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Природа и карактер ратова у послехладноратовском свету. I Појам и врсте рата II Различита схватања узрока рата III Карактер и природа ратова у послехладноратовском свету IV Литература. I Појам и врсте рата.

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Природа и карактер ратова у послехладноратовском свету


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  • I послехладноратовском светуПојам и врсте рата

  • II Различита схватања узрока рата

  • III Карактер и природа ратова у послехладноратовском свету

  • IV Литература


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I послехладноратовском светуПојам и врсте рата

“Одлучујуће средство у политици је насиље. Свако ко не успева ово да схвати је... политичко дете” (Макс Вебер)


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Историјат ратова послехладноратовском свету

  • Од преко 3 300 година познате историје, само раздобље у току 200 година прошло је без ратова

  • У току 5 500 година историје, водило се преко 14 500 ратова, у којима је погинуло око 4 милијарде људи (Швајцарски научници)

  • Since 1815 there have been between224 and 559 wars, depending on the definition ofwar that is used (Mingst 2004: 198).

  • Број жртава је огроман: 17. век- 3 милиона; 18. век- 5, 2 милиона; 19. век- 5, 5 милиона; Први светски рат- 10 милиона мртвих, 20 милиона рањених и осакаћених; други светски рат- 55 милиона мртвих, 35 милиона рањених; Током хладног рата у свету у развоју вођено је 127 ратова у којима је убијено 21, 9 милиона људи (Андреја Милетић, Рут Сивард)

  • “После краја хладног рата, велики рат је постао мање вероватан, али су се регионални и домаћи сукоби одржали са увек присутним притиском на државе изван и међународне институције да интервенишу. Од 111 сукоба који су се водили од краја хладног рата до почетка новог века, 95 су били унутардржавни, а у девет случајева догодила се и страна интервенција. Више од 80 државних актера је било укључено, као и две међународне организације, и 200 невладиних актера” (Џозеф Нај)


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Историјат ратова према Мајклу Хауарду

  • Ратови витезова

  • Ратови плаћеника

  • Ратови трговаца

  • Ратови професионалаца

  • Ратови револуције

  • Ратови нација

  • Ратови технолога

  • Нуклеарно доба

  • Сајбер ратови?


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Појам и дефиниција рата Хауарду

  • “Рат је најоштрији облик друштвених сукоба, у коме се, непосредном употребом оружане силе између држава, њихових савеза или организација, покушавају да остваре одређени политички циљеви победом над противничком страном и њеним принуђивањем да прихвати услове победника.” (Андреја Милетић, “Рат”, у, Енциклопедија политичке културе, Савремена администрација, Београд, 1993, стр. 953)


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  • It is possible to argue that war is simply any form of armed violence between groups of people, but it is valid to ask what sorts of goals are involved and how much violence is required for an armed clash to be called a ‘war’.

  • Is a clash between two street gangs in which several people are killed, really the same phenomenon as a military conflict between two or more states in which millions are deliberately killed?

  • Choosing a particular threshold can also seem arbitrary, as with the influential Singer and Small definition which requires a war to involve at least 1,000 battle deaths per year. By this token the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom would barely qualify, though few would argue that that conflict was not a war.

  • Some sense of scale is clearly needed, but perhaps Quincy Wright’s less specific formulation is still reasonable, that war is ‘a conflict among political groups, especially sovereign states, carried on by armed forces of considerable magnitude, for a considerable period of time’ (Wright 1968: 453).


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  • Рат је оружани сукоб међу државама а не између приватних лица или њихових група.

  • Рат није”однос човека према човеку, већ државе према држави.” (Русо)

  • Рат је сукоб између политичких друштава- политичке групе које још нису државе, као и у државно необликованим друштвима (Вјатр)

  • Проблематика унутардржавних ратова

  • IUS AD BELLO ET IUS IN BELLO


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  • Физичка и “вољна” димензија рата

  • Физичка принуда као средство, а воља као циљ рата

  • Намера да се води рат (ANIMUS BELLIGERENDI)

  • Рат обухвата не само “стварну борбу” него и “читаво раздобље у коме је видљива спремност на њу.” (Томас Хобс)

  • Повезаност рата и политике

  • Бријан/Келогов пакт – 1928. године

  • Забрана употребе силе и претње силом- члан 2, став 4, Повеље УН


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Врсте ратова: рата

  • Међудржавни и унутардржвни ратови

  • Нападачки и одбрамбени ратови-

  • Напaдачки (Blietzkrieg, превентивни рат (preventive war), предухитрујући рат (preemptive war)

  • Кратки и дуготрајни ратови

  • Фронтални и герилски или партизански ратови


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  • Локални, регионални, светски рата

  • Средишњи и периферни

  • Копнени, поморски, ваздушни и свемирски (ратови звезда)

  • Ограничени и тотални (неограничени)

  • Конвенционални и нуклеарни

  • Праведни и неправедни


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Preemptivni preduhitruju i i preventivni ratovi

Preemptivni (preduhitruju ратаći) i preventivni ratovi



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  • Državni sekretar Danijel Vebster je 1837. godine povodom poznatog slučaja sa brodom „Karolina“ (Carolina Incident), odredio okolnosti pod kojima je preduhitrujuće delovanje opravdano, ističući da to pravo može da se koristi kada je država suočena sa: „Trenutnom, neodoljivom potrebom... Koja ne ostavlja prostor za izbor sredstava niti vremena za razmišljanje.“


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  • Posle iskustva od 11. 09. 2001. godine, Amerika više jednostavno ne sme da čeka da se ovakve pretnje materijalizuju, jer bi onda, po rečima Buša i Čejnija, bilo prekasno da se reaguje. Odvraćanje i zastrašivanje kao deo hladnoratovskog strateškog arsenala i načina mišljenja treba da budu zamenjeni tzv. anticipativnom samoodbranom; drugim rečima, SAD sebi daju odrešene ruke, moralno i pravno opravdanje takođe, da preduzmu pruduhitrujuće udare „što dalje od svojih obala“ protiv država, organizacija i/ili pojedinaca koji mogu da ugroze bezbednost Amerike i njenih saveznika. Posebno u naše vreme kada postoje realni izgledi da oružje za masovno uništavanje dođe u ruke terorista, ne sme se čekati da ona budu upotrebljena, pa da se steknu uslovi za legalnu i legitimnu samoodbranu. Premda i dalje kod ovakvih objašnjenja ostaje nejasno, da li će, kada i gde neprijatelj zaista napasti, odlike novih oružja i fanatizam terorista ne daju pravo na pasivnost, tvrdili su zagovornici preemptivnih udara.


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  • Ono što je, međutim, izazvalo raspravu povodom prava na anticipativnu samoodbranu, na način kako je obrazložena u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti SAD iz 2002. godine, ticalo se najviše mogućnosti eventualne zloupotrebe ovog prava (pravo na samoodbranu je, inače, uređeno u Povelji Ujedinjenih nacija, u članovima 2(4) i 51.). Drugim rečima, postavilo se i jedno suštinsko pitanje: nije li ovako široko tumačeno i samododeljeno pravo na preduhitrujuće delovanje, zapravo, paravan za vođenje preventivnih ratova? Ovde je, razume se, važno praviti razliku između onoga kako države treba da se ponašaju u međusobnim odnosima u cilju očuvanja međunarodnog sistema i međunarodnog poretka i pouke o značaju preventivnog delovanja u načelu iskazanog, između ostalog, i u poslovici da je „vrednija jedna unca prevencije nego funta lečenja“.


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Чарлс Кегли, Грегори Рејмонд nastavkom politike drugim sredstvima, govorio je da mu preventivni rat izgleda „kao izvršiti samoubistvo iz straha od smrti“


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Преемптивни (предухитрујући) ратови

  • The SixDay War between Israel and an alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq was aclassic case of preemption (see Reiter, 1995:16–19). Tensions between Israel and itsArab neighbors had been growing throughout the spring of 1967, and reachedtheir zenith in May when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser undertook aseries of actions that raised fears in Tel Aviv of an imminent attack. Besidesmobilizing his troops and cementing military ties with Syria, Jordan, and Iraq,Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force to leave the Sinai, where it had beendeployed since the 1956 Suez War as a buffer between Egypt and Israel.Furthermore, he announced a blockade of the Strait of Tiran, Israel’s vitalwaterway to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and proclaimed that his goal in anyfuture war with Israel would be the destruction of the Jewish state. Assuming aninvasion was forthcoming and survival doubtful if Egypt landed the first blow,the Israelis launched a surprise attack on June 5, which enabled them to win adecisive victory.


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Првентивни ратови ратови

  • the Third Punic War (Prvi punski rat (264 - 241 BC); Drugi punski rat 218-201 B. C.) betweenRome and Carthage (149–146 B.C.E.) illustrates preventive warfare. Although reduced to the status of a minor power bylosses to the Romans in two previous wars, Carthage had undergone an economicresurgence during the first half of the second century, which led some Romanleaders to worry about its future ambitions. Consumed with the fear that Carthagewould regain its former strength and eventually threaten Rome, Marcus PorciusCato ended every speech to the Roman Senate by proclaiming: ‘‘Carthage must bedestroyed!’’ Heeding his advice, Rome annihilated Carthage in a brutal,unprovoked military campaign.

  • Рат у Ираку из 2003. године


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Џозеф Нај ратови


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  • Ukoliko postoji nedvosmislena i dovoljna pretnja teritorijalnom integritetu i političkom suverenitetu jedne države, ona mora delovati odmah, ili kasnije neće biti prilike za delovanje. Pretnja mora biti, međutim, neposredna. Takav argument ne bi opravdao, na primer, sovjetsku intervenciju u Avganistanu. Postoji razlika između preemptivnih i preventivnih ratova. Preemptivni napad dogadja se kada je opasnost neposredna. Do preventivnog rata dolazi kada su državnici uvereni kako je rat bolje voditi sada nego kasnije. Kao što smo videli, 1914. godine takvo preventivno razmišljanje uticalo je na nemački generalštab. Mnogi su se bojali da će, ako bi čekali do 1916. godine, Rusija biti suviše jaka da bi Šlifenov plan uspeo


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Збигњев Бжежински teritorijalnom integritetu i političkom suverenitetu jedne države, ona mora delovati odmah, ili kasnije neće biti prilike za delovanje. Pretnja mora biti, međutim, neposredna. Takav argument ne bi opravdao, na primer, sovjetsku intervenciju u Avganistanu. Postoji razlika između preemptivnih i preventivnih ratova. Preemptivni napad dogadja se kada je opasnost neposredna. Do preventivnog rata dolazi kada su državnici uvereni kako je rat bolje voditi sada nego kasnije. Kao što smo videli, 1914. godine takvo preventivno razmišljanje uticalo je na nemački generalštab. Mnogi su se bojali da će, ako bi čekali do 1916. godine, Rusija biti suviše jaka da bi Šlifenov plan uspeo


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  • A teritorijalnom integritetu i političkom suverenitetu jedne države, ona mora delovati odmah, ili kasnije neće biti prilike za delovanje. Pretnja mora biti, međutim, neposredna. Takav argument ne bi opravdao, na primer, sovjetsku intervenciju u Avganistanu. Postoji razlika između preemptivnih i preventivnih ratova. Preemptivni napad dogadja se kada je opasnost neposredna. Do preventivnog rata dolazi kada su državnici uvereni kako je rat bolje voditi sada nego kasnije. Kao što smo videli, 1914. godine takvo preventivno razmišljanje uticalo je na nemački generalštab. Mnogi su se bojali da će, ako bi čekali do 1916. godine, Rusija biti suviše jaka da bi Šlifenov plan uspeoni мesanje dvaju razlicitih koncepata - prethodnog (preemptive) i preventivnog(preventive) djelovanja nije pomoglo razjasnjavanju stvari. U Poglavlju 5dokumenta 0 Nacionalnoj sigurnosnoj strategiji za 2002. godinu kojije razmatraloNacionalno vijece za sigurnost, naslovljenom Prevent Our Enemies from ThreateningUs, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (Sprijeeimonaie neprijatelj« da prijete nama, naiim saveznicima i naiim prijateijima oruijem zamasovno unistavanje), ova dva pojma koriste se kao istoznacnice. Zamjenik drtavnogtajnika za obranu dodatno je zamaglio stvar izjavivsi 2. prosinca 2002. na InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) kako "svako tko misli da mi moiemoc!ekati do trenutka kada imamo pouzdane infonnacije da se napad sprema,nije nis~a naucio iz 11. rujna".


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  • Ipak, razlika izrnedu prethodnog i preventivnog vrlo je vain a za medunarodniporedak i ne bi smjela biti izgubljena iz vida. Ona podrazumijeva razliku izmedu,npr. izraelske odluke izlipnja 1967. da preduhitri (preempt) arapski napad za kojisu arapske snage okoncavale pripreme i izraelskog zracnog napada 1981. godinena nuklearni reaktoru Osiraqu s ciljem sprecavanja (prevent) Iraka u stjecanjunuklearnog oruzja, U prvom slucaju djelovalo se po izravnoj prijetnji; u drugom sesprijecilo da do prijetnje uopce dode. Na isti se nacin i napad SAD-a na Irak 2003.godine moida moie sagledavati kao preventivan (preventive) protiv neke buduce"ozbiljne i rastuce prijetnje" (kako je to nazvao predsjednik Bush), ali sigurno nekao djelovanje da se preduhitri (preempt) neki konkretan, izravan iracki napad.



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  • U slu a za medunarodničaju ratova treće vrste, rec je o unutrašnjim sukobima najčešće uzrokovanim etnoverski mrazlozima, ili sukobimakoji su izbili usled borbe za izraženiju autonomiju, veća prava ili zaodvajanje od već postojeće države putem njenog razbijanja. Unutrašnjiratovi predstavljaju u naše doba novu bezbednosnu pretnju koja zahtevadrukčije odgovore od dobro poznatih klasičnih, vojnih sredstava - iako su pomestu izbijanja takvi nasilni sukobi unutrašnji, posledice ovakvih ratovatreće vrste utiču na bezbednost u njihovom bližem i širem okruženju, kao i nameđunarodnu bezbednost.


Asimetri ni ratovi

Asimetrični ratovi a za medunarodni


Martin ewans

Martin Ewans a za medunarodni

Conflict in Afghanistan- A Study in Asymmetric Warfare


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  • In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as well as during the ensuing invasionsof Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’.

  • Broadly speaking, this purports to describe a means of fighting through which a weakerpower can offset or neutralise the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applyingwhat strengths it has to its opponent’s weaknesses.


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  • The concept is as old as history and during the ensuing invasionscould, for example, be used to typify the encounter between David and Goliath. It fits setbattles between trained and organised armies, as, for example, the Battle of Agincourt of1415, where a stronger force including armoured horsemen was defeated by a weakerforce using the armour-piercing longbow. More frequently, however, it is used todescribe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrillaactivity.


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  • Since the beginnings of nation-state formation in the seventeenth century, asymmetricwarfare has been the exception rather than the rule, except possibly in colonialenvironments. As states developed and became embroiled in warfare, so they madegreater use of regular armies. These were equipped with progressively more sophisticatedweaponry, and became increasingly permanent and professional. Mechanisation, whichbegan during the First World War, became the principal characteristic of inter-state‘conventional’ warfare from the Second World War onwards. This meant that warfarebecame both more expensive and more destructive, until, with the development ofnuclear weapons, the scale of destruction and expense became self-defeating. In a nuclearwar, there would be no winners.


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  • In 9 AD, three Roman legions commanded by Publius Quinctilius Varus weredestroyed in the Teutoburger Wald by German tribesmen, having been lured onto terrainin which they were unable to deploy the tactical formations which would have renderedtheir superiority irresistible. Among the most spectacular of more recent examples werethe Boer and Vietnam Wars, where the use of asymmetric tactics against regular forceswas supplemented by political and public relations activity. The ability to erode thestronger power’s will to fight by adducing a moral dimension to the conflict is a valuableasset in an asymmetric context. For both parties, to ‘win hearts and minds’ is a significantstep towards success.


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  • In recent years, with major inter-state warfare largely stalemated, the main focus hasbeen on asymmetric warfare. While ‘conventional’ warfare has not been precluded –Iraq/Iran, India/Pakistan, Britain/Argentina, Iraq/Kuwait – it has generally been eithershort-lived or has been kept within strictly local limits, or both. The threat currentlyfacing the ‘elite’ countries, mainly of Europe and North America, as well as the centresof superior power in the Third World, does not now arise from open warfare betweennations. In its place is a threat from non-state organisations, some based in knownlocalities, as for example Chechnya and Kashmir, others, notably al-Qa ida, with noreadily accessible focus of command or activity. Their ability seriously to challengemajor state power is doubtful, but their potential to inflict material damage and loss oflife is undeniable, the more so if they should gain access to weapons of mass destructionor can find means to disrupt the extensive and intricate infrastructure on which modernsocieties depend. A discussion of the nature of asymmetric warfare and the applicabilityto current circumstances of the lessons to be learnt from its past employment, is thus oneof considerable contemporary interest, if not urgency.


Ratovi etvrte generacije

Ratovi četvrte generacije stalemated, the main focus has


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  • Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:

  • Are complex and long term.

  • Terrorism

  • A non-national or transnational base, highly decentralized.

  • A direct attack on the enemy's culture.

  • Highly sophisticated psychological warfare especially through media manipulation and lawfare

  • All available pressures are used - political, economic, social and military.

  • Occurs in low intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks.

  • Non-combatants are tactical dilemmas.


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  • The concept was first described by the authors William S. Lind, Colonel (US Army), Captain (USMC), Colonel (US Army), and Lieutenant Colonel (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”.

  • The generations of warfare described by these authors are:

  • 1st Generation: tactics of line and column; which developed in the age of the smoothbore musket.

  • 2nd Generation: tactics of linear fire and movement, with reliance on indirect fire.

  • 3rd Generatin: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them; and defence in depth.


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  • In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through fourgenerations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver,and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all availablenetworks—political, economic, social, military—to convince anopponent’s decisionmakers that their strategic goals are eitherunachievable or too costly.


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  • The theory went through a second incarnation when the notion fourof nontrinitarian war came into vogue; but it failed to examinethat notion critically. The theory also is founded on myths aboutthe so-called Westphalian system and the theory of blitzkrieg. Thetheory of 4GW reinvented itself once again after September 11, 2001(9/11), when its proponents claimed that Al Qaeda was waging a4GW against the United States.


War of necessity and war of choice

War of Necessity and War of Choice four

Richard N. Haas, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq Wars, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2009


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  • “Wars can be defined any number of ways: civil wars, wars of national liberation, world wars, cold wars, counterinsurgencies, a global war on terrorism, wars of attrition, defensive wars, nuclear wars, limited wars, just wars and preventive wars all come to mind. What these and other such descriptions tend to reflect is scale, purpose, duration, the means employed, the nature of conflict, and / or nature of undertaking.”


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  • “There is however, another way to think about war. Wars can be either be viewed as essentially unavoidable, that is acts of necessity, or just the opposite, reflecting conscious choice when other reasonable policies are available but are deemed to be less attractive… History offers us numerous examples of each. Any list of modern wars of necessity from the American Perspective would include World War II and the Korean War. Wars of choice undertaken by the United States would include Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo and a Century before, the Spanish-American War.”


What characterizes wars of necessity
What characterizes Wars of necessity? can be either be viewed as essentially unavoidable, that is acts of necessity, or just the opposite, reflecting conscious choice when other reasonable policies are available but are deemed to be less attractive… History offers us numerous examples of each. Any list of modern wars of necessity from the American Perspective would include World War II and the Korean War. Wars of choice undertaken by the United States would include Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo and a Century before, the Spanish-American War.”

  • The most common situation involves self-defense. More generally, wars of necessity involves the most important national interests, the absence of promising alternatives to the use of force, and the certain and considerable price to be paid if the status quo is stand. Wars of necessity do not require assurances that the overall results of striking or resisting will be positive, only the assessment that the results of not so doing will be unacceptably negative and large.


What characterizes wars of choice
What characterizes Wars of Choice? can be either be viewed as essentially unavoidable, that is acts of necessity, or just the opposite, reflecting conscious choice when other reasonable policies are available but are deemed to be less attractive… History offers us numerous examples of each. Any list of modern wars of necessity from the American Perspective would include World War II and the Korean War. Wars of choice undertaken by the United States would include Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo and a Century before, the Spanish-American War.”

  • Wars of Choice tend to involve stakes or interests that are less clearly “vital”, along with the existence of viable alternative policies, be they diplomacy, inaction, or something else but still other than the use of military force. One result is that wars of choice tend to increase the pressure on the government of the day to demonstrate that the overall or net results of employing force will be positive, that is, that the benefits outweigh the costs. If this test cannot be meet, the choice will appear to be ill-advised and in fact most likely is


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  • Menachem Begin, the former prime minister of Israel, differentiated between what he called “wars of choice” and “wars of no alternative”

  • Maimonides, one of the great scholars in the annals of Judaism, wrote more than eight century ago of wars he judged to be obligatory and those he termed optional. The former were those waged by the king for narrowly defined religious cases and in self-defense, i. e. “to deliver Israel from the enemy attacking him”. He distinguished such necessary wars from those discretionary conflicts undertaken buy a king against neighboring nations “to extend the borders of Israel and to enhance his greatness and prestige”


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  • The distinction between wars of necessity and wars of choice is obviously heavily subjective, inevitably reflecting an individual’s analysis and politics.

  • I introduced the phrases into the Iraq war debate in an op-ed in the Washington Post on November 23, 2003, five months after I left the Administration. The piece argued that the first Iraq war was a classic war of necessity, the second a classic war of choice.


Cyber warfare

Cyber Warfare is obviously heavily subjective, inevitably reflecting an individual’s analysis and politics.


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  • In the spring of 2007, when Estonian authorities moved a monument to the Red Army from the center of its capital city, Tallinn, to the outskirts of town, a diplomatic row erupted with neighboring Russia. Estonian nationalists regard the army as occupiers and oppressors, a sentiment that dates to the long period of Soviet rule following the Second World War, when the Soviet Union absorbed all three Baltic states. Ethnic Russians, who make up about a quarter of Estonia’s 1.3 million people, were nonetheless incensed by the statue’s treatment and took to the streets in protest. Estonia later blamed Moscow for orchestrating the unrest; order was restored only after U.S. and European diplomatic interventions.


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  • But the story of the “Bronze Statue” did not end there. Days after the riots the computerized infrastructure of Estonia’s high-tech government began to fray, victimized by what experts in cybersecurity termed a coordinated “denial of service attack. A flood of bogus requests for information from computers around the world conspired to cripple (Wired)the websites of Estonian banks, media outlets, and ministries for days. Estonia denounced the attacks as an unprovoked act of aggression from a regional foe (though experts still disagree on who perpetrated it—Moscow has denied any knowledge). Experts in cybersecurity went one step further: They called it the future of warfare.


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  • The attack on Estonia’s “paperless government” (BBC) was one of the most publicized hacks in recent computing history. But it wasn’t the first case of cyber espionage, nor the most egregious. It’s the “tip of the iceberg of the quantity and quality of attacks that are going on,” says O. Sami Saydjari, president of the Cyber Defense Agency, a security consultant, and a former Pentagon computer security expert. Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States have all been accused of launching similar attacks on adversaries.

  • China, however, may be the most active. Washington has accused the Chinese of hacking into government computer networks at the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense—in some instances making off with data. But accusations of Chinese cyber-meddling reached a crescendo in June 2007, when, according to the Financial Times, hackers broke into a Pentagon network that serves the Office of the Secretary of Defense, briefly shutting it down.


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  • Another technique is the use of “malware,” “spyware,” and other malicious programs imbedded into computer systems to steal information without user knowledge. The software is designed to hide undetected and siphon information from its host—everything from secrets stored on personal computers to Pentagon military mainframes


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  • Less common but far more worrisome are cyber attacks aimed at critical infrastructure—like nuclear-power-plant control systems, banks, or subways

  • According to a tally by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank, the hackers may already be winning: In 2007 the Department of Homeland Security logged an estimated 37,000 attempted breaches of private and government computer systems, and over 80,000 attacks on Pentagon systems. Some hacks “reduced the U.S. military’s operational capabilities,”


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  • Economist Borg says the biggest threat from cyber attacks may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”


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II may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”Различита схватања узрока рата


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Узроци рата may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”

Нивои анализе у међународним односима и узроци рата


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Нивои анализе may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”

  • Анализа на нивоу појединца

  • Анализа на нивоу државе

  • Анализа на нивоу система


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Анализа на нивоу појединца may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”

  • Проблематика људске природе- воља за моћ

  • Когнитивни фактори- Људи нужно доносе одлуке унутар граница оног што свесно знају и оног што хоће да разматрају (когнитивна конзистентност и когнитивна дисонанца,wishful thinking, систем националних уверења, стереотипи, аналогије)

  • Психолошки чиниоци- Теорија фрустрација- агресија

  • Биолошки чиниоци- сличности са животињама,питања пола,

  • Организационо понашање (Role behavior, Понашање појединца у групама)

  • Идиосинкретичко понашање (људи као индивидуе)- Позитивне и негативне личности- активне и пасивне, физичко и ментално здравље, его и амбиције,

  • Политичка историја и лична искуства

  • Перцепције- оперативна реалност

  • Августин, Спиноза, Фридрих Ниче, Ханс Џ. Моргентау, Рандал Швелер


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Анализа на нивоу државе may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”

  • Природа државе као узрок рата

  • Да ли су неке државе склоније рату а неке не

  • Теорија демократског мира и комплексне међузависности

  • Милитаризам

  • Екстернализација унутрашњих сукоба

  • Решавање унутрашњих сукоба помоћу ратова

  • Имануел Кант, Ричард Кобден, Томас Пејн, Вудроу Вилсон, Мајкл Дојл, Брус Расет


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Анализа на нивоу система may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.”

  • Природа међународног система као узрок рата

  • Анархична природа међународног система

  • Борба за успостављање и очување равнотеже снага

  • Економски чиниоци на нивоу међународног система

  • Проблеми у биосфери – ратови због ресурса

  • Power Transition Theory

  • Капитализам и империјализам

  • Жан- Жак Русо, G, Lows Dickinson, Кенет Волц, Џон Џеј Миршајмер


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III may be economic. He estimates a shutdown of electric power to any sizable region for more than ten days would stop over 70 percent of all economic activity in that region. “If you can do that with a pure cyber attack on only one critical infrastructure, why would you bother with any traditional military attack?” CSIS’ Lewis takes a less alarmist view. “The U.S. is a very big set of targets, and some of our important networks are very secure. So you could inflict damage on the U.S. but it wouldn’t be crippling or decisive,” he says. “I’ve seen people who say a cyber attack could turn the United States into a third-world nation in a matter of minutes. That’s silly. We have to be realistic about this.” Карактер и природа ратова у послехладноратовском свету


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  • If, as some have argued, war has indeed taken on new forms in the post-cold war era, or perhaps has even seen an evolution in its essential nature, then it is necessary to compare these recent examples with traditional forms and interpretations of war in order to determine what, if anything, has changed and what are simply contemporary manifestations of an ancient phenomenon.

  • This is not as straightforward an exercise as might at first appear. War is a form of organized human violence, and when conducted by states using significant quantities of personnel, materiel, and firepower, it is comparatively easy to recognize. But at the lower end of the spectrum of violence it begins to overlap with other forms of conflict, such as terrorism, insurgency, and criminal violence, and clear distinctions and definitions become harder to maintain.

  • War always involves violence, but not all violence can be described as war. Violence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, requirement for a conflict to be defined as a war.


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  • Wars are fought for reasons in the post-cold war era, or perhaps has even seen an evolution in its essential nature, then it is necessary to compare these recent examples with traditional forms and interpretations of war in order to determine what, if anything, has changed and what are simply contemporary manifestations of an ancient phenomenon.. The Western understanding of war, following Clausewitz, sees it as instrumental, a means to an end.

  • Wars in this perspective are not random violence; they reflect a conscious decision to engage in them for a rational political purpose.

  • They are rationalized by those who initiate them by appeal to belief and value systems.


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  • War is a form of social and political behaviour. This was one of the central arguments of Clausewitz.

  • It remains true at the start of the twenty-first century, but only if we operate with a broad and flexible understanding of what constitutes politics. As our understanding of politics, and the forms it can take, has evolved in the post-modern era, we should expect the same to be true of the character of war since that is itself a form of politics.


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  • The political nature of war has been evolving in recent decades under the impact of globalization, which has increasingly eroded the economic, political, and cultural autonomy of the state. Contemporary warfare takes place in a local context, but it is also played out in wider fields and influenced by non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, regional and global media, and users of the Internet. In many ways, contemporary wars are partly fought on television, and the media therefore have a powerful role in providing a framework of understanding for the viewers of the conflict.


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  • One effect of the constant coverage of international violence by the global media may be to gradually weaken the legal, moral, and political constraints against the use of force by making it appear routine, and thereby reverse the moral questioning of war that was a feature of the second half of the twentieth century. The advent of such ‘war fatigue’ might make recourse to war appear a normal feature of international relations.


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  • Michel Foucault called the institution of war ‘the military dimension of society’ (1996: 415). This is because the conduct of war requires a society to cooperate in performing complex tasks on a large scale. Societies can fight wars because they are able to cooperate at the internal level. On the other hand, they feel themselves compelled to fight other societies because they oft en find it difficult to cooperate at the external level. The very act of fighting outsiders may make it easier to cooperate internally. Unless a war is highly unpopular domestically, there is a sense in which a state at war is also a state at peace.


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  • War is both highly organized and a highly military dimension of society’organizing phenomenon. In the words of the sociologist Charles Tilly (1975: 42), ‘war made the state, and the state made war’. The machinery of the state derived historically from the organizational demands of warfare, and modern states owe their origins and development to a large degree to the effects of earlier wars. The modern state was born during the renaissance, a time of unprecedented violence.


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  • The high point of this evolution was the Thirty Years War, which racked Europe from 1618 to 1648. By the end of that conflict Europe was entering a new phase of historical development, modernity, which would come to dominate international history for the next three hundred years before giving way to post-modernity in the late twentieth century. Modernity had many features and, as Clausewitz noted, each age has its own dominant characteristic form of war, which reflects the era in which it occurs, though there will also be other forms reflecting cultural and geographical realities. Th ere was therefore a form of warfare that was typical of modernity.


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  • The period of modernity was characterized by the rise of which racked Europe from 1618 to 1648. By the end of that conflict nationalism and increasingly centralized and bureaucratic states with rapidly rising populations, by the scientific and industrial revolutions, and by the growth of secular ideologies with messianic visions and an intolerance of opposing metanarratives and, broad overarching ideologies, such as Marxism.


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  • The result was industrialized warfare on a massive scale, in which civilian populations as much as enemy soldiers were seen as legitimate targets, a process that culminated in the nuclear attacks on Japan in 1945. At the same time, another feature of warfare during the modern period was that, at least in the conflicts between the developed states, it was governed by rules.


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  • For many analysts of war, war’s which civilian populations as much as enemy soldiers were seen as legitimate targets, a process that culminated in the nature, as the use of organized violence in pursuit of political goals, always remains the same, and is unaltered even by radical changes in political forms, in the motives leading to conflict, or technological advances (Gray 1999b: 169). For Colin Gray, if war’s nature were to change, it would become something else, so he, like Clausewitz, insists that all wars have the same political nature, one fundamentally based on the idea that war is a political act, the use of force for conscious political ends.


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  • For Clausewitz and Gray, there is an important distinction between the nature and the character of war. The former refers to the constant, universal, and inherent qualities that ultimately define war throughout the ages, such as violence, chance, and uncertainty. The latter relates to the impermanent, circumstantial, and adaptive features that war develops and that account for the different periods of warfare throughout history, each displaying attributes determined by socio-political and historical preconditions, while also influencing those conditions.

  • Clausewitz also distinguished between the objective and subjective nature of war, the former comprising of the elements common to all wars and the latter consisting of those features that make each war unique.


The revolution in military affairs rma
The revolution in military affairs between the (RMA)

  • The concept of the revolution in military affairs became popular after the dramatic American victory in the 1991 Gulf War. The manner in which superior technology and doctrine appeared to give the United States an almost effortless victory suggested that future conflicts would be decided by the possession of technological advantages such as advanced guided weapons and space satellites.


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  • The former US Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, defined an RMA as ‘when a nation’s military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, operations and tactics to achieve decisive military results in fundamentally new ways’ (quoted in Gray 2002: 1).


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  • Most of the RMA literature focuses on the implications of developments in technology. In the conflicts in Kuwait (1991), Serbia (1999), and Iraq (2003), American technology proved vastly superior to that of its opponent. In particular, computing and space technology allowed the US forces to acquire information about the enemy to a degree never before seen in warfare, and allowed precision targeting of weapon systems.


Asymmetric warfare
Asymmetric warfare developments in

  • Asymmetric warfare exists ‘when two combatants are so different in their characters, and in their areas of comparative strategic advantage, that a confrontation between them comes to turn on one side’s ability to force the other side to fight on their own terms. . . . The strategies that the weak have consistently adopted against the strong often involve targeting the enemy’s domestic political base as much as his forward military capabilities.

  • Essentially such strategies involve inflicting pain over time without suffering unbearable retaliation in return.’ (L. Freedman (1998), ‘Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs’, Defense Analysis, 14: 58)


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  • Th e increasing importance of information in warfare may be a validation of Clausewitz’s argument that the form of war reflects the culture and technologies of the age. Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993) argue that the way a society makes war reflects the way it makes wealth. Starting with the very invention of agriculture, every revolution in the system for creating wealth triggered a corresponding revolution in the system for making war. Therefore, to the extent that a new ‘information economy’ is emerging, this will bring with it a parallel revolution in warfare. In the Information Age, information is the central resource for wealth production and power, and the RMA is the inevitable outgrowth of basic changes in the form of economic production.


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  • The American approach has been to attempt to win wars quickly by applying overwhelming force, and to use the industrial and technological strength of the United States to minimize casualties. Yet the reality of war is that it is never clean or bloodless. Even in the age of smart weapons and space technology, war remains a brutal and bloody undertaking where political objectives are achieved through the infliction of human suffering on a major scale.


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  • Benjamin Lambeth warns that, “a revolution in military affairs” cannot be spawned merely by platforms, munitions, information systems and hardware equities. These necessary but insufficient preconditions must be supported by an important set of intangibles that have determined war results since the days of Alexander the Great—namely, clarity of goals backed by proficiency and boldness in execution. In the so-called “RMA debate”, too much attention has been devoted to technological magic at the expense of the organisational, conceptual and other human imputs needed to convert the magic from lifeless hardware into combat outcomes.’ (B. S. Lambeth (1997), ‘The Technology Revolution in Air Warfare’, Survival, 39: 75)


Post modern war
Post-modern war affairs” cannot be spawned merely by platforms, munitions, information systems and hardware equities. These necessary but insufficient preconditions must be supported by an important set of intangibles that have determined war results since the days of Alexander the Great—namely, clarity of goals backed by proficiency and boldness in execution. In the so-called “RMA debate”, too much attention has been devoted to technological magic at the expense of the organisational, conceptual and other human imputs needed to convert the magic from lifeless hardware into combat outcomes.’

  • If war is a reflection of its age, as Clausewitz argued, then contemporary warfare should reflect key aspects of postmodernity. A number of authors have suggested that this is in fact the case, that the world is undergoing a dramatic evolution into post-modernity and that this will inevitably lead to a radical redefinition of war itself. Global society is moving from the modern to the postmodern age.


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  • For several decades and is the result of a wide range of economic, cultural, social, and political changes that are altering the meaning of the ‘state’ and the nation. It has been marked by a shift from production to information as a core output of advanced economies. As this happens, it will affect the character of war. In some parts of the world the state is deliberately transferring functions, including military functions, to private authorities and businesses. In other areas, these functions are being seized from the state by other political actors. At the same time, globalization has weakened the ‘national’ forms of identity that have dominated international relations in the past two centuries, and reinvigorated earlier forms of political identity and organization, such as religious, ethnic, and clan loyalties.


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  • Privatized Military Firms (PMFs) sell a wide range of war-related services to states, overwhelmingly in the logistical and security roles rather than direct combat. Hundreds of PMFs have operated in more than 50 countries since the end of the cold war. The growth of PMFs reflect a broader global trend towards the privatization of public assets. Through the provision of training and equipment, PMFs have influenced the outcomes of several recent wars, including those in Angola, Croatia, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone. PMFs played a signifi cant role in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.


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  • For some authors in the late 1990s, the possibility of casualty-free or virtual war seemed to be becoming a possibility.

  • From the NATO perspective, the 1999 war against Yugoslavia over Kosovo appeared to be just such a conflict, a ‘virtual’ war in which the NATO forces attempted to employ their technological superiority in such a way as to reduce the risk of casualties to the absolute minimum.


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  • For the Kosovan and Serbian victims of ethnic violence on the ground and the Serbian victims of allied air attacks, the war was anything but ‘virtual’. As Freedman points out in relation to the temptations of the RMA, the new technologies do not ‘offer the prospect of a virtual war by creating a situation in which only information matters so that there is never any point in fighting about anything other than information. … War is not a virtual thing, played out on screens, but intensely physical. That is why it tends to violence and destruction’ (Freedman 1998: 78). War’s very nature involves the use of violence.


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  • Edward Luttwak has suggested that the world has entered a new age of post-heroic warfare ‘easily started and fought without restraint’ (Luttwak 1995: 110).

  • The effects of the industrial revolution, along with the advent of popular democracy and modern bureaucracy, had combined to ‘nationalize’ war to involve the whole of society. Raymond Aron (1954: 19) called this hyperbolic war, where the growing scale and intensity of war is driven by the pressure of industrial and technological advances


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Globalization and war
Globalization and war to capture the continuity of contemporary wars with the genocidal total wars of the twentieth century.

  • ‘The impact of globalisation is visible in many of the new wars. The global presence in these wars can include international reporters, mercenary troops and military advisers, diaspora volunteers as well as a veritable “army” of international agencies ranging from non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) like Oxfam, Save the Children, Médicin sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch and the International Red Cross, to international institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations itself, including peacekeeping troops.’(Kaldor 1999: 4)


New wars
New wars to capture the continuity of contemporary wars with the genocidal total wars of the twentieth century.

  • Mary Kaldor has suggested that a category of new wars has emerged since the mid-1980s. The driving force behind these new wars is globalization, ‘a contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalization and localization’ (Kaldor 1999: 3). These conflicts are typically based around the disintegration of states and subsequent struggles for control of the state by opposing groups, who are simultaneously attempting to impose their own definition of the national identity of the state and its population. Just as earlier wars were linked to the emergence and creation of states, the new wars are related to the disintegration and collapse of states, and much of the pressure on such states has come from the effects of globalization on the international system. In the past decade, 95 per cent of armed conflicts have taken place within states rather than between them.


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  • The new wars occur in situations where the economy of the state is performing extremely poorly, or even collapsing, so that the tax revenues and power of the state decline dramatically, producing an increase in corruption and criminality. As the state loses control, access to weapons and the ability to resort to violence is increasingly privatized and paramilitary groups proliferate, organized crime grows, and political legitimacy collapses. One of the effects of these developments is that the traditional distinction between the ‘soldier’ and the ‘civilian’ become blurred or disappear altogether


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  • For Kaldor, a significant feature of these conflicts is the combatants’ focus on questions of identity, which she see as being a result of the pressures produced by globalization. In the post-modern world there has been a breakdown of traditional cleavages based on class and ideology, and a greater emphasis on identity and culture. To the extent that war is a continuation of politics, therefore, war has become increasingly driven by questions of culture and identity. A major cause of the wars since 1990 has been the demands of various groups for national selfdetermination.


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  • The relationship between identity and war is also shifting in terms of the gender and age of the combatants. The ‘feminization’ of war has grown as women have come to play increasingly visible and important roles, from auxiliaries in the late modern period, to direct front-line roles in the post-modern period, from uniformed military personnel to female suicide bombers. Children have also become more visible as participants rather than non-combatants in war.


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  • Child soldiers can be found on every continent, but have been particularly prevalent in recent African conflicts. In the civil war in Sierra Leone, nearly 70 per cent of the combatants were under the age of 18. Children fight in around three-quarters of today’s armed conflicts, and may make up 10 per cent of current armed combatants (Brocklehurst 2007: 373). Nearly one third of the militaries that use child soldiers include girls in their ranks.


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  • Mark Duffield argues that the non-state dimension of much contemporary warfare is striking and that describing such conflicts as ‘internal’ or ‘intra-state’ is misleading since the combatants oft en are not attempting to impose a political authority in the traditional sense. The use of statist terminology is therefore too limiting, leading him to propose the alternative terminology of post-modern conflict (Duffi eld 1998: 76), although the use of the term in this way is also rather constraining.


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  • The relationship of terrorism campaigns to war is also important. The war on terror can be seen simply as a metaphor for an intense national commitment against Al Qaeda, but it can also be seen as a recognition that a long duration military–terrorist campaign and the countermeasures taken by the target group are a form of warfare in the sense


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  • These complex interrelationships of non-traditional actors are not limited to insurgents or criminal gangs. Because of the prevalence of humanitarian interventions and the belief that economic development acts as a deterrent to war, aid organizations, UN agencies, armed forces, and private security firms are increasingly networked in areas such as the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East.


Third tier states
‘Third tier’ states are not limited to insurgents or criminal gangs. Because of the prevalence of

  • Steven Metz groups the world’s states into three ‘tiers’ for the purpose of predicting likely future forms of conflict. Those of the first tier are the states which have effective functioning economies and political systems, and exhibit high degrees of internal stability and external law-abiding behaviour. The democracies of the North Atlantic region are typical of this group. Second-tier states exhibit periodic instability, and may have areas within their territory where the government does not exercise internal sovereignty. However, the state is not in danger of collapse. Third-tier states are marked by crisis. There are considerable areas where the central government has lost control and non-governmental armed forces are operating. In such areas, the ‘warlords’ or other groupings neither exercise full control over the areas they dominate, nor contribute to the stability of the country as a whole, which is therefore essentially ungovernable. War in such areas will typically ‘involve substate groups fighting for the personal glory of the leader, or wealth, resources, land, ethnic security or even revenge for real or perceived past injustices’. Such conflicts may involve groups representing different ethnic or communal groupings and ‘the fighting will usually be undertaken with lowtechnology weapons but fought with such intensity that the casualty rates may be higher than in conventional warfare, especially among civilians caught up in the fighting’. (Craig Snyder and J. Johan Malik (1999), ‘Developments in Modern Warfare’, in C. Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Macmillan): 204)


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  • The end of the cold war has not significantly altered the dominant patterns of war that have been in place for the past fi ft y years. The ‘new’ forms of conflict are for the most part not new as such, but have received more Western attention since the end of the cold war. While they are oft en characterized by great brutality, the absence of heavy weaponry and superpower support means that casualty levels are markedly lower than during the cold war. RMA technologies have dramatic potential, but have so far had little impact outside US operations. While war is less common and less deadly than in the 1945–92 period, it remains a brutal and inhumane form of politics.


I ii iii iv
Литература: dominant patterns of war that have been in place for the past fi ft y years. The ‘new’ forms of conflict are for the most part not new as such, but have received more Western attention since the end of the cold war. While they are oft en characterized by great brutality, the absence of heavy weaponry and superpower support means that casualty levels are markedly lower than during the cold war. RMA technologies have dramatic potential, but have so far had little impact outside US operations. While war is less common and less deadly than in the 1945–92 period, it remains a brutal and inhumane form of politics.

  • Андреја Милетић, “Рат”, у: Енциклопедија политичке културе, Савремена администрација, Београд, 1993, стр. 953- 964.

  • Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War-Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000

  • Richard K Betts, Conflict after the Cold War-Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, Longman, New York, 2002, Second Edition,

  • Пол Кенеди, Успон и пад великих сила, Службени лист СРЈ, Београд, ЦИД, Подгорица, 1999

  • Рејмон Арон, Мир и рат међу нацијама, Издавачка књижарница Зорана Стојановића, Сремски Карловци, Нови Сад, 2001

  • Мајкл Хауард, Рат у европској историји, СКЦ, Београд, 1999

  • Алвин и Хајди Тофлер, Рат и антират, Паидеја, Београд, 1998

  • Ерик Хобсбаум, Доба екстрема, Дерета, Београд, 2002

  • Кенет Волц, Човјек, држава и рат, Барбат, Загреб, 1998

  • Phillip Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles, Penguin Books, New York, 2002

  • John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton, New York, 2001

  • Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, (Eds.), International Politics- Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, Addisson Wesley Longman, New York, 2003, Sixth Edition

  • John T. Rourk, International Politics on the World Stage, Dushkin/ McGraw Hill, New York, 1999, Seventh Edition

  • Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, Addisson Wesley Longman, New York, 2003, Fifth Edition,

  • Lawrence Friedman, "War", Foreign Policy, July/ August 2003, pp. 16- 24.

  • John A. Vasquez, Marie T. Henehan, (Eds.), The Scientific Study of Peace and War, Lexington Books, New York, 1992


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