Conferece : ‘Getting Europe back to work. Alternatives to Austerity ’ Brussels, 6 November 2013

1. Transnational trade union strategies in European wage policyEmpirical evidences from the metal sector Conferece: ‘Getting Europe back to work. Alternatives to Austerity’ Brussels, 6 November 2013 Vera Glassner University of Linz, Austria

2. Why wage policy coordination? • (Forthcoming) EMU: • Common monetarypolicy in Eurozone • Non-accommodatingmonetaryregimeof ECB: mainaimcontainmentofinflation • ‚Convergencecriteria‘ Stabilityand Growth Pact: balancedpublicbudgetsandcontrolofpublicdebt • Pressure on wagesasparametertoadjusttoimbalancesin international (cost) competitiveness • Pressure on wage settinginstitutions, in particularcentralised MEB.

3. Trade unions as actors in Europeanisation of wage policy • EU ‚enlargements‘: increasingheterogeneityof IR andwelfareregimes • Asymmetryofsocialandeconomicintegrationof EU: capitalmobility vs. nationallyembeddedtradeunions • WithdrawalofEuropean Commissionin European socialpolicyandsocialdialogue • TNCs andemployers‘ associations: Nointerest in European socialdialogueand wage policycoordination (makinguseofregimevariation) •  unilateral initiativestocoordinate wage bargainingacrossbordersby European and national tradeunions : based on transnationalsolidarity(vs. wage competition)!

4. Determinantsof transnational unioncooperation • Transnational trade union action in the context ofgovernancecrisisand wage politicalinterventionism(decentralisationof wage setting, pressure on publicsectorwages & employment, labourmarketderegulationandrestrictingtradeunionandemployees‘ rights)in Europe • Standard assumption: conflicting national interests and differences in the national systems of industrial relations - competition prevail over cooperation • Eastern enlargement has further decreased the likelihood of trade union cooperation • Counter evidences • Example I: Creationofstructuresandinstrumentsfor wage coordination in the European metalsector • Example II: Transnational unionunioncooperationat GM Europe/Opel (beforecrisis)

5. Three arguments: WHY do trade unions cooperate? 1)(Power)positionsof actors shaped by their material interests and availability of (legitimate) resources (structural, associational andinstitutional power). 2) Institutionsat (trans)national/supranational level promote or hinder transnational solidarity between trade unions: Three pillars of institutions (Scott 1995; 2001; 2008):

6. Empirical evidences – the effects of supportive institutions Early cross-border coordination initiatives (1960s, 1970s) Transnational CB networks (since late 1990s) Bargaining Network Nordic Europe SE, FI, DK, NO, IC Nordiska Metall SE, FI, NO, IC Bargaining Network Western Europe BE, NL, DE DACH DE, AT, CH

7. Insitutions hampering transnational cooperation/promoting transnational competition Institutionssupporting transnational cooperation Institutional power resources at national level (metal sector) • Regulative/normative institutions: • AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL: • Highly coordinated and inclusive MEB (sector level), • Practice to extend collective agreements (BE, lesser in DE, NL) • strong role of social partners in public policy making, • Cutural-cognitive institutions: • Welfare state traditions (social democrat, corporatist) • Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived as ‘solidaristic’ • Trade union identities • Regulative/normative institutions: • DE: • decentralisationof CB (openingclauses), • organisational weaknessofunions in (services) sectorresults in wage restraint • BE: • Law on safeguardingof international competitiveness • AT, DE, DK, SE, NO, FI, BE, NL: • Decentralisationof CB andflexibilisationof wage setting • Deregulationoflabourmarkets • Orgnisationalweakeningoftradeunions

8. Insitutions hampering transnational cooperation/promoting transnational competition Institutionssupporting transnational cooperation Institutional power resources at transnational level (metal sector) • Regulative/normative institutions: • 1993:EMF ‘Principlesof CB policycoordination’ • 1997: Transnational bargaining networks • 1998: EMF CB coordination rule • Cutural-cognitive institutions: • Common language (DE, AT, CH) • Cultural closeness and long experience of cross-border exchange and interaction • Common welfare state traditions (social democrat and corporatist) • Productivity-oriented wage policy perceived as ‘solidaristic’ Regulative/normative institutions: Viking and Laval rulings of ECJ General: • Weakening of institutions such as ESD and European labour law • Economic governance: European Semester (‘excessive deficits’, ‘excessive imbalances’)

9. Trade union strategies at the level of TNCs: The Opel case (DE and PL plants) Before the crisis (2000-2008) Europeanisation: transnational cooperation (collective bargaining, mobilisation, industrial action) During and after the crisis (2009-2012) (Re)nationalisation: political lobbying, logic of influence (e.g. car scrapping schemes, extension of short-time work regulation), strengthening influence at company level.

10. Opel plantsDE and PL beforethecrisis: Transnational cooperationofunions

11. Opel plants DE and PL beforethecrisis: Transnational cooperationofunions

12. Opel plants DE and PL duringthecrisis: (Re-)nationalisationand end of transnational cooperation?

13. Opel plants DE and PL duringthecrisis: (Re-)nationalisationand end of transnational cooperation?

14. Conclusions • Explanationof transnational unioncooperationin wage policyneedsto take account ofbothmaterial interests and institutional embeddedness of trade union behaviour • Institutions (rules, norms, culture) may provide supportto transnational trade union action (ormightlimitit) • Structuralandassociationalpower (lowunemployment/scarcenessof high-skilledlabour; uniondensity, unionpresence plant level etc.) • Supportive institutions can be set up by trade unions themselves (bargaining coordinationnetworks, EEF GM Europe) • However, in order tocreatetransnationally supportive institutions of wage bargaining coordination, (European) statesupportis an absoluteprecondition for a solidaristic wage policy that also includes the employers‘ side

15. Thank you for your attention!