ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech
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Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to society Colin F. Camerer, Caltech. Ultimatum game: Proposer offers division of $10; responder accepts or rejects Theories: Rejections express social preferences (care about $, envy, guilt)

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ultimatum bargaining from synapse to society colin f camerer caltech
Ultimatum bargaining: From synapse to societyColin F. Camerer, Caltech
  • Ultimatum game:
    • Proposer offers division of $10; responder accepts or rejects
  • Theories:
    • Rejections express social preferences (care about $, envy, guilt)
    • “Unnatural habitat” (adapted to repeated games, one-shot is Stroop)
  • Variants:
    • Dictator games (same responsibility?)
    • Demographics (generally weak)
    • Stakes– rejected $ goes up, % goes down
    • Repetition etc.– weak
    • Low information about “pie” size lower offers (and “pleading poverty ”)
    • Proposer competition offers give most to responder
    • Two-stage games responders (weakly) accept lower offers because proposers have an “excuse” (intentions matter)
ultimatum vs dictator games forsythe et al 1994 nb dictator games are weak situations more variance
Ultimatum vs dictator “games” (Forsythe et al 1994) NB: Dictator games are “weak situations”, more variance
special subject pools conditions
Special subject pools & conditions
  • Neural evidence (ACC, DLPFC, insula for low offers; difference predicts rejection r=.4)
  • Autistics offer less (don’t expect rejection)
    • Adults learn to take “objective stance”
  • Cutting-off-nose effect (Monkeys reject unequal pay, Brosnan and De Waal, Science 9/18/03; F capuchins will refuse exchange for low payoff if others get high payoff)
  • Small-scale societies
    • Variation in mean offer (some offer very little)
    • Fair offers correlated with “market integration” and “cooperativeness”
slide19
The Machiguenga

independent families

cash cropping

slash & burn

gathered foods

fishing

hunting

slide21
Whale Hunters

of

Lamalera, Indonesia

High levels of

cooperation among hunters of whales, sharks, dolphins and rays. Protein for carbs trade with inlanders

Researcher: Mike Alvard

fair offers correlate with market integration top cooperativeness in everyday life bottom

Fair offers correlate with market integration (top), cooperativeness in everyday life (bottom)

unnatural habit hypothesis
Unnatural habit hypothesis…
  • "Although subjects fully understand the rules of the game and its payoff structure, their behavior is influenced by an unconscious perception that the situation they are facing is part of a much more extended game of similar real-life interactions…We believe that it is practically impossible to create laboratory conditions that would cancel out this effect and induce subjects to act as if they were facing an anonymous one-shot [ultimatum game]." (Winter & Zamir, 1997)
testing theories new ideas
Testing theories: New ideas
  • How to separate preference vs unnatural habitat views?
    • Role of emotions
    • Look for cross-game regularity in measured preferences
    • Learning (…or is it temporary satiation?)
    • fMRI and ACC Stroop interpretations
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