICA (Since 2008) • HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE & DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS • HOSPITAL SHIP DAISHANDAO (PEACE ARK) • UN PEACEKEEPING & OBSERVER MISSIONS • MOST “BLUE HELMET” TROOPS AMONG P-5 • COMBINED EXERCISES WITH FOREIGN NATIONS • TURKEY OCTOBER 2010 • “QUASI-NEO” IN LIBYA 2011 • 35,860 PRC NATIONALS WERE IN LIBYA • 2012 — FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIER CV 16 LIAONING

  26. POINT 7 – THE PLA REMAINS A “PARTY ARMY”

  27. POINT 8 WHILE THE PLA IS MAKING IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS, IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CERTAIN OR INEVITABLE THAT THE PLA WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ALL OF ITS OBJECTIVES.

  28. INHIBITORS • PLA A VERY LARGE ORGANIZATION • EDUCATION LEVELS • CONSCRIPTS VERSUS PROFESSIONALS • COMPETITION FOR “BEST & BRIGHTEST” • “ONLY SON SOLDIERS” • BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA • NO RECENT COMBAT EXPERIENCE

  29. XI JINPING & THE PLA

  30. AN ACTIVE FIRST SIX MONTHS

  31. XI & PLA: NOVEMBER 2012 – MARCH 2013 • VISITS ALL 5 BRANCHES OF PLA • HQ, PEOPLE’S ARMED POLICE • STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES BRIGADE IN BEIJING MR • SOUTH SEA FLEET • GROUP ARMY IN GUANGZHOU MR • PLA AIR FORCE BASE IN GANSU • LANZHOU MR HQ • JIUQUAN SATELLITE SPACE CENTER (GAD) • PRESIDES OVER EXPANDED CMC SESSION • PROMOTES CMC MEMBER TO FULL GENERAL • SPECIAL UNIT AWARD TO MISSILE UNIT • MEETS WITH ENLISTED PLA DELEGATES TO NPC

  32. XI’S BIG MESSAGE ON DEFENSE “BUILDING A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE AND A POWERFUL ARMED FORCES THAT ARE COMMENSURATE WITH CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL STANDING AND MEET THE NEEDS OF ITS SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS IS A STRATEGIC TASK OF CHINA'S MODERNIZATION DRIVE.”

  33. REPETITIVE THEMES • THE CHINA DREAM HAS A MILITARY COMPONENT • ACCELERATE NATIONAL DEFENSE MODERNIZATION • BE ABLE TO FIGHT AND WIN BATTLES! • TRANSFORM INTO A MARITIME POWER • INTENSIFY REAL COMBAT PREPAREDNESS • PARTY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY • ROOT OUT CORRUPTION AND WASTE

  34. THE “CHINA FACTOR” A GLOBAL ACTOR OF CONSEQUENCE FOR MANY U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS

  35. GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

  36. OVERTAKES JAPAN TO BECOME LARGEST HOLDER OF U.S. DEBT PRC IS U.S.’S 2ND LARGEST TRADE PARTNER LARGEST SOURCE OF IMPORTS TO U.S. 3RD LARGEST EXPORT MARKET FOR U.S. U.S. IS LARGEST PRC TRADE PARTNER U.S. IS LARGEST EXPORT MARKET OF PRC 2008: PRC BECAME U.S.’S LARGEST CREDITOR

  37. NORTH KOREA

  38. IRAN

  39. AFGHANISTAN & PAKISTAN

  40. CLIMATE CHANGE & GLOBAL WARMING

  41. GLOBAL HEALTH ISSUES — H5N1, H7N9

  42. GLOBAL COMMONS OUTER SPACE CYBER SPACE MARITIME

  43. SOUTH CHINA SEA USNS IMPECCABLE INCIDENT, MARCH 2009

  44. Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

  45. DOMESTIC CHALLENGES — “ALL UNDER HEAVEN” IS NOT WELL

  46. “RISING CHINA”

  47. “CHALLENGED CHINA”

  48. DAUNTING DOMESTIC ISSUES • RICH-POOR GAP WIDENING • UNEVEN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT • PEASANTS ARE “LOSERS” • BREAK DOWN IN SOCIAL SECURITY • MEDICAL SYSTEM INADEQUATE • GENDER IMBALANCE • “GRAYING” POPULATION • ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION • RAMPANT CORRUPTION BY OFFICIALS • IRRATIONAL TAX BASE • HEALTH CRISES (SARS, AVIAN VIRUS, AIDS/HIV) • POOR POWER GRID; NET OIL IMPORTER • NET GRAIN IMPORTER • INCREASINGLY “EMPOWERED” MIDDLE CLASS & ELITE • IRRATIONAL BANKING & FINANCIAL SYSTEM

  49. POPULAR UNREST A SERIOUS CONCERN • IN 2006 THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY REPORTED 87,000 CASES OF PUBLIC ORDER DISTURBANCES. • IN 2005 THERE WERE 84,000 INCIDENTS OF UNREST IN CHINA INVOLVING AS MANY AS 3.5 MILLION PEOPLE • MOSTLY DISPLACED PEASANTS AND URBAN POOR LOSING JOBS OR PENSIONS IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

  50. XINJIANG — JULY 2009

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