Commercial SATCOM Mission Assurance Richard H. Buenneke Senior Policy Analyst The Aerospace Corporation Plans and Progra

1. Commercial SATCOM Mission Assurance Richard H. Buenneke Senior Policy Analyst (The Aerospace Corporation) Plans and Programs Division richard.buenneke.ctr@osd.mil

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3. 3 Commercial hazards and threats

4. 4 SATCOM Mission Assurance “Best Practices” Information sharing and analysis Situational awareness Radio frequency interference incident reporting Orbital position reporting Network disruption reporting Global Network Operations Operations management Cyber/network security Operations security Information assurance Terrestrial physical security Supporting infrastructures Personnel security Source: Buenneke, Abramson, Shearer & McArthur, “Best Practices for Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure,” 24th AIAA International Communications Satellite Systems Conference, AIAA 2006-5386, San Diego, California, June 2006 Source: Buenneke, Abramson, Shearer & McArthur, “Best Practices for Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure,” 24th AIAA International Communications Satellite Systems Conference, AIAA 2006-5386, San Diego, California, June 2006

5. 5 NC FCB Approved Capabilities for COMSATCOM Mission Assurance Protection Floors Operations Security Clearances -- U.S. SECRET (or higher) clearances for staff having access to OPSEC sensitive data Satellite Operations Clearances-- Staff with U.S. or allied SECRET clearances who can effect satellite operations available at all hours Information Assurance -- Command uplink encryption compliant with DoD Directive 8581.1E Electromagnetic Interference/Radio Frequency Interference Geolocation Access to EMI/RFI geolocation capability (organic or contracted service) Best efforts made in response to USSTRATCOM geolocation requests Network Operations Floor Situational Awareness -- Real-time monitoring and fault reporting NetOps Selectable Situational Awareness -- Access to real-time spectrum monitoring data First Validated Set of Warfighter Requirements for Commercial SATCOM Services Sources: NetCentric Functional Capabilities Board, 21 Feb 2006, and DISA PL8221, 30 Mar 2006

6. 6 Commercial SATCOM Mission Assurance Working Group Objective: “To provide an on-going forum for DoD and the commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) industry to discuss potential improvements to policies, programs and processes for enhanced mission assurance of SATCOM services used in support of the Department of Defense and U.S. national security interests” Sustains and enhances government-industry partnership

7. 7 Commercial SATCOM Mission Assurance Working Group: Current Issues Modification of terms in DoD SATCOM service contracts US Strategic Command and NSSO contributing to draft language regarding Protection and NetOps requirements National Security Agency Information Assurance Division contributing to draft language on space information assurance (per DoD Directive 8581.1E) EMI/RFI incident response preparedness Cooperation on close approach/conjunction events Other activities “Neighborhood watch” threat updates Analysis of commercial elements of Transformation Communications Architecture v3.0 Commercial operator participation in Schriever IV game

8. 8 Back-Ups

9. 9 Mission Assurance Performance Levels

10. 10 Information Sharing and Analysis

11. 11 Global SATCOM Operators

12. 12 SATCOM Mission Assurance Context The DoD Commercial SATCOM Study is the result of a combination of several chains of events, which are depicted on this chart. The most significant chain of events were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resulting Global War on Terrorism. As a result of 9/11, policy makers paid increased attention to the need to protect critical national infrastructures. The military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq also highlighted the importance of commercial SATCOM for U.S. and coalition warfighting. Although 9/11 was the signal event, it’s worth noting that the issue of commercial satellite protection had already been highlighted by the Space Commission that Mr. Rumsfeld just prior to his nomination of Secretary of Defense. In calling for a reorganization of National Security Space organization, the Space Commission noted the growing interdependency between the defense and commercial sectors as well as increasing threats to U.S. and allied space systems. These concerms led to a classified study by the NSSO of national security space vulnerabilities and protection efforts. The importance of treating commercial satellites as critical infrastructure was also noted by the Congress’ Government Accountability Office. As a result of a 2002 report by GAO, Congress specifically tasked the Department of Homeland Security to assume responsibility for satellite critical infrastructure protection. As both DoD and DHS paid increasing attention to satellite protection issues, they benefited from the findings and recommendations of a Satellite Task Force of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). The NSTAC report, which went to the President last April, called for a more coordinated approach to planning for the use of SATCOM in support of national security and emergency preparedness communications. As the NSTAC task force was starting up in mid-2003, both government and industry received a dramatic reminder about the growing threat when a U.S. satellite carrying commercial traffic was deliberately jammed by an offshore source. This incident highlighted the importance of improved information flows and coordinated response. The huge increase in DoD’s demand for SATCOM bandwidth also prompted a reexamination of the department’s acquisition strategy. By late 2003, both GAO and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had concluded that DoD needed to consider a more strategic approach to SATCOM. So the confluence of these events – increase attention to protection, the emergence of a hostile jamming threats, and the need to reconsider acquisition strategies – prompted DoD to kick off a comprehensive study of Commercial SATCOM Issues last year. The kick-off for this study occurred on 4 March 2004, when a number of satellite industry CEOs met with Mr. Teets, Admiral Ellis and Dr. Wells. As a result of this meeting, the Protection Working Group that NSSO was able to conduct a comprehensive survey of the satellite industry’s “best practices” for protection. The results of this survey will feed directly into a series of follow-up actions that we’ll now discuss. The DoD Commercial SATCOM Study is the result of a combination of several chains of events, which are depicted on this chart. The most significant chain of events were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resulting Global War on Terrorism. As a result of 9/11, policy makers paid increased attention to the need to protect critical national infrastructures. The military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq also highlighted the importance of commercial SATCOM for U.S. and coalition warfighting. Although 9/11 was the signal event, it’s worth noting that the issue of commercial satellite protection had already been highlighted by the Space Commission that Mr. Rumsfeld just prior to his nomination of Secretary of Defense. In calling for a reorganization of National Security Space organization, the Space Commission noted the growing interdependency between the defense and commercial sectors as well as increasing threats to U.S. and allied space systems. These concerms led to a classified study by the NSSO of national security space vulnerabilities and protection efforts. The importance of treating commercial satellites as critical infrastructure was also noted by the Congress’ Government Accountability Office. As a result of a 2002 report by GAO, Congress specifically tasked the Department of Homeland Security to assume responsibility for satellite critical infrastructure protection. As both DoD and DHS paid increasing attention to satellite protection issues, they benefited from the findings and recommendations of a Satellite Task Force of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). The NSTAC report, which went to the President last April, called for a more coordinated approach to planning for the use of SATCOM in support of national security and emergency preparedness communications. As the NSTAC task force was starting up in mid-2003, both government and industry received a dramatic reminder about the growing threat when a U.S. satellite carrying commercial traffic was deliberately jammed by an offshore source. This incident highlighted the importance of improved information flows and coordinated response. The huge increase in DoD’s demand for SATCOM bandwidth also prompted a reexamination of the department’s acquisition strategy. By late 2003, both GAO and the Office of the Secretary of Defense had concluded that DoD needed to consider a more strategic approach to SATCOM. So the confluence of these events – increase attention to protection, the emergence of a hostile jamming threats, and the need to reconsider acquisition strategies – prompted DoD to kick off a comprehensive study of Commercial SATCOM Issues last year. The kick-off for this study occurred on 4 March 2004, when a number of satellite industry CEOs met with Mr. Teets, Admiral Ellis and Dr. Wells. As a result of this meeting, the Protection Working Group that NSSO was able to conduct a comprehensive survey of the satellite industry’s “best practices” for protection. The results of this survey will feed directly into a series of follow-up actions that we’ll now discuss.

13. 13 A range of informal and formal responses are possible in responses to RFI incidents Private sector Checks with ground station operators Collaboration with other satellite operators (e.g., Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group) Commercial geolocation capabilities Law enforcement Domestic actions International cooperation Diplomatic measures Military support Surveillance and reconnaissance Active responses