The Special Challenges of Cruise Missile Proliferation

1. The Special Challenges of Cruise Missile Proliferation Dennis M. Gormley Senior Fellow Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies

2. Definition: Cruise Missile • A cruise missile is essentially a small unmanned aircraft designed for offensive missions • Like an airplane it generates lift by airflow over aerodynamic surfaces and is propelled by a small jet engine • The focus of this discussion will be on cruise missiles for land attack and unmanned air vehicles capable of being turned into weapons-carrying cruise missiles • However, many jet-propelled anti-ship cruise missiles have essentially the same design, and while they are optimized for attacking ships at sea, they potentially could be converted to land-attack roles

3. The Context • Obsessive focus on ballistic-missile proliferation as cruise-missile use increases • Cruise missile proliferation seen as “lesser included case” • National Intelligence Estimates emphasize that “other means,” including cruise missiles, are more likely ways of attacking the US homeland • Quantum leap in enabling technologies for land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) • Slow but steady increase in LACM manufacturers • Strategic consequences for viable force projection and possible threats to homeland • Slowly reacting defense preparedness and serious loopholes in non-proliferation policy

4. Key Points • Threat uncertainty has led to either careless exaggeration or—more the case—neglect and an excessively singular focus on the ballistic-missile threat • Multiple paths to cruise-missile acquisition, pace of technological change, and weak export controls, mean that the cruise-missile threat could emerge suddenly—before minimal defense preparedness measures are in place • Unfolding threat demands hedging strategies encompassing both improved non-proliferation policy and investments in technology readiness programs • Technological change challenges governments to keep nonproliferation policy up to date

5. Outline • Technological challenges of acquiring LACMs • Alternative ways to acquire LACMs • Defending against LACMs • Strengthening non-proliferation policy

6. Technological Challenges of Acquiring LACMs • Key enabling technology—from TERCOM and DSMAC to GPS/INS • Small aerospace firms now provide variable autonomy flight management systems • Commercial satellite imagery for fixed targets and GPS-aided mission planning • Advanced propulsion systems for >1000 kilometer ranges still remain tightly held • But propulsion workarounds abound: civil systems, reciprocating engines

7. Knowledge and Skill Requirements • Aeronautical, electrical, computer, mechanical/machining, and testing skills • Systems-integration skills needed for complex weapon-system development • Two primary drivers: scope and sophistication of indigenous skills and level and quality of foreign assistance • True autarky is mythical

8. Alternative Ways to Acquire LACMs • Converting anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) into LACMs • Converting unarmed UAVs into LACMs • Converting very light manned aircraft into armed UAVs (viz., LACMs) • Acquiring LACMs from industrial suppliers

9. Converting ASCMs • From pool of ~75,000 ASCMs, potential conversion candidates are likely to be a small fraction • Modern designs offer little space (physical volume) for longer-range conversions (additional fuel) • Silkworm-class ASCMs offer attractive potential • Developing modern land-attack navigation system is biggest barrier; finding suitable propulsion is next • Several years to achieve full capability to manufacture and effectively deploy converted ASCMs (cut in half with substantial foreign assistance)

10. Notional Extended-Range HY-4 100 to 200 m 0.68 (Mach) Ship, truck/trailer, aircraft Role: Length: Body Diameter: Wingspan: Launch Weight: Range: Warhead: Guidance: Propulsion: Fuel: Land attack 8.48 m 0.76 m 2.41 m 2,221 kg 708 km 500 kg HE GPS-IMU Turbojet 855 kg Cruise Altitude: Maximum Speed: Launchers: Modifications: • Installation of Land-Attack Navigation System • Installation of fuel “plugs” • Fuel system modifications

11. Hypothetical Tularemia Attack on San Diego A land-attack Silkworm variant, moving southward offshore, releases 120 kg of liquid BW agent. The colored bands represent the probability of infection (yellow >90 percent, green >50 percent, pink >10 percent).

12. Converting Unarmed UAVs • Major market growth expected in both military and civilian sectors by 2005 • 40 nations produce UAVs, of which half are not MTCR members • Some already come with GPS/INS systems • Several examples (India, South Africa, Israel, Italy) already demonstrate conversion potential • True range potential of UAVs not apparent—recent study reveals that nearly 80 percent of 600 UAVs examined have ranges >300km

13. >75% of the UAVs Have Range Greater Than 300 km

14. Converting Very Light Aircraft • Appeal represented by low cost, ease of conversion, and challenges posed to advanced air defenses • Many well-tested designs with ranges to 1000km, payloads of 150kg, take-off distances of 100-200m, cruise speeds of 120kts (stall speeds <80kts) • UAV flight control systems—permitting conversion from manned to unmanned flight—make conversion much easier • “Poor man’s” strategic arsenal or terrorist’s weapon of choice?

15. Quest for WMD • Interest in aerial balloon delivery for dispersing biological or chemical agents • Crop duster airplanes investigated by at least two of the September 11 plotters • 43 recorded cases involving 14 terrorist groups in which remote-control delivery systems either threatened, developed, or actually utilized • Aerodynamic delivery (airplanes, UAVs, cruise missiles) most effective method of delivering biological and chemical agents • Suicide appeal is compelling but effectiveness probably drives choice of delivery means

16. Simply Buying LACMs • Expanding number of LACM producers with strong export motivations to reduce unit costs • European manufacturers have leapt to top rung of world producers • Russia and China could choose to exploit MCTR deficiencies regarding cruise missiles

17. Marketing Brochure for Russia’s Kh-65SE

18. Cruise Missile Defense Challenges Detecting another class of air targets featuring • Reduced signatures • Terrain masking • Use of simple endgame countermeasures • 360 degree route of attack • Need for high clutter rejection • Saturation attacks with cheap UAVs • Fratricide or identifying friend from foe (IFF) problems

19. The Limits of Defense Preparedness • Despite huge investments in air defenses, notable shortcomings—some on display during Operation Iraqi Freedom—exist in defending against LACMs • Limited connectivity among services in C3 and combat ID • Each service procures equipment and develops procedures unique to its own vision of LACM defense • Only a handful of manned interceptors supported by limited ground-based radars comprise continental air defenses • Virtually no detection capability below 3000 feet over the US homeland • “Poor man’s” arsenal of low-cost cruise missiles threatens to make both ballistic- and cruise-missile defenses problematical • Yet, however difficult the challenge, there is something to build upon, which is less the case with ballistic missile defense

20. The Effect of RCS Reduction on AWACS Performance(Target Speed: 800 km/hr)

21. Implementing Joint Cruise Missile Defenses • Congressional support began in earnest with “Cruise Missile Defense Initiative” FY96 Defense Authorization Act • Very uneven technology development program thus far—Air Force only service making some progress • Several years of technology development needed to position DOD to implement Defense Planning Guidance on CMD • Homeland defense requires both external and internal focus • Cruise missile defense remains weak sister to BMD programs

22. Four LACM Defense Priorities • Providing a single integrated air picture with greatly improved combat ID • Improving the performance of airborne surveillance radars and missile seekers against low cross-section cruise missiles and linking elevated sensors to ground- and air-based shooters to create a wide-area defense • Lowering the cost of air-defense interceptors to cope with large, low-cost raids of LACMs • Exploiting improvements in theater cruise missile defense to consider homeland defense options

23. Nonproliferation Policy Options • 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime • Seeks member adherence to agreed list of export-policy guidelines controlling transfer of ballistic, cruise, UAVs having range of 300km and payload of 500kg (nuclear) • 1993 modification to include systems capable of delivering chemical/biological payloads • Wide range of dual-use technologies subjected to case-by-case review • Members—now 33—unilaterally implement export controls

24. MTCR Successes: The Glass Half Full • Dismantling of the Condor ballistic missile program • Hundreds of blocked transfers of components, technologies, and production capabilities • Strong consensus on ballistic missile transfers • Need to capitalize on recent MTCR attention to UAVs/cruise missiles

25. Antiterrorism Proposal • MTCR Warsaw Plenary 2002: examine ways of limiting the risk that controlled items and their technologies could fall into the hands of terrorist groups • Terrorist capabilities trail ambitions: therefore make the “long pole in the tent” (flight management) even longer • U.S. “anti-terrorism” proposal to Wassenaar Arrangement reflects concern about kit airplanes as terrorist weapons, but it failed to elicit support because of lack of specificity • Changes to the MTCR technology annex (Item 10) covering flight controls are needed to impose case-by-case reviews of UAV flight management system • Advantage over Wassenaar because of MTCR’s no-undercut provisions

26. Strengthening Non-proliferation Policy: Top Priorities • Creating a uniform set of ground rules for determining LACM/UAV range and payload--Accomplished • Close existing loophole on flight management systems--Attempted in Wassenaar Agreement (needs reformulation and consideration in MTCR, too) • Implementing tighter controls on stealthy cruise missiles--Attempted but stalled by lack of consensus • Implementing tighter controls on countermeasure technologies specially designed for LACM penetration • Broadening current MTCR parameters governing controls on jet engines--Accomplished