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Explore the lectures by Michael Smith on the journey from understanding the human condition to developing a standard of judgement in moral rationalism.
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A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair: • that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher. • that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains. • that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize her desires in that world no matter what she desires. • that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair: • that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher. • that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains. • that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize her desires in that world no matter what she desires. • that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair: • that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher. • that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains. • that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize her desires in that world no matter what she desires. • that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know from the armchair: • that an agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher. • that the outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains. • that the desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world where this is to be understood in modal terms that is, as the capacities to know what the world is like no matter what it is like and to realize her desires in that world no matter what she desires. • that there would be the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities if ideal agents didn’t all have certain dominant coherence-inducing desires in common
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have. • that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do. • that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons. • that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have. • that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do. • that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons. • that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have. • that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do. • that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons. • that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that every agents' ideal counterpart therefore has: (i) a dominant coherence-inducing desire that they do not now interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a dominant coherence-inducing desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have. • that it is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do. • that moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons. • that all agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
More specifically concerning agents, we know…(continued): • that to coordinate with others in acting on moral reasons, given how vague our knowledge of their content and weight is from the armchair, agents must develop conventions that precisify their content and weight • that these conventions may well assign non-moral reasons equal or greater weight than moral reasons in certain circumstances • that in light of the weight of the moral and non-moral reasons we can define the following deontic statuses of actions: • an act is morally forbidden when there are moral reasons and some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform it; • an act is morally permissible when there are moral reasons and it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it; • an act is morally obligatory when it is uniquely morally permissible. • an act is supererogatory when it is morally permissible and its performance counts especially towards the agent’s moral credit.
Facts about what is intrinsically desirable as fixed by the intrinsic desires of ideal agents Evaluative and deontic facts in possible worlds inhabited by our crappy selves obtain in virtue of facts about the desires the ideal counterparts of our crappy selves have about those possible worlds Facts about what there is reason to do Facts about what is morally forbidden, permissible, and obligatory
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents any of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
When we leave the armchair we discover that we are human beings whose non-moral reasons have certain characteristic features: • many of us have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component • many of us have desires concerning our own happiness, where this in turn provides us with desires concerning our own wealth, power, and reputation. • many of us have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning ourselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and so on and so forth in the best case scenario; in this way the well-being of each of us comes to be tied up with the well-being of those particular others—in more commonsense terms, we become friends and lovers • many of us have similar dispositions to acquire desires by iterated interactions with natural objects and artifacts—in more commonsense terms, we find beauty in things note that many of these desires presuppose our conventional human sense of our persistence conditions as agents many of these desires also lead us to act wrongly, whether through weakness or compulsion or recklessness, so the question arises what we have reason to do in such circumstances.
in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it, and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern. • the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of faulty wrongdoing emerges. • because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed did so act.
in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it, and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern. • the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of faulty wrongdoing emerges. • because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed did so act.
in the typical case, blaming someone is a reaction to their faulty wrongdoing, where we explain why their wrongdoing is faulty in terms of their having the capacity to act permissibly, but failing to exercise it, and we explain their having the capacity to act permissibly but failing to exercise it in terms of the modal fragility of their wrongdoing. The modal fragility of their acting wrongly makes salient the possibility of a future in which they don’t act wrongly, but it also alerts us to the possibility that this is the beginning of a pattern. • the reaction to the modal fragility of their acting wrongly therefore has to do with trust, where we trust someone when we are disposed to treat them as though they will do what they have have reason to do when we interact with them. To blame someone is to think of them as having done wrong when it is their fault, and it is also to add thoughts about their faulty wrongdoing to the stock of thoughts that we have about them with a view to downgrading how much we trust them, and perhaps even giving up on trusting them altogether, if a pattern of faulty wrongdoing emerges. • because blaming someone is a state that disposes the blamer to desire to act in certain ways towards the person they blame on account of their pattern of faulty wrongdoing, blaming is correct only if their so acting is desirable, and this in turn requires the one blamed did so act.
Loose end #1 The self as a persisting thing disappears from view at a certain point in the argument and then reappears again. It is worthwhile talking through these two moments in the argument and seeing what happens.
“Person” is a forensic term. Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of law, and happiness, and misery. This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, —whereby it becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present. John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Chapter XXVII
Loose end #2 The account of blame provided explains why freedom, thought of as the capacity to respond to reasons, is intimately connected with responsibility. It also suggests that a full understanding of human freedom—that is, the capacity of a human to respond to reasons—will turn on empirical questions about the circumstances in which we as humans are liable to become compulsive, weak, and reckless, and the psychological and social resources available to us to address our condition in should we find ourselves in these circumstances.
Loose end #3 The account of desirability and reasons for action provided explains why, even though it is not silly for people to be tempted by the error theory, it is still okay to hold everyone, including those tempted by the error theory, responsible for their faulty wrongdoing.
Loose end #4 The account of desirability provided dovetails with a version of analytic functionalism to explain both why belief and desire have the correctness conditions they have, and why belief and desire are both judgement-sensitive attitudes.
Loose end #5 The account of the deontic statuses of actions provided suggests that the moral issues about which there are likely to be relatively determinate answers are: (i) those that take issue with social and political conventions that betray their partialist origins; (ii) those that involve clear cases of someone’s interfering: ie their deceiving, misleading, manipulating, coercing, diminishing, or disabling someone when they act on their non-moral reasons; (iii) those that involve clear cases of not helping; and (iv) those that arise in the context of interpersonal relationships where there is common knowledge of the relevant expectations surrounding the nature and significance of helping and not interfering. Moral issues where what's at stake are different preferences about what the social conventions are to be that precisify the content of our reasons to help and not interfere, and how weighty these reasons are to be both vis a vis each other and vis a vis other important non-moral reasons, will be much more indeterminate and fraught. In this sense our moral concepts really are “essentially contested”.
Loose end #6 Similarities and differences between the view argued for here and other views: (i) consequentialism (ii) Kant’s view, Christine Korsgaard’s view (iii) Scanlon’s contractualism
A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11
